B 

53 


C&     riJE  UNIVERSITY  OP  CHICAGO 


UC-NRLF 


mKM.    ,yi<  LOGICAL 

HEORY 


x-ate  Edition,  Distributed  by 

SITY  OF  CHICAGO  LIBRARIES 


K1 


Chicago,  Illinois 
1918. 


EXCHANGE 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO 


THREE  TYPES  OF  LOGICAL 
THEORY 


A  DISSERTATE  >\ 
MITTED  TO  I  UK  FACULTY 

oi-  Till-:  QRADUATE  SCH<  ><  >i.  OF 

ARTS   AND    1.1  PERATURE 
\\i)ii).\i  v  FOR  THE  I>K<;KKE  OF 

DOCTOR  OF  I'Hll.osoi'HY 
DEPARTMENT  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

i;v 
IK  >LLY  ESTIL  Cl'XXIXUIAM 


Private    Kditinn.    Distributed  by 
THK  U.NIVERSITY  or  CHICAGO  LIURAKIK: 

Chicago.  Illinoi- 
1918. 


".   •    . 


INTRODUCTION 

Tin-  appeal  to  time  <>r  m  the  verdict  of  history  is  legitimate 
in  cases  of  political,  economic,  scientitic.  an<l  even  of  mathemat- 
ical theorus.  f«.r  it  is  reco^ni/ed  that  these  are  cases  in  which 
the  temporal  element  enters  that  their  Successes  and  failures 
will  come  out  in  the  ijive  and  take  of  experience.  The  contract 
theory  of  the  state,  the  Malthusian  principle,  the  IVlema •. 
in-Homy,  the  Kuclidian  geometry,  Aristotelian  L.-ic  all  these  and 
man\  other  "truths"  have  been  toted  in  the  laboratory  of  time. 
Ilistoiy  M-i-nis  Mrewn  with  the  wreck-  -i'  "  Prole-omenas  in  any 
future  Metaphvsic".  with  I'nknowahlcs,  with  Ahsolutes, 
Limit-,  \\itli  Force  and  Matter,  with  Souls  all  t1  niyin; 

in   their  day   the   efforts   of    nun   to   interpret    the   data   of   experi 
l>hilos,,phical  tOO,     yield     to     the     hum.;     of     tin: 

Si»iic    do    for    th-»e    that    are    tinicL \v.v      can      n..t      appeal      to      time 
cither     for       \erification       or       rejection.      Such       systems.       in 
would   find   it    impro|)er   to   treat    historically    the   social   and    p"' 
conditions    out    of    which    ami    from    which    the    system    in    qu 
originated,    for    Midi    pi  rt    in      n«  •  <  rmane      to      a 

tinu-l<  VCr,   he   profitable    from   the    stand- 

pnint    of    the    history    ..f    the    kno\\  ;.art      of      his      personal 

aphy,  to  have  in  mind  for  >oeial  occasions,  the  historical 
si-ttin-  -f  his  >\>t(.-m. 

Flic  tact  that  questions  i  >uee  ci  iHsidercd  ot  vital  si^niticance 
have  not  heen  solved  hut  shuiiicd,  lived  over,  lias  value  to  him 
whose  interests  lead  to  an  historical  consideration  of  problems. 
It  has  simiitieance  :t  is  evidence  of  the  constant  shift- 

ing of  problems  due  to  conditions  which  the  older  students  of 
the  problem  did  not  have  to  face.  For  a  thousand  years  the 
best  intellects  of  the  world  were  cnnayed  on  the  "other  world" 
problem,  with  the  result  that  little  was  accomplished  for  there 
were  few  means,  save  by  dialectics,  for  accomplishing  anything. 
A  shift  in  the  problems  which  confront  a  people  carries  with 

shift  from  older  theories  to  ones  which  attempt  to  meet  the 
situation  at  the  present  time.  N'ot  that  the  old  is  wholly  aban- 
doned, but  it  is  modified  in  the  presence  of  newer  data,  so  that  a 
more  agreeahle  and  satisfactory  method  of  behavior  is  establish- 
ed. When  an  attempt  is  made  to  select  a  certain  type  of  suc- 

•1    behavior,   analyze    it.   and    thereupon    set      it      aside     as      a 


C 


4G1766 


mode]    for   all    future   generations,    we    have     that      type   of    philo- 
sophical   system     which    cannot    appeal    to    time    because      of      the 
nature   of    Us   assumptions,      \\1ieu    that    attempt    is    made     the 
issumption  always  present,  th,,  not   necessarily     made     explicit   is 
that   at   that   moment   all   history,   all   progress;   all   achievement     is 
orever    ended.     The    influence    of    metaphysical    concepts     on    the 
I'lace,    nature',    and    function    of    science    indicates    well    tlu-    temporal 
nature   oi    systems.     Both    change    with    the   coming   of    contradic- 
lons,   l.ut   the  type  of   metaphysical   doctrine   in   which   the  age   is 
planted    determines    the    sphere    in    which    science    is    ahle    to    move 
Admitting  that   progress   has   been   made   in   the   world   of   science 
t    can    he    shown    that    this    progress    is    possible    only    in    terms    of 
Changed    metaphysical    conceptions;    or.    on    the      other      hand     if    a 
correct'   doctrine     of     a      metaphysical      nature     had    been    launch- 
ed  in  the  beginning,  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  scientific  pro- 
gress   would    not    have   occurred,    for     the     facts     of      experience 
would.   ,n   the   first   instance,   have   been    interpreted    in   terms   of   the 
correct    metaphysical    theory. 

For    the    Greek    scientist    the    purpose    was     to      discover      the 

essence    of    the    object— the    object    being    outside    of      the      experi- 
ence   ot    the    individual.     The    essence    of    the    object    could    be    dis- 
covered    by    careful    and     numerous    perceptual     observations,    and 
when    this    was    discovered   a   judgment   consisted    in    predication    of 
an    attribute   to   the    thing.     But    essential    to     the     observation      of 
phenomena    was    the    fact    that    the    observer    had    the    idea    or    the 
form.     He    could    not,    that    is,    observe    facts    as    they    were    them- 
selves,   but   he   could   observe   them    only    in    and      thru      the      form 
which    was   already   known.     "He   tests   his   theory   by   the   observed 
individual    which    is    already    an    embodied    theory,    rather    than    by 
what    we    are    wont    to    call    the    facts."*     As    logic    was    subsump- 
tive.    so    was    science    a    matter   of    Classification.     The      space      oi 
the    Euclidian    Geometry    determined    the    advance    that    was    po'ssi- 
hle  in   mathematics.     The  axioms  of   mathematics   were   interpret ed 
in  terms  of  content;   that   is,  the  axioms  are     statements     of     the 
essence    of    the    objects    to    which    they    refer    or    include— a    state- 
ment   of    the    law    of    the    object.     It    thus    came    about    that    it    was 
impossible    for    the    Greek    mind    to    treat      mathematics      "sui 
tntially"    rather    than    "existentially."     The      conception      o:      finite 
space    and    of    the    earth    as    the   center   of      the     planetary      system 
rendered    it    impossible   to   employ  the   heliocentric   hypothesis   sug- 
gested   by    Aristarchus    and    others.     During    the    middle    ages    the 

'Creative    Intelligence,    Professor    Mead's    paper,      p.    177. 

4 


dogma    of    tin-    church    marked    the    limits    within    which    sciei 
procedure   could    take   place.     The    Aristotelian    ct inception    of    finite 
space    which    was    taken    over    hy    the    church,    the    view      that      the 
earth     was    tin-    center    of     the       system,       rendered       astronomical 
theories    half    scientific    and    half    mythological. 

The    notion    ol  nee      has      had       various      melaplu  -ic.d 

statements  each  of  which  has  had  its  influence  on  science.  It  is 
true  that  when  the  substance  doctrines  were  most  strenuously  ad- 
vanced, physics  reacted  against  this  notion  and  sought  to 
interpret  is  data,  not  in  terms  ..f  forms.  attributes, 

hut  in  terms  of  the  relation  between  things.  I'.ut  what  is  true 
of  physics  is  not  true  of  all  When  the  s-.ul  i>  define. 1 

as    "thinking    suli stance"  miturc      thinks.      Mich      a 

ment    closes   the   do.,r   .  .n   any    scientific    statement    as    to   ..rigin.   his- 
tor\.    or      -fo\\th.      It    is      already      defined,      nothing      m 
he    attempted.      Variations    ..n    the    Mil'stance    theme    occur.    >ueh    as 
determining   the    faculties   of   the   s,  .ul.   hut    this   process   ,,f    apparent 
analysis   is   nothing   more  than   an  anah  md   there- 

upon   attributing    to    the    soul  tacts      which 

perience     revealed. 

In    fact    the    substance    doctrine    -  :    origin    m    a 

life   in    which      everything      must      hcl>>n,t      to      something.      A    slave 
hcloii-s    to    the    master,    the    master    in    turn    to    a      higher      in 
until     the     whole     s-.cial     group     becomes     "possessed"     b\      some     oile 
else.     So     it     was     with     attriliutes  r     matter,     \\hich     func- 

tion, d  in  physical  theories  until  recent  da\s.  and  of  mind  which 
to  this  da\  tind  <•  in  certain  type-;  of  psychology.  The 

mind    or    O'n>ci«'U>nesN    has  nages.      \\'hen      tin- 

notion  of  sUl»tance  is  dri\en  from  psycho], ,-\  liecaiise  of  its 
failure  to  take  into  itself  the  peculiar  case,  then  will  the  way  he 
clear  for  a  scientific  p^ 

This  apparent  diyn ->si.  .n  has  as  its  ohject  to  make  clear  the- 
relation  between  certain  elements  of  progress.  If  we  -rant  that 
such  has  heen  made,  it  is  evident  that  it  i>  made  only  on  the 
breakdown  of  older  systems,  for.  as  has  been  pointed  out,  if  a 
fact  is  to  be  explained  it  mu>t  be  explained  in  terms  of  tin- 
theory  then  in  vo^ue.  The  astronomer  who  notices  for  the  first 
time  a  small  >peck  on  the  photographic  plate,  who  notices  it  on 
successive  nights  at  different  places,  can  calculate  its  orbit,  can 
interpret  it  in  terms  of  the  system  of  which  it  is  a  part,  where- 
upon it  becomes  an  embodied  theory,  possessing  all  the  richness 
the  system  itself  posseses ;  and  is  no  longer  a  bare  fact.  In  such 
a  case  as  this  example  three  possible  results  may  happen: 


nt    in    the 

tin-    individu.  nit    mix-lit    IK-    a-    in    the 

in    terms    of    tin-   theory;    third, 

hirh    in    a    lonu    time    will    lead    to    a    rcinterpretatioii    «>f 
the     whole     sy>tcm     in    term-    ..|"     n-'wer    hypotheses      It     is     in     this 

i<  ntitie    pr<  >^re-x    ta'  and    not 

Of    indi\iduals    wliich    are    already    an    embodied 

theory.    '«r    1>\  a    predicate    to    a    substance    which    pred- 

':ias    been   derived    fr..ni   an    analysis   of    thr   concrete    situation- 
ill    which    the    s,  .-called    substance    functioned. 

That     the     practical     precedes     the     theoretical     will     lie     granted 
by    all       The    demands    of    the    en\  irotiment    led    to    counting    a: 
surveying,  at    first    very   crudely   attempted,   hut    later   developed   into 
our    arithmetical     and     ueonutrical     systems.      The     early       attempt- 
at    curing  by    ma-ic    and    witchcraft    led    to    the    theory    of 

the    four    humor-.     The    trial    an*1    error    methods    in    weapons    led 
to    the    >tudy   of   projectiles.     So   it   is   with   all   the     lines     of    in- 
_:innin-    a-    a    need    and    with    a    trial    and    error    method, 
the    methods    ha\e    been     refined,    theories    have    heen      projected. 
hypothcsi-     adxanccd,    the     hetter    to    act     in     the    premises.      It     i- 
•ally    admitted    that    in    so    far    a-    the    theory    fulfills    the 
function    for    which    it    was    projected,    it    is    true.     When.    ho\\  • 
a    new    condition    arises,    at    first    in    the    experience    of    an    individ- 
ual,   which    is    not    explicable    on    the    prevailing    theory,    either    the 
theory    is   modified   or  the   experience   of    the   individual    is   regarded 
"psychological".     It    is    peculiar    that    what    is    applicable 
ace   is    not    c-msideml    applicable    in    the   systems 

of     pliilox.pln .     This     is    probably    accounted     for     from    the     fact 

that    there    is    rarely    if    ever    an    experience,    either      individual      or 

'.    that    will    .v-ive    a    philosophical    theory      an      experimentum 

crucis.    such    as    was    possible,     for    example,    in      the      two       rival 

theories    of    liv;ht.     The    «-nly    experiment     applicable       to      such    a 

theory   is  that    which   nature   performs   in   her   on-ijoinjjs   and   multi- 

tudiii"ii-    changes.      She    shows    by    the    shift    of    interest    that    what 

a    problem    is    no    longer    one.    tho    not    showing    thereby 

that   what    wa-  once  a  problem   was   not   one  at   the  time,   but   show- 

the   while  that    s\-tems   are   in   time,   that   they   serve   their   need, 

and  matter   of    history.      Problems    in    this    Held    are   not 

1    but    lived    over,    forgotten    in    the    oil-rush    of    eve, Us    which 

1     adjustment. 

It    is    but    natural    to    expect    that     these     sober      theories      of 
tiling-    w-'iild    be    the    lea-t    readily    changed.     We    naturally    expect 


to  find  more  conservatism  in  religion  than  in  science1,  for  once 
postulating  infallibility,  it  is  with  great  difficulty  that  religion 
can  modify  itself  in  any  respect  to  account  for  matters  not  orig- 
inally contemplated  in  the  premises.  But  the  fact  remains  that 
both  philosophical  and  religions  -.y stems  undergo  drastic  modifi- 
cations from  time  to  time.  An  idealism  that  grew  up 
pre-e\olutionary  basis  must  necessarily  undergo  radical  revision 
or  drive  from  itself  the  respect  of  men  of  science. 

A  reli.uious  system  founded  «.n  an  Aristotelian  space  and  a 
I'tokmaic  astronomy  must  undergo  modification  in  the  light  of  a 
different  conception  of  space  or  face  the  possibilities  of  finding 
itself  without  believers.  Hut  tin  jious  and 

philosophical  systems  come  about  with  greatest  difficulty.  I. on- 
after  the  ..ccasi«>n  which  -i 

.    are    the    traces    of    it    found      in      later      thought.     The 
dualism    shov  ncction    with    the    dualism   of    th; 

the  other  world  of  medieval  thought;  the  dualism  of  Locke  and 
the  English  empiricists  >ho\\ -,  the  tcnacit\  of  the  :•  nhor- 

ity  :  the  Kantian  Thing-in-itself  and  the  phenomenon  i>  evidence 
of  ti  of  incoinplct  lack  of  control.  of  in- 

feriority  a  heritage  not  only  from  the  church  but  from  tin 
torn  of  primitive  tribes.  It  is  to  be  cmpliasi/ed  that  such 
terns  :  mancnt  \alue,  but  it  i>  further 

urged   that   the   type  of   pp.bl-  >\    which   a   theory 

the    condr  I  •    that     problem    oi  problems, 

ought  to  be  Considered  in  forming  an  estimate  of  the  place  and 
value  of  the  sy>tem  in  question.  It  i>  urged  that  >uch  a  study- 
will  render  evident  the  temporal  natr.  -lenis,  with  the  re- 
sult that  Absolute  .f  whatever  type-  -whether  of  Un- 
realistic with  the  empli.L  he  priority  of  logical  and  mathe- 
matical entities  .«r  of  space;  or  the  idealistic,  emphasizing  the 
priority  of  consciousness,  individual  or  super-individual,  will  take 
their  places  along  with  the  others  ..f  the  p  'tempts  to  meet 
certain  critical  and  vital  issues  which  arose  from  the  on-gi.ings 
Of  1 

In  the  two  great  periods  of  origin  from  the  standpoint  of 
science  and  philosophy,  namely,  the  Greek  extending  approxi- 
mately from  (-,00  to  300  B.  C.,  and  the  period  of  discovery  in  the 
renaissance,  we  find  many  suggestions  of  kinship  between  the 
various  problems  .  .f  interest.  The  Greek  sought  to  unify  the 
manifold  of  life  and  experience  about  certain  common  principles 
such  as  air.  fire,  earth,  and  water.  Most  generally  the  histor- 
ian of  philosophy  tells  us  that  the  Greek  mind  possessed  a  pecul- 

7 


•ml     temporal     •  nd     because     IK 

this  instinct   «T  bias   for   unil\    and   harmony   IK-   is   rightly 
!    the    founder   of    tin-   philosophic   attitude.      I'ut    it    is    int< 

te   that    this    attitude    is    forced    .  >n    him    liy      the      peculiar 

he    hail    t.i    meet,      h"    it    were    mcrcK    the-    Mas    for    unity 

.in    instinct    that    craved   satisfaction,    it    i>    difficult    t<> 

rein     this    instinct     was     not     satisfied      win     »m-    principle 

:ulv    migi  •  well    In-    employed    a>    aiiotlier.     One    must 

•;oii   this   original    bias.   ho\\c\er.   and    state   that    their   explana- 

wn    at    the   point    of    novel    experiences    which    conlr 

vomited    for   on  ^thc    pa-vailing    principles    ,,f    explanation. 

When    such    problems    as    choice,    purpose,    desire,    need,    et    cetera. 

.    that    is    t"    sa\ .    the    prohlems    sometimes    designated    a> 

the    principles    used    in    the    world    of    physical    nature    ap- 
d    inade(|uate    to    the    needs      of    the      situation.      When, 
science    had    taught    the    harmony   and    rhythm    of    the    spheres    and 
since    harmony    is    an    indication    ,,f    intelligence,    it    was    discovered 
that    the    principles    of    Kmpedocles    failed      to      account      for      the 
phenomenon,    intelligence.     The    fact    that      it      was      thought      that 
change    involved    change    in    quality    as    well    a>      of    quantity,      told 
t    the    Kmpcdoclean    elements,    with      the    result      that      an    in- 
definite   numher   of    elements    was    postulated,    together    with    an    in- 
telligence   t"    get    things    started. 

It    is   a   commonplace   that   the   (ireek   had   no   method   by    which 
••dilations,    his    hypotheses.      The    atomism    of     Demo- 
critus   and    Leucippu-.    suggesting    as    it    does,    the   attitude    of    mod- 
ern   chemi.str\.    was    unfruitful      for      two      thousand      years.     The 
crilan    theory    of    perception    held    until    the      time      of      Locke 
and    Berkeley    -the    theory    of    effluxes    which    accounted      for      the 
difference    between    sensation    and    thought    on      the      basis      of    the 

-  in   the   case   of   the    former,     causing     a      confusion 
on    the   part    of    the    subject,    while    in    the   case    of    the      latter,      the 
finer                      ive    rise  to  a   gentle   movement   of   the   soul.     To   one 

•  is    in    the    temporal    nature    of     systems,    however, 
Jf'/iv    test    the      hypoti  vital.     From      the 

dpoint    of    harmony    and    beauty    and    completeness,    why 

•  t      the     theory     of   efflr  good      as     any     other?      ll'hy 

•lie    atomic    hypothesis:1      Why    is    a    technique    necessary     for 

of    a    purely      intellectual      ink  rot      or      instinct? 

Thesi-   qii'  is,   are   vital    for   they   indicate   the   practical 

nature    of    theory;    they    indicate    the    road    that    thought    has    al- 

when    thought    is    genuinely    itself. 


The    .yiowinii    individual^  in    part    I 

al    conditions     tin-    sturdy    and    active    tyrant    who    made    his 
will    the   law    of    the   land    with    the    result    that    little    concern    fmm 
::tndl>nint   <>f    revennce.   could   he   had    f»r   law  --led   to   a   criti- 
first,    of    the    foundations    of    le-al    authority   and.    second,    of 
the     foundations    of     religion     and     morality.      The     i;  rowing     demo- 
cracy,   the    hreakdown    of    trihal    conceptions    of    -nilt    and    retribu- 
tion,  the   attitude   of    the   popular   assembly    in    constant    i 

and  various  ..ther  movements  itnphasi/in-  tile  individual. 
has  e\pre*.>i..n  on  the  philosophical  side  in  the  work  of  the 
Sophists.  Tin-  time  called  for  the  man  who  cared  for  \ictoi  \ 

than    the    means    by    which    it    \\;; 

the   dcmar  n    which    earlu  r 

of    a    moral    natui  it       moraht)       should    be 

.1   matter  of   prudence.      It    \\a«.   e\  ident    that    the   principle 

nol    a    working    ,  in-,    for    the    unjust    apparently    met    with    the 

•han    the      man      of 

i  inclinations.  Tin-  result  is  a  i>rinciple  of  morality  which 
emphasixis  tin  of  the  natural  inclinations  of  u 

Jit. 

not    insignificant    that    the      movement  with 

chiefly    ethical.      Had    the    mo\eim.nt    been    primarily 

1.    it    would    until    within    recent      years      ha\e      heen      rather 

difficult    to    render    evident    the    practical    nature    of    (,reck    think- 

inu.      It    has.    in    fact,    taken    the    world    twenty    five    hundred    year- 

to    reco^ni/e    this    fact      the    fact    of    the    practical    nature    of    lo-ie 

hut    since    the    prime    interest    lay    then    in    a      type      of    hel: 
which     would    make     for    stahility    in    the    rapidly    d  (  .reck 

\.  the  pniliK-ms  of  t-thics  would  first  he  attacke*!.  Indeed 
in  Socrates  ;tnd  especially  in  his  successor,  ethics  is  a  propae- 
diutic  to  nutaph\sics.  Kr.owlci'.  i-  action.  "X'irtue  is 

'r.nowhd.-e."  Th.e  "virtue"  of  the  shoemakt  r  is  that  he  makes 
o>,  ,d  <hoes.  of  the  soldier  that  he  meets  the  enemy  as  a  (ireek 
should,  of  the  physician  that  he  -ives  rules  for  health  and  that 
he  cures  di>ea>is.  "Virtue",  in  other  words,  consists  in  doiiiii 
that  for  which  the  person  or  thin-  is  intended,  and  knowled-e 
is  the  discovery  of  the  "form"  of  the  object,  the  better  to  under- 
stand its  "virtue"  what  is  expected  of  it  in  the  way  of  actual 
practice. 

Had  Plato  belon-ed  to  a  different  class  of  society,  his  ans- 
wer to  the  Heracleitean  tendencies  in  the  Sophist  mi.uht  have 
taken  a  different  turn.  Had  (ircck  society  heen  founded  on  an- 
other basis  than  slavery  we  should  have  expected  in  turn  a  dif- 


find    that    the 

differ  ami     "opinion".       the       difference 

Let  ween    the    t!  t"    the    ma^es      and      the      reality 

whieh     i>    abiding    and    uneh.r  difference    of     insight     <  »n 

tlu-    ;  he    man    in    \\  I  .1    condition     Plato    was.     The 

i     his    li\clihood    occupied    from    the    psych 

humhle    position    (,f    tin-    Laser    feelings    below 

the    midriff:    the    .soldier    who    fought     for    the      advantage      of    the 
ruler,   occupied    a    higher   position    in    the    "spirited"    portion,    or   the 
:    the   ruler,   however,    in    whose   cla-s    was    I'lato,   occupied    the 
the   head,    to    whose    keeping    was    intrusted    the    peculiar 
t     into    the    fixity    and    permanency    of      the      supersensuous 
realm,    th<  knowledge    of    which    created    tlie    prohlems    of 

i«n   the   part    of   the   Sophists.      It    is   in    keeping   with    the 
•al   spirit   of  the  age  that    Plato  should   find  the  essence  of  jus- 
rfi  r     that    is.    the    spirit    of    the    age    as      represented      by 
the    .social    class    of    Plato.     \\'liat    was    essential    for    the    wellheing 
of   the   ruling  and   ari.stocratic   classes   was  that  those   in   the   lower 
strata   of   society   should   stay  tenaciously  hy  their  places  and  leave 
to   tho>e   aLove    them    to   do   the   thinking    for   the    nation.     One    of 
the    win-' d   horse's   .,f    the   charioteer   is   of   nohle   origin,    the   other 
nohle.     The    former   is    ever   striving   to  mount   to   the   eternal 
where    it    may    Lehold   the    Idea   in   its     purity,     while     the     other 
strives   as   diligently   to   keep   a   footing   on      the      earth      amid      the 
pleasure    of    tlv    st  nsual.     Just    so    it    is    with    the   philosopher-aris- 
tocrat   and    with    those    who    work    with    their      hands.      It      seems 
clear    that    Plato    lias    answered    the   questions    ()f    the    Sophists,    the 
questions,    first,    uf    individualism,    and    second,    the    skeptical    atti- 
tude   towards    morality.     The    individual    exists    only    in    and     for 
State;    there    is   a   permanent    element    in      morality     which      the 

pher    can     discern. 

With    the    decadence    of    (ireek    life,    philosophy    hecomes    more 

and    more   a    way   of    living.     Men    turn    from   the   investigations   of 

nature    for   the   purpose    of   control    to    the    more   primitive    method 

of    magic    and    witchcraft.     The    philosopher    is    more    and    more    a 

:ier   whose   Lusine.ss   it    is   not    to   inquire   Lut   to  convince,   and 

•h    th,e    I.,  ,rd"    is    the    authority    for    their    mess 

The    sehools    which    flourished    during    the    medieval    period      were 
founded    to   meet   a   moral    and    religious    need:    the      Epicurean      to 
men  how  to  live  in  a   world   in   which  he  has  nothing  to  fear 
either   bei  death:   the   Stoic,   to   believe   in   God   and   to 

foll..w    his    Jaws,    the    former    -oiim    to    Democritus    for   his    reality, 
the    latter    I  -itiiv 

10 


Christian  philosophy,  which  came  to  the  front  in  the  latter 
part  of  the  period,  was  preeminently  a  philosophy  of  life,  and 
the  concepts  underlying  it  gave  the  limits  to  further  progn 
the  realms  of  science.  Whatever  of  speculation  was  present  in 
any  of  the  systems  of  thought  during  the  middle  ages,  was  there 
for  the  fuller  life.  Tin  Mole  life  according  to  nature  carried 
with  it  an  explanation  of  nature;  the  Hpicurcan  life  of  plea- 
sure, an  account  of  pleasure;  the  Christian  and  Xeo  Platonic 
philosophy,  technical  as  they  may  he.  wrre  after  all.  hut  an  ac- 
the  wax  that  man  must  travel  to  reach  the  abode  in 
the  world  heyond.  Metaphxsics  lure,  as  with  Plato,  depends 
upon  ethics  and  religion. 

Ivnou-h    has    been    said    to    indicate    in    part    the    method    to    lie 
pursued    in   the   treatment    of   the    -  H    examination. 

They    will    he    treated    a-    parts    of    a    1.  al    movement 

which  the\  are  dt  rived,  being  as  llu  \  an-,  the  reflective  aspi-ct 
of  what  i>  an  attitude  of  s,,eiet\.  \\'ith  the  nvn-  recent  s\  stems, 
this  will  h^  difficult  to  acO'tupl:  .dl\  tlu-  portion  of  the 

work    which    attempts    to    show    that    the    >\  >u-m    in    <|uestion    breaks 
(:own    at    the    point    of    >odal    ad\ance.      It    has    lu-i-n    hriefly    indi- 
cated  that   philosophy   has   be-en   and   must   lie   if   true  to  her   m 
a  method  of  creation   of   \alurs,  a  method  of   control   of   that    which 
thwarts    tin-    growing    purp. ->cx    ,,f    the    individual    or    group. 

There'    are   certain    assumptions,    hypot!  ndpoints,    which 

serve    as   a    work-in-    ha--  OL      Tlu-se      assumptions 

might  he  called  the  postulati>  of  the  s\stem.  The\  are  not  ar- 
bitrarily chosen  hut  ar<_-  selected  after  a  survey  of  tlu-  field,  as 
the  best  nuthod  ,  .f  interpretation  of  the  data  at  hand.  They 
are  meanin.-s.  ideas.  sUu-isted  b\  things,  and  when  verified,  they 

me  the  facts  .  r  rather  the  facts  become  them  they  are  the 
facts.  Thes.  -tandpoints  or  as-umptions  have  a  history  in  the 
{TobKirs  of  t!:e  aix.  and  are  temporal  in  their  nature.  The  as- 
sumption- more  gnu-ral  as  the  problems  of  life  gr«i\v  in 
complexity.  The  early  ( ireek  thinker  did  not  find  it  essential  to 
effect  a  working  relation  between  mind  and  things  not  mind, 
l.ut  with  the  i.rowth  of  problems,  (.specially  wlun  the  problem  of 
'fion  and  its  error  a  more  general  assumption  which 
took  account  of  the  newer  data,  became  necessary.  At  length,  the 
r.i  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  matter  became  acute  in  the 
time  of  IX^carUs.  and  the  same  has  been  a  leading  problem  of 
philosophy  from  his  time  to  our  own.  Just  what  meanings  a 
sit  of  data  will  suggest,  it  is  impossible  to  say.  but  one  thing  is 
sure,  the  meanings  or  viewpoints  will  always  be  such  as  fall 

11 


ire     pi'"j< 

•nincd    by   tin-   individual    bia> 
:u.    in    tli«  nd      pc,.p! 

personal, 

.f   this  paper,  tlu-  principle  «'t    classification 

tin-    relation.  d    l>\     llu- 

and    its    object.      *  >\     UK 
and    object,,  there      an-    cer- 

;      may    obtain,    which    make    the    chief    assump- 
5tem.      <  )n<-  of  these  possibilities  is  that 

•drpimUr.-  a*    |)ri"rity    is    concerned     (temporally) 

li    as    obtains    in    parallel    lino    is    present  : 

dualism,    mind    and    matter.     This    is    the    char- 

••iption    ..r    postulate    ot"    i  mpiricism.      Another      po>- 

•he   two   entities    is      that      o>nsciuusi!< 

.    that    "things"    are    merely    om.M'i«  .usnes.s.     This      is      the 
lie    \arious    forms   of    idealism   and   constitutes    their    most 

mption.     Another    i>    the      prioritx 

-    the    leading    postulate   of    reali>m    of    tin-    mod- 

.       Tl;e    laM    of    the   possibilities    for   ,,ur   puropse    is    that 

and    things    arc    functions    in    a    larger    experi- 

tuation    which    has    reached    the   point    of    reflection.     The 

:niption    of    this    last    type   of    theory    is.    then,    that    experi- 

IS    prior    and    that    consciousness    and    object      both      function 

therein,    and    that    apart     from    this    experience    neither    coiiscious- 

nor    object    h.i  :niticance.     This    is    the      postulah 

.standpoint    of    pragmatism.     To    state    these    possibilities    in    another 

form,    we    should    say    that    idealism    of    whatever    variety    works    on 

the    assumption    that    things    do    not    have    an    existence    except    for 

consciousness,    cither    individual,    or    absolute:    new    realism 

rts    that    things   have    an    independent    exigence    and    that    things 

•'rinr    to    consciousness    since    the    latter      is      a      development; 

empiricism    assorts    that    ideas    an-    copies    of    things    and    that    the 

-imuhaneou- ;    ])raymatism    works    on    the    assumption    that 

.-'.ml    object    are    functions      which      become      at      cer- 

•  rucial    points    in    experience,    and    that    the    two    are    simultan- 

that    the    thinu    is    only    a    tiling,    an    olijective.     when     it    is 

'or    in    a    tcnsioiial    situati«»n.    and    that    both    tiling      and      con- 

;;>pear    \\hen    the    objective    is    met    by    an    act    which 

:sm    so    that    it    may    enter    more    direct    experi- 

n     the     non-problematic.     noti-rerlecti\  e, 


EMPIRICISM 

Science    is    supposed    to    take    its    origin    it)    the    atlemp: 
plain    in    terms    of    natural    caii-so    and    principles.      \\'lu-n    nat 
Tuna    a  ix-    interpreted    in    terms    of    liunian      activiti- 
ample,  tin-  i  anh   i>  "mother",  the  sun   "    father",  tli. 
tic  .n    of    these    plu  ii'  in    other    than    "natural"    terms.      I'.u: 

when  tlu-  .  ill.  MI-   In 

.pK-    al»i>nt    which    t«»    correlate-    the    data   «.; 
«>n    tlu-    w-  >i  Id    i-    i"  'i  n.   '  It    tin  i 

.    the    lai-  meaning      tlu 

hypi.ii  difficult} 

which  I!' ii.     \\h 

l.\     an    • 

account     fi.r     that     which  1'lii^ 

is    d-.ne    a>    in    case    "i     I  )eni. 'criti:  -  unlimited      niunlu  i 

tlu 
i     nunihe:  lp     t->    this    puint 

had      pi 

l.nt    a    small    p:n  i       "Mind"    v  i    ni.inne: 

a>   a    i-i  .m: .  1'ut    hy 

the   time   ••  -f    kn««x\l'  MH-   acuti. 

•a\eK    had    made    him  '.    with    the    la\\>      and 

'('    \.ui"ii^   countries,   and   he   noticed   that    while   each   dii 
t'n.m    the    rest,    rach    >eeme«l    t««    prosper    under      the      o>de>      or"    its 
own    formation;    and    this,    coupled    with    his    kno\\li-dm-    of    percep- 
tion,   led    him    to    his    famous    statement    th.it    "man    is    the    m< 
<r\  tiling"     ;ui    earl\     st.itenunt    of    lt    piiucii»le      which 

romincnt   part    in   shaping   ti  of   the   h 

<.f    thought.      The    an>\ver    to    the    Protagorean    difticulties    ren:. 
practically    unchanged    until    the    stru^ylc      hetweeii       realism 
nominalism,    the    former    of    which    in    its    future    development    he- 
came   the    philosophy    of    the   "static   universe",    while   the    latter    he- 
came    the    attitude    of    the    practical    mind,    of    natural    scieno 
democracy. 

Modern    pliil.iM.pliy    originates    in    the    shift    of     inter, 
the    supernatural    to    the    natural:    and    in    emphasizing    this    change, 
the    interest    lies    more    in    the    direction    of    differentiating      science 
from    theology    rather    than    in    ijm->ti«ms    as    to    the    difference    he- 
twc<.n    science    and    philosophy.     The    method    of     science    and    the* 

13 


construction  of  systems  held  the  first  place  in  the  early  stages 
of  modern  science  and  philosophy,  and  not  until  the  time  of 
Locke  is  the  prohlem  of  the  origin,  extent,  and  validity  of 
knowledge,  raised.  Prior  to  this  time  and  to  all  intents  and  pur- 
poses, since  the  time  of  Locke,  the  scientist  has  gone  on  without 
serious  consideration  of  the  problem  of  knowledge. 

Although  the  empiricist  attenpts  to  begin  anew,  as  in  the  case 
of  Bacon,  he  is  not  able  wholly  to  sever  his  connection  with  an 
attitude  which  had  found  a  firm  lodgment  in  the  mind  of  man. 
In  spite  of  Bacon's  polemic  against  scholasticism,  he  believed  in 
a  fixed  number  of  "forms",  and  to  find  it  the  business  of  science 
to  discover  these  "  forms".  Although  Descartes  asserts  it  as 
his  purpose  to  build  anew,  he  can  not  free  himself  from  a  dual- 
ism of  mind  and  matter,  a  heritage  of  the  dualism  of  the  middle 
ages  expressed  by  this  and  the  other  world.  Dualism  is  one  form 
of  the  doctrine  of  authority.  It  takes  its  origin  in  primitive 
nature  worship  where  beneficent  and  harmful  natural  forces  are 
in  striking  contrast  with  each  other.  Each  must  be  appealed 
to — the  one  in  order  that  its  acts  of  grace  may  continue,  the 
other  so  that  it  may  at  least  remain  neutral.  The  idea  of  "matter" 
is  of  something  to  which  our  thoughts  must  conform.  It  is  the 
"given",  and  strive  as  we  will,  we  can  not  escape  its  compulsion. 
It  is  not  the  compulsion  of  an  Absolute,  however,  but  is  the  hard 
and  fast  fact  of  immediate  experience.  Matter  may  occupy  a 
lowly  place,  as  the  prison  house  of  the  soul,  as  that  which  drags 
down  the  upward  striving  mind  in  its  attempts  to  contemplate 
the  eternal  plan  of  things,  as  that  waiting  for  the  application  of 
the  "form"  ;  but  with  the  growth  of  science  and  with  the  increase 
of  knowledge  of  the  methods  of  controlling  nature  for  our  own 
purposes,  matter  became  the  object  of  study,  but  matter  still  in 
the  sense  of  the  "given".  When  epistemology  became  thoroughly 
launched  after  Locke,  the  problem  of  the  relation  between  mind 
and  matter  became  more  acute.  Realism  of  the  common  sense 
kind  served  the  purposes  of  science  up  to  this  time,  .  but  the 
difficulties  involved  in  the  relation  between  perception  and  the 
object,  difficulties  formulated  by  the  Greeks,  led  to  the  view- 
held  by  the  empiricists,  namely,  of  representative  perception.  In- 
stead of  a  direct  experience  of  the  object,  we  have  on  the  re- 
presentative theory,  an  image  of  the  object  which  answers  for 
its  reality.  The  "given"  is  not  perceived  directly  but  only 
through  the  idea — a  conception  not  unlike  the  means  of  salvation 
in  the  religious  world  of  the  period,  and  comparable  in  many 
ways  with  the  idea  of  absolute'  authority  developed  in  the  polit- 

14 


ical   philosophy  of    1  Thus  it  was  that     religion,  the     state, 

and  science,  each  had  its  "given",  its  principle  of  authority,  which 
determined  the  problems  against  which  the  methods  in  the  res- 
pective spheres  could  he  - 

The  early  beginning  of  F.nglish  philosophy  is  indicative  of 
tlu-  general  trend  of  their  later  thinking.  While  it  is  true  that 
science-  is  more  universal  in  its  appeal,  it  is  less  true  with  philo- 
sophy where  national  characteristics  and  interest-  of  a  temporal 
nature  arc  influential  in  determining  the  point  of  view.  Duri'ig 
tlu-  period  of  church  supremacy  there  was  community  of  inter- 
'hroughout  Kurope.  due  in  part  to  a  common  language  as 
a  vehicle  for  thought;  l.ut  with  the  publication  of  the  "Advance- 
ment of  Learning"  in  the  Knglish  tongue1,  the  way  was  opened  for 
a  more  characteristic  Knglish  philosophy.  \\'hile  the  empirical 
attitude-  is  seen  in  the  church  philosophy  as  represented  by  the 
i  in  the  ninth  century,  and  by  Alexander  of  Hales 
and  i  "ii  in  the  thirteenth  and  of  William  of  Occam  in 

the  fourteenth,  it  is  n,,t  until  the  break  with  scholasticism  on  the 
part  of  F.  I  '-aeon  that  the  empirical  type  of  thinku  i  firm 

foothold.      <  >ecam     '  'eve-lop    Uie    doctrine    of     the 

"two-fold"    truth    which    was    fatal    to    the    schoi.  -uiption    of 

the   identity   of    faith    and    knowledge.      \\'ith   the   growth    of    science- 
and     mathematics    the    difference    between    the     worlds    becar 
proiiiiiincei!    tliat    no    etT.-n     was    made    to    treat    one    in    the    terms 
of    tlu-    other.     The    "idols"    of    the    tu  the 

need    of    a    con  of    problems    in    freedom      from      the    re- 

straint of  authority,  for  they  rcali/rd  what  is  n.-w  a  common- 
place that  the  limits  ,  .;  are-  fixed  by  the  metaphysical 

conception    of    the    day. 

Kmpiricism,  then,  is  the  outcome  of  a  practical  type-  of  mind 
:ed  in  the  businos  of  this  world  —  in  the  solution  of  scientific, 
social,  and  political  problems.  While  its  exponents  belie. 
c-  'inplete  break  hajj  been  effected  between  themselves  and  the 
older  type  of  thinking,  it  requires  only  to  be  pointed  out  that 
the  chief  diff.  :  a  shift  in  the  locus  of  the  Absolute,  the 

Idea,  the  <  ioal.  Men  had  been  taught  obedience  too  l«,ng  to  regard 
reality  a>  an  achie\ment.  For  the  former  period  of  thinking, 
reality  is  the  fixed  world  beyond,  and  matter,  while  following 
Aristotle,  is  never  without  form.  it  occupies  a  subordinate 
place  in  the  s.:ale  of  things.  It  approaches  the  (Hood  in  organi- 
zation. until  in  man  the  limits  of  its  possibility  are  reached.  Rut 
when  Matter  i>  taken  as  the  reality  itself,  and  when  the  former 
reality  has  been  relegated  to  the  world  of  faith  —  when  this 


15 


.vorld  is  the  world  <>f  reality  1  >  which  thought  must  conform, 
we  have  the  attitude  of  the  "plain"  man  engaged  in  the  pro- 
blems of  scitnce  ad  politics.  The  case  is  not  unlike  that  in 
which,  after  the  regular  physicians  have  given  up  hope  for  the 
recovery  of  the  patunt.  the  older  women  come  forward.  each 
with  her  remedy.  The  difficulty  might  he-  one-  of  diagnosis,  in 
which  case  if  recovery  happened,  it  would  lie  a  case  of  accident. 
or  of  such  a  mild  nature  of  treatment  that  in  any  case  it  effected 
nothing.  It  seems  safe  to  say  that  the  diagnosis  of  the  patient 
in  the  hands  of  the  scholastics  was  faulty  and  that  the  empiri- 
cists inheriud  the  same  faults.  They  inherited  the  hahit  of  think- 
ing in  terms  of  completion,  and  regardless  of  the  locus  of  au- 
thority similar  difficulties  must  arise. They  misinterpreted  the 
method  of  science— that  is  they  took  as  an  example  a  hit  of  scien- 
tific achievement,  analy/.ed  the  product  in  the  completed  form, 
and  from  this  dictated  what  must  he  the  method  in  the  actual 
performance  of  the  original  discovery. 

After  on  experiment  has  been  made,  certain  elements  in  the 
•performance  of  it  may  he  selected  and  grouped  as  "data";  cer- 
tain elements  ma\  "answer  the  "conclusion";  hut  before  the  ex- 
periment has  been  performed  we  can  not  speak  of  data  and  con- 
clusion in  the  case  in  particular  The  fallacy  of  empiricism  is 
that  of  regarding  the  world  of  matter  as  data  for  science — the 
>  world"  in  "general,  "given" ,  so  to  speak,  wllidl  stands  m3T"m  need 
of  construction,  hut  to  he  "represented"  in  consciousness. 

It  might  be  said  that  the  standpoint  of  empiricism  is  dualism. 
On  the  one  hand  there  is  the  world  as  given;  on  the  other,  there 
is  a  mind  the  business  of  which  is  to  represent  this  world,  a; 
mind,  moreover,  which  is  passive,  which  is  a  "white  piece  of 
paper"  which  receives  the  impressions  from  the  outer  world  and 
which  records  them  wax-like.  Under  the  leadership  of  a  differ- 
ent idea  of  authority  and  of  a  changed  conception  of  conscious- 
ness we  should  expect  to  find  a  different  type  of  philosophical 
thinking.  With  the  shift  of  authority  from  the  church  to  the 
state  over  which  was  a  ruler  who  held  by  divine  right,  we  have 
a  transformation  which  is  notable  in  its  consequences,  but  we 
still  have  a  form  of  authority,  something  given,  which  is  a  limit 
beyond  which  nothing  need  be  attempted.  All  endeavor  is  cir- 
cumscribed by  the  circle  of  authority.  This  method  of  social 
and  political  living  is  reflected  in  the  scientific  and  philosophical 
thinking  where  a  norm  is  present  in  the  form  of  matter.  >>f 
nature,  on  the  one  hand  which  dictates  to  a  passive  subject, 
mind,  on  the  either.  As  the  sin-sick  and  penitent  semi  received 

ir, 


from  the  representative  of  the  church  <>r  the  unworthy 
suhjcct  r«.cei\i-  -.;racc  from  the  hands  of  the  sovereign,  so  ton 
tin-  mind  rommands  from  it-  sovereign,  matter.  An 

'ute  matter  and  a  subject  mind  will  answer  as  a  principle  of 
explanation  as  Ion-  as  the  sodal  conditions  are  such  that  that 
explanation  is  a  reflection  of  them;  hut  with  the  dawn  of  a  dif- 
ferent attitude  of  a  political,  social,  and  religions  nature,  due.  in 
part  .to  the  exceptional  individual  who  pioneer-like  reaches  a 
little  hcyond  his  fellows  to  "thin-s  unattempted  yet  in  pr< 
Hume",  we  have  a  changed  conception  of  the  nature  of  reality 
and  of  the  function  .  .f  intelligence  ii;  nee.  With  the 

.th    of   democracy    in    Knglaml    tlifoii.iji    the    effort^    of    -«me    of 
the    very    leader.-    of    the    empirical    school,    we    note    a    Correspotid- 

.  haime    in    tlu  n    of    matter    '  thinker- 

we    pa--    fr.>m    an     undi--_;u:>ed    empirici-m    [«  type, 

rnallx    "there"    to    matt  ;>ermamnt    pos- 

<\".     The   duali-tic  hypot  uihedded   in   the 

\ir\    fai-ric   "f   the   life   <.f    tlu    a^e    in    which    it    flourished,    hut    Ike 

idea!  the    child    of    the    age    and    ha-    fallen      with      m  wer 

tin     nature  'f    political    and 

authorit).    and    with    a  --nception    of    the    nature 

and    function 

An    exatnination    of    tin  the    -\-tem    will      reveal      the 

CoiitraditioUs  which  hi>tory  has  already  made  evident.  We  have 
in  the  ca-e  ••«'  empiricism  two  ".uivrii>".  namely,  thin-s  and  mind. 
\\'ith  these  the  i>rol)lem  U  .alid  knowledge  a  working 

n-latii-n  hetween  mind  and  thin--  of  such  a  nature  a-  will  ex- 
plain what  i-  admitted  to  exist,  namely,  knowledge.  Knowledge 
comes  ah. -ut  in  the  judgment  and  an  examination  into  the  jiultf- 
nunt  siioiild  rexeal  the  dith'cul' 

Locke's  -tatenuiits  are  well  known  and  have  often  hecn 
criticised,  hut  they  contain  the  essential  elements  of  modern 
epistemology.  "Since  mind,  in  all  its  thoughts  and  reasonings, 
hath  no  other  immediate  ohjcct  hut  its  own  ideas,  which  it  alone 
doth  or  can  contemplate,  it  is  evident  that  our  knowledge  is  only- 
conversant  aln.iit  them.  ****Knowlediie  then  seems  to  me  to  be 
nothing  hut  the  perception  of  the  connection  of  and  agreement, 
or  disagreement  and  repugnancy,  of  any  of  our  ideas.  In  this 
;  alone  it  *  From  this  standpoint  the  act  of  judgment 

cons:sts  in  referring  one  idea  to  another,  and  when  true,  the 
ideas  ague.  Win  n  the  judgment  is  not  true  the  ideas  (the 

i'.k.    IV.    I'll.    1.    Sees.    1    and    2. 

17 


subject  and  predicate  being  both  ideas)  do  not  agree.  Ideas  are 
built  uj)  i"  two  ways:  first  from  "sensation",  and  secondly,  from 
the  perception  of  the  operations  of  our  own  minds  within  our- 
selves. "(  htr  suises***  do  convey  into  the  mind  several  distinct 
perceptions  of  things,  according  to  the  various  ways  wherewitli 
those  objects  do  affect  them;  and  thus  we  come  by  what  idea> 
we  have  of  yellow,  white,  heat,  cold,  soft,  hard,  bitter,  sweet,  and 
all  those  we  call  sensible  qualities;  which  when  I  say  the  senses 
convey  into  the  mind,  I  mean,  they  from  external  objects  con- 
vey into  the  mind  what  produces  there  those  perceptions.***** 
These  two,  1  say,  vi/..  external  material  things  as  the  objects  of 
sensation,  and  the  operation  of  our  own  minds  within  as  the  ob- 
jects of  reflection,  are,  to  me,  the  only  originals  from  whence 
all  our  ideas  take  their  beginnings."*  An  idea  is  not  the  "thing", 
therefore,  but  is  representative  of  the  thing.  Judgments  accord- 
ingly have  nothing  to  do  with  so  called  "reality",  but  is  only 
the  perception  of  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  represent- 
atives of  reality.  Locke,  however,  attempts  to  make  the  matter 
clear  by  an  explanation  of  "wherein  this  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment consists" ;  and  in  doing  this  he  has  recourse  to  the  four- 
fold nature  of  agreement,  one  of  which  is  Real  existence.  The 
essence  of  this  type  of  agreement  as  stated  by  Locke  is  "that  of 
actual  real  existence  agreeing  to  any  idea."f  The  first  type  of 
judgment,  as  Locke  soon  recognizes,  makes  no  place  for  the  ob- 
jective world  ;  the  result  is  that  he  must,  in  case  the  judgment  is 
to  render  knowledge  objective,  modify  the  former  statement  of 
the  nature  of  knowledge,  by  an  assertion  to  the  effect  that  it  is 
the  perception  of  the  agreement  of  the  idea  with  an  object. 

We  shall  ask  the  following  question  of  the  Lockian  theory 
of  knowledge :  (a)  What  determines  which  of  the  ideas  gained 
in  the  manner  stated  shall  be  applied  either  to  another  idea  as 
in  the  first  statement  of  the  nature  of  judgment  or  to  real  exis- 
tence as  stated  in  the  second  definition?  (b)  What  determines 
agreement  or  repugnancy?  (c)  W'hat  is  actually  accomplished 
by  an  act  of  judgment? 

In  answer  to  (a)  it  may  be  said  that  there  is  no  method  :n 
the  madness  of  the  coming  together  of  ideas  or  of  objects  and 
ideas.  Thinking  on  the  principle  of  "givens"  is  an  idle  pas- 
time of  putting  together  blocks  which  have  been  made  to  order, 
or  rather  given  to  fit.  There  is  no  difficulty  as  to  the  final  out- 
come, only  try  long  enough,  but  trying  itself  is  a  mystery  on  the 


*Op.   C.   Bk.   II,   Ch.   I,   Sees.   3   and   4. 
tO.    C.    Sec.    7. 


18 


as-umptions.  It  is  as  if  in  making  a  judgment  we  started  with 
an  idea  or  a  reality  in  the  nature  of  an  object,  pinned  down,  so 
t<>  -peak,  and  fitted  to  them  or  it.  the  various  supply  of  ideas 
which  we  have  in  our  heads,  until  at  length  we  eoine  to  one 
which  "agre€Sw,  whereupon  we.  Archimedes  like.  pioush, 
claim.  Kurcka.  luireka.  In  short,  there  is  no  method  in  any 
particular  ca>e  to  tell  which  of  the  stock  of  ideas  we  shall  em- 
ploy as  a  predicate.  The  same  is  true  of  the  subject,  only  in 
this  case  any  idea  or  object  may  l>e  chosen  arhitrarily.  In  either 

it    is    a    n-att«.r    of    assortment,    for    h<«th    idea    and    ohjev 
the    two    ideas    were    given    in    the    ordinal    expel  -    identical 

and  u  nt. 

A>  to  (]>)  the  question  concerns  the  truth  or  falsity  of  an 
idea,  in  the  'he-  aguinurt  of  one  idea  u  ith  another 

in    the    fit-  nt    ••!"    the    nature    of    ;  or    jud.umt.nt. 

it    is    e\  ulent    that    if    the    ide.i  A  ith    itself    we    have    made    no 

^s    hut    have    as^rted    a    nun-    :deiiu\.      It    i-    evident, 
that    th's    is    all    that    can    he    done,    for    if    the    ideas    do    not    agne, 
that    is.    if    there    is    any    ditTerein  .m    not    have    knowledge, 

for    tin  re    is    disagreement.      Kverv    judgment    is    either    the    . 

of  identity,  such  a-  A  is  \.  Of  IS  fal.se.  In  the  second 
statement  of  the  agreement  of  an  idea  with  an  object,  we  have 
the  same  difficulty  when  it  o-nv  For  truth  and 

falsity.      The    idea    heing    a    copy    .  ,r    a  f    the    oliject    ought 

certainly    to    "ague"    with    it    for    there    is    nothing    eKe      for      it    to 
with;    hut    in    a.ss.ertin.  ive      done      nothing 

more  than  to  assert  identity.  If  wr  a^e-rt  another  idea  it  will 
not  agree  with  the  ohject.  and  consequently  there  will 
not  he  truth  hut  falsity.  In  hoth  cases  the  following  strange 
paradoxes  confront  us:  il^.t  all  judgments  are  true,  hut  do  not 
extend  our  knowledge:  second,  that  all  judgments  are  false  hut 
that  our  knowledge  is  extended  hy  them.  In  a  world  of  mean- 
•n  the  one  hand  and  a  world  of  things  on  the  other,  it 
appears  that  truth  and  falsity  have  no  significance.  Truth  is 
reduced  to  identity  which  is  given  in  the  original  experience, 
identity,  thai  is,  latween  the  idea  and  the  thing,  or  between  the 
idea  as  subject  and  the  idea  as  predicate;  and  consists  merely  in 
the  perception  of  agreement. 

In  answer  to  (c)  it  may  be  said  that  there  is  nothing  ac- 
complished by  the  act  of  judgment.  If  the  idea  is  in  the  fact,  it 
is  difficult  to  see  how  it  ever  got  away  from  it;  if  it  is  not  in 
the  fact  but  in  a  world  of  divorced  meanings,  the  mystery  is  pre- 
sent none  the  less  in  accounting  for  a  principle  of  reference.  In 

19 


tile    lirst    caM'    a    judgment    is  reiteration;    in      the 

it    must    In-    false. 

hi  the  second  chapter  nf  the  fourth  book  of  the  lissnv. 
Locke  considers  mediate  knowledge.  The  first  kind  of  know- 
ledge i>  iininediaie  or  intuitive  and  it  is  on  "this  intuition  that 
depends  all  the  certainty  and  evidence  of  all  our  knowledge." 
Demonstrative  or  mediate  knowledge  is  that  type  or  de-ree 
"where  tjie  mind  perceives  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of 
any  ideas,  hut  not  immediately".  Xo\v  the  mind  can  not  always 
perceive  presently  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  two  ideas, 
a  fact  which  renders  necessary,  if  agreement  is  to  he  perceived 
finally,  the  introduction  of  a  few  or  many  intermediate  steps 
in  each  of  which  "there  is  an  intuitive  knowledge  of  that  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  it  seeks  with  the  next  intermediate  idea, 
which  is  used  as  a  proof."  liy  a  perception  of  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement throughout  the  series  of  steps,  the  final  conclusion 
is  reached. 

The  classic  attempt  in  logical  theory  from  the  empirical 
standpoint  is  Mill's  l.<n/ic.  His  efforts  in  this  direction  are 
hetter  understood  as  the  logical  aspects  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
philosophical  radicals  who  were  social  and  political  reformers 
first  and  logicians  and  moralists  second.  Philosophy  as  con- 
ceived hy  them  is  hut  a  means  to  social  and  political  reforms; 
the  reforms  of  the  law.  of  the  methods  of  punishment  and  of 
the  English  constitution.  The  different  philosophical  aspects  of 
intuitionism  and  empiricism,  in  the  view  of  Mill,  are  of  great 
significance  from  a  practical  standpoint  ;  and  it  is  the  practical 
aspect  of  the  controversy  hetween  the  two  contending  views 
that  led  him  to  write  the  l.ot/ic.  He  says,  "The  System  of 
Logic  Mipplies  what  was  much  wanted,  a  text  hook  of  the  op- 
posite doctrine  (to  the  apriori  view  of  knowledge) — that'  which 
derives  all  knowledge  from  experience,  all  moral  and  intellectual 
qualities  principally  from  'the  direction  to  the  associations.**** 
The  notion  that  truths  external  to  the  mind  may  he  known  by 
intuition  or  consciousness  independently  of  observation  and  ex- 
perience, is.  I  am  persuaded,  in  these  times,  the  great  intellectual 
support  of  false  doctrines  and  bad  institutions.  By  the  aid  of 
this  theory  every  inveterate-  belief,  and  every  intense  feelim 
which  the  origin  is  not  remembered,  is  able  to  dispose  of  the  obli- 
gation of  justifying  itself  by  reason,  and  is  erected  into  its  own 
all-sufficient  voucher  and  justification.  There  was  never  such  an 
instrument  devised  for  consecrating  all  deep-seated  prejudir 

'Autobiography,  p 

• 


Mill    i>   quite   ri-^lit    in   his   contention;   a>   no   ..tic    will    deny,    hut 

tin-    question    is    as    t»    the    method     for    overcoming    the    difficulty. 

.1    of    the    'mind'    of    the    idealist.      Mill      suhstitutc-s      another 

,nd    LMMII    as    the    min<l    itself,    namely,    nature.      In- 

of  the  mil  to   nature  as    Kant    would   ha\e   it.   we 

MI    Mill    thi-    common    -hift    in    the    1"<  uthority.    with 

:eMih    that    nature    dictate-    l»    the    nr.: 

Philosophical     spi-culati- ••  .    and      his    aim 

:n    tii  lop    the    il  i-s..eiation 

•Moditk-d    l.y   his    father   in   the 

t\\  ei  n      psych  M  Hi 

tin-   mental    p-  If.   of   the 

conditioti>   it    depends   '-n.   and   th--  which   it   consists,    is   tlu 

1'rection  of  the 
mded.***  >     the 

".tided    on 
'he   relat 
wliu-h    in    turn    i>    atx-tl:  po-,tula'' 

the     empn  >\>     out     in     alm>  .>t     e\  ery 

chapter,    for    whctl    "things"      be  •i])licated      he      ha- 

•A  lun    "mind"  n       in      the 

..  nt    of    the    pi'o\iuee 

of    loyic.    wh"-  ither    to  nvent,    noi 

r.    hut    to    jiuL  if    the    IdiNitii^-    of    I'-'-jic 

to    inform    the    Miryeon     wh.  found     to    accom- 

pany   a    \ioK-m    death.      "I'hi-    hr    imi>t    learn    from    IIJN    own    e.xper- 
I'vatii'ii.   oi    from   that    of   others,   his   predrco-vor->    in 
hi^   peculiar   pursuit.      I'.ut    lo^ie   >its   in   judiituent    on   the   Mii'ticn nc\ 
of   that   nh><.rvation   and   experience   to  justify  his   rules,   and   on   the 
'nis    ride>    to    justify  his  conduct,     [t  does  not  give  him 
proof. s.    hut    teaches    him    what    makes    them    proofs,    and    how    he 
jud-e   them."t      Log  n.it    attempt    to    find    evidence,    l.ut 

merely  to  determine  whether  or  not  evidence  has  heen  found. 
The  alio\f  statements  were  written  when  the  "mind"  side-  of  the 
dualism  had  ;  I'.ut  when  he  comes  to  treat  induction 

which    is    inference,   he    discovers    that    a    formal      lo^ic      of      proof 
-urticknt.      When,   in  other   words,  he  discovers  that  the  "mind" 
-    the    jo!)    ..f    the    logician    >,  .tnewhat    as    that    of    the 


.    Intrudue".  ;• 
[ntroduct 


coroner,  and  rcali/ing  that  tin-  met  hod  of  science  had  been  dif- 
ferent, he  introduces  another  statement  of  the  business  of  logic. 
"\\e  have  found  that  all  Inference,  consequently  all  Proof,  and 
all  discovery  of  truths  not  self-evident,  consists  of  inductions."* 
Thereupon  lie  skives  as  a  statement  of  induction  "the  opera- 
tion of  discot'criinrf  and  proving  general  propositions."^ — a  pro- 
Cess,  however,  which  is  made  very  complex,  when  it  is  remember- 
ed that  the  individual  facts  upon  which  the  general  proposition  is 
based  are  themselves,  or  at  least  may  be,  the  results  of  the  in- 
ductive process.  On  the  one  hand  logic  does  not  observe,  on  the 
other,  this  is  the  essence  of  scientific  discovery;  on  the  one 
hand  logic  does  not  discover,  but  merely  proves,  discovery  being 
the  result  of  "sagacity";  on  the  other,  the  object  of  logic  is  to 
discover  the  "invariable  antecedents". 

An  examination  of  .the  treatment  of  the  "categories"  will 
show  the  same*  shift  in  position  >n  the  face  of  the  difficulties 
which  confront  one  who  works  from  the  dualistic  standpoint.  .We 
have  as  a  general  division  the  two  classes  of  categories,  the 
subjective  and  the  objective,  the  former  being  states  of  con- 
sciousness, the  latter  being  something  different  from  states  of  con- 
sciousness, or  substances  an  attributes.  The  difficulties  come 
about  in  getting  a  working  affiliation  between  the  two  classes. 
The  first  class  is  made  up  of  feelings  or  states  of  consciousness, 
under  which  sensation,  motion,  and  thought  are  subordinate 
species.  Thought  includes  "whatever  we  are  internally  conscious 
of  when  we  are  said  to  think ;  from  the  consciousness  we  have 
when  we  think  of  a  red  color  without  having  it  before  our 
eyes,  to  the  most  recondite  thoughts  of  the  philosopher  or 
poet".*  In  this  connection  Mill  takes  great  care  to  distinguish 
sensation  from  the  object  which  causes  the  sensation,  but  in  so 
doing  he  is  committed  to  the  agnostic  position  of  the  believer  in 
the-thing-in-itself.  He  is  introducing  the  concept  of  cause  as 
applying  to  a  world  or  in  a  world  from  which  he  is  forever  ex- 
cluded by  the  nature  of  his  assumptions. 

The  next  division  of  "nameable  things"  is  substances  which 
are  the  external  causes  to  which  we  ascribe  our  sensations. 
The  sensations  are  all  of  which  one  is  conscious,  but  these  consid- 
ered as  produced  by  something  external  to  the  body  and  the 
mind,  which  external  soireth'ng  is  called  body.  "All  lue  know 


*Op.  cit.  Bk.  3,  Ch.   1,   Sec.   1. 

tltalics   mine. 

JL.   C.   Sec.   2. 

*0.    C.    Ch.    3,    Sec.    3. 

22 


of  objects,  is  the  sensations  which  they  uive  us  and  the  order  of 
occurrence  of  those  sensations. "T  I'.ut  the  question  as  to  how 
sensations  have  objective  reference  must  he  answered  and  it  is 
answered  strangely  f..r  an  eni])iricist  for  Mill  says  it  is  by  intui- 
tion. "The  answer  is***that  the  helief  is  intuitive;  that  mankind 
in  all  'nave  felt  themselves  compelled,  hy  a  necessity 

of  their  nature  to  refer  their  sensations  to  an  external 
cause."  In  contrasting  the  two  kinds  of  siihstanc.es.  mind  and 
matter.  Mill  makes  u-e  ..f  the  f. ill. win-  :  "a  l.ody  is  that  of  an 
unknown  recipient  or  percipient  of  them;  and  not  of  them 
hut  of  all  our  other  feeling.  As  body  is  understood  t" 
he  the  mysterious  s,  .nu-thiiiii  which  excites  the  mind  to  tY 
the  mind  is  the  mysterious  snim-thinn  which  feels  and  thinks."* 
Duali-m,  consequently,  lead-  -ticism.  i 

•lie  method,  in  short,  all  attempts  at  thinking  must  he 
doomed  to  failure  when  all  are  founded  on  "unknowns"  and 
"mysu  n- 

Attr:'  BOS     by     w!;ich     Mill    attempi  - 

ie    himself":    tluy  nbject    matter    of    judgments;    hut 

at    hottotn    they    are    powers    in    that       mysteri--"  .r\.      suh- 

stance.    t-«    excit  of    (|uan- 

tity.  of  qualitx.  or  of  relation.  Krotn  the  standpoint  of  lo-ie. 
quality  and  >uisation  are  synonyms.  The  same  may  he  said  of 
quantity,  hut  en  tain  nl  ,-uliar  place.  The  rela- 

mltaneity.    and     resemblance,    do    not     haw 

ohjective   refei.  .   tlu-   other   attributes    hut    the\    an-    innate. 

As    Mill    puts    it.    "Our  of    the  n    of    these 

•ions    is    not    a    third    iefl  nlded    to    them;    we 

ha\e   not   t'ir.st   the  two    feelings,  and   then   a    feelin-   of   th 

siou.     To    ha\e    two    feelinus    at    all.    iinplio    either    havin-     tliem 

successively    or    else    simultaneously.      Sensations    or    other    feelings, 

ision    or    simultanoiusiu-ss    are    the    two    eondi- 

tlu-      alternative    of      which      they    are    subjected    l>y    the 

nature   of   our     faculties.''-?     "Uesemblance      is      nothing      hut      our 

feeling    of    resemblance;    succession    i>    nothing    but    our    feeling    of 

succession". j      Mill    is    forced    here    to    the    apriori    view    which    lie 

so    violently    criticises    as    the    source    of      prejudice.      because      he 

has    no    other    method    of     reach  inu    objectivity,    on     his    premises, 


•.    7. 
mine. 

tltalics   mine.    Cli.    .>.    Sec.    10. 
tOpus 


except  by  the  "high  apriori  road".  If  the  question  be  asked, 
What  is  the  business  of  thought?,  on  the  foundation  laid  by 
Mill,  tin-  only  answer  that  can  be  given  is  that  it  is  merely  a 
registration  of  impressions,  a  reception  of  what  is  in  the  object. 
Attributes  are  in  the  objects,  they  are  powers  which  the  objects 
have  to  excite  sensibility.  If  attributes  are  already  objec- 
tive (all  attributes,  that  is.  except  certain  relations  which  are 
innate),  how  can  any  mistake  ever  occur  in  the  registration  of 
attributes  by  the  mind?  In  other  words,  the  problem  of  error 
is  impossible  on  Mill's  theory  of  the  categories. 

I»\  an  appeal  to  the  "universal  belief  of  mankind",  an  act. 
of  "intuition"  Mill  at  last  gets  on  the  outside  to  objectivity,  He 
is  stron-  in  bis  criticism  of  the  view  of  the  philosophers  of  the 
Lockian  type  that  propositions  are  expression  of  the  relation  be- 
tween ideas;  and  insists  on  the  other  band  that  the  relation  is< 
one  between  phenomena  themselves.  He  characterizes  the  opposite 
view  as  one  of  the  most  fatal  errors  ever  introduced  into  the 
philosophy  of  logic;  and  the  principal  cause  why  the  theory  of 
the  science  has  made  such  slow  progress  during  the  last  two  cen- 
turies. II  is  own  statement  of  the  nature  of  a  proposition  is, 
"The  object  of  belief  in  a  proposition  is  generally,  either  the  co- 
existence or  the  sequence  of  two  phenomena".*  But  when  he 
discussed  these  relations  among  the  categories,  these  same  ones 
were  such  as  did  not  refer  to  objectivity  but  were  of  the  original 
nature  of  the  mind— the  mind's  contribution  in  the  formation  of 
objects. 

His  discussion  of  the  categories  leads  to  the  following  alter- 
natives: (a)  All  is  mental:  in  which  case  he  is  in  the  same 
position  as  the  subjective  idealists;  or  (b)  All  is  objective:  in 
which  case  there  is  no  place  for  error,  or  in  fact,  for  thought 
at  all,  except  as  a  matter  of  registering  inmpressions ;  or  (c) 
Part  is  mental  and  part  is  objective;  in  which  case  there  is  no 
way  to  find  how  they  are  connected  or  related;  or  (d)  All  is 
appearance :  in  which  case  we  know  nothing  of  either  mind  or 
matter,  subjectivity  or  objectivity,  but  live  in  a  world  of 
Kantian  phenomena. 

Mill's  treatment  of  inference  affords  the  best  example  of 
the  difficulties  of  the  dualistic  postulate  or  assumption.  In  the 
treatment  of  the  categories  he  makes  it  clear  that  attributes  are 
subjective,  but  that  they  are  caused  by  powers  in  an  unknown 
substance  and  refer  to  objects.  These  attributes  are  the  subject 


'Ch.    5,    Sec.    5. 

24 


matter  of  proposition.-*  which  arc  matters  to  which  proof  or  lo^ic 
is  applicable.  It  is  true  that  in  other  connections  Mill  has  a  dif- 
ferent statement  of  the  nature  of  objectivity  as  the  "permanent 
possibilities  of  sensation".*  But  the  paradox  involved  in  such 
a  >tatement  is  evident,  it  is  by  mean-*  of  sensation  that  we  build 
up  a  world  of  possibilities  of  sensation.  The  question  of  chief 
importance,  howe\tr,  at  this  time,  is  the  possibility  of  making 
am  inference  whate\er.  If  we  view  the  matter  from  the  stand- 
point of  consciousness  there  is  nothing  in  the  wa\  of  discovery 
Me  for  all  i-*  already  in  the  mind.  NOW  tlu-  mind  is  mere- 
ly receiver,  a  recipient  from  the  ab*»  -lute  of  the  system,  nature; 
it  P"  creati\e  abdity.  not  even  tile  ability  to  recall.  In 

the  mind  actuall)  could  perform  any  sort  of  operation  on 
its  materials,  it  is  forever  hound  down  to  a  fixed  "given"  from 
which  it  can  n<  \"o  truth  or  error  could  ever  come  to 

pass  for  sensations  ari.  m.jther  true  nor  false.  If  the  mind  was 
dynamic,  the  only  possibility  of  error  would  lie  in  false  recall  of 
the  "i-iven".  Hut  reproduction  of  what  is  "th  not  infer- 

\\hen  the  attempt  is  made,  as  Mill  does,  to  shift  to  phe- 
nomena, to  the  world  ..f  objectivity,  the  difficulty  i-*  not  obvi- 
ated; but  it  appe.f  only  under  a  different  "uiven".  If 
objects  are  -i\en.  why  inference?  If  inference  is  a  movement 
from  the  known  to  the  unknown,  what  is  the  result  of  such  a 
process;  how  can  Mich  a  process  take  place'  If  u  e  already  have 
the  known,  why  disturb  it?  Let  the  known  be  either  stat' 
Consciousness  Of  objects,  «rl  -led  by  making  any  kind  of 
sail)  from  what  is  already  fixed!" 

But  Mill  treats  inference  as  an  objective  matter,  and  the 
ground  of  all  inference,  of  all  induction,  is  the  universal  law 
of  causation.  \ow  Mill  ulls  us  that  this  -round  is  a  case  of 
induction  itself  but  he  meets  the  paradox  by  a  reference  to  his 
treatment  of  the  major  premise  <»f  the  syllogism— that  the  major 
premise  is  nothing  more  than  the  sum  of  the  cases  of  particular 
instances,  and  consequently  that  "no  reasoning  from  generals  to 
particulars  can  prove  anything,  since  from  a  ueneral  principle 
we  cannot  infer  any  particulars,  but  those  which  the  principle 
itself  assumes  as  known."*  With  this  in  mind  it  is  difficult  to 
see  just  what  is  accomplished  by  making  as  a  major  premise  of 
e\erv  induction  a  generalization  of  the  uniformity  of  nature. 
If  the  ground  of  every  induction  is  the  uniformity  of  nature. 


f    Hamilton's    FMiiN.s.    Ch.    11. 


and  if  the  ground  has  no  other  proof  than  is  expressed  in  the 
cases  which  have  gone  into  its  composition,  it  certainly  seems 
a  useless  process  to  labor  so  diligently  for  some  ground  which 
renders  legitimate  the  inductive  process.  But  later  in  speaking 
of  the  uniformities  of  nature  of  which  the  law  of  causation 
stands  at  the  head  in  point  of  universality,  he  says,  "we  shall 
find  ourselves  warranted  in  considering  this  fundamental  law, 
though  itself  obtained  by  induction  from  particular  laws  of 
causation,  as  not  less  certain,  but,  on  the  contrary,  more  so, 
than  any  of  those  from  which  it  was  drawn. "f  Now  if  the  uni- 
versal law  is  founded  on  particular  laws,  and  if  these  particular 
laws  are  sometimes  modified,  what  is  the  result?  If  the  general 
is  the  sum  of  the  particulars  and  if  the  particulars  change,  then 
what  of  the  general?  Mill  asks  this  question  and  attacks  it  as 
follows  :  "For  there  is  probably  no  one  even  of  the  best  established 
laws  of  causation  which  is  not  sometimes  counteracted,  and  to 
which,  therefore,  apparent  exceptions  do  not  present  themselves, 
which  would  have  necessarily  and  justly  shaken  the  confidence  of 
mankind  in  the  universality  of  these  laws,  if  the  inductive  pro- 
cess founded  on  the  universal  law  had  not  enabled  us  to  refer 
these  exceptions  to  the  agency  of  counteracting  causes,  and  there- 
by reconcile  them  with  the  law  with  which  they  apparently 
conflict". $  In  other  words  the  universal  law  is  founded  on 
lesser  laws  which  may  be  counteracted,  but  the  universal  law, 
the  sum  of  the  particulars,  remains  as  a  check  against  the  very 
particulars  of  which  it  is  composed. 

We  are   confronted   here   with   these   difficulties : 

(a)  The    major   premise   proves    nothing;    yet   that    nature    is 
uniform  is  the  major  premise  which   serves  as  the  ground  of   all 
inductions. 

(b)  The   major  premise   is   the   ground   of   all    induction;   yet 
it    is    itself    a   case   of    induction. 

(c)  The    ground    of    induction     (the      major      premise      that 
nature    is    uniform)    is    nothing    more    than    the    particular    cases; 
yet    these    particular    cases    may      be    counteracted      without      any 
effect  on   the  universal   law   which   in   fact   is   used  as  a  check  on 
the  particulars   of   which   the   universal   is   made   up. 

The  difficulties  of  the  dualistic  standpoint  is  again  seen  in 
the  treatment  of  the  hypothesis.  The  hypothesis  as  Mill  views 
it  is  not  a  case  of  inference  but  it  is  an  auxiliary  thereto.  It 


tBk.    3,   Ch.    21.    Sec.   3. 
JL.   C. 


26 


-kilful  .uuess.  It  is  a  .uuess  which  .ui\cs  mental  unity  and 
wholeness  KI  a  chaos  of  facts,  of  scattered  particulars.  It  is  a 
which  is  made,  moreover,  only  by  minds  which  abound  in 
knowledge  and  which  are  disciplined  in  intellectual  combina- 
tions. On  the  otlK-r  hand,  the  hypothesis  is  absolutely  indis- 
pensable in  >cience.  Without  them  science  could  never  have 
attained  its  present  state.  "They  are  necessary  steps  in  the  pn>- 
-•"inethinvj  more  certain;  and  nearly  everything  which  is 
now  theory  was  once  hypothesis."*  It  is  stran.ue  that  an  instru- 
ment SO  \aluable  occupies  the  position  of  an  auxiliary  to  inference. 
Mill  tell.s  us  that  hypotheses  are  employed  in  order  that  the  de- 
ductive method  may  be  applied  earlier.  When  we  remember  that 
no  inference  is  possible  by  the  deductive  method,  but  only  in 
the  formation  of  the  major,  premise  in  place  of  which  in  this 

-lands  the  hypothesis,  the  mystery  conccrnin.L;  the  function 
of  the  hypothesis  urows  deeper.  Then  ayain.  ue  have  a  ina-- 
of  -cattered  facl>.  a  cl  particulars  .uiven.  and  the  busi- 

>i  the  hypoth'  ib-ate"  tlie>e  fact-  by  means  of 

conceptions  in  the  mind  of  him  who  abounds  in  knowledge  and 
who  is  disciplined  in  intellectual  combinations.  P.ut  on  the  other 
hand,  the  conception  is  in  the  facts  and  the  mind  sees  it  there. 
"If  tin-  tact-  are  rightly  classed  under  the  conception,  it  is  be- 
cause there  i-  in  the  fact>  themselves  somethin-  of  which  the 
conception  i>  itself  a  copy;  and  which  if  we  cannot  directly  per- 
ceive, it  is  because  of  the  limited  power  of  our  organs,  and  m»t 
becau-e  the  thiim  itself  is  not  there.  The  conception  itself  is 
often  obtained  by  abstraction  from  the  very  facts  which  it  is 
afterwards  called  in  to  connect."*  If  the  conception  is  in  the 
facts,  -iven.  there  is  no  guess,  lucky  or  otherwise;  and  the  dis- 
coverer would  be  merely  the  man  whose  sense  of  perception 
happened  to  be  a  little  keener.  If  the  conception  is  not  in  the 
fact-,  the  mystery  as  to  where  it  came  from  and  how  it  happens 
to  fit  the  facts  is  still  there.  In  fact  the  whole  treatment  of  the 
hypothesis  is  based  on  "luck"  and  "mystery." 


>Bk.   3.  Ch.   15,  Sec.  5. 
>Bk.   3.    Ch.   _'.    Sec.   4. 


27 


IDEALISM 

The  standpoint  of  idealism  is  the  priority  of  consciousness. 
The  different  aspects  of  this  postulate  have  received  the  greatest 
amount  of  consideration  all  the  way  from  Plato  and  especi- 
ally from  Berkeley  to  our  own  time.  When  Plato  gave  the 
(ireek  world  the  answer  to  the  questions  propounded  hy  the 
sophists.*  he  answered  as  the  aristocratic  (ireek  would,  namely, 
that  knowledge  is  above  the  world  of  the  fleeting  experi- 
ences of  the  democrat,  the  artisan,  the  toiler;  that  it  can  he  dis- 
covered only  hy  the  keen  eye  of  the  philosopher  who  removed 
himself  from  the  vagaries  of  the  world  of  the  common  lot  who 
occupied  the  same  position  in  the  social  world  that  matter  occu- 
pied in  the  physical  world  of  Aristotle. f  While  it  is  true  that 
the  idealism  of  Plato  is  not  the  idealism  of  the  modern,  his  em- 
phasis on  the  intellectual  aspect  of  experience  has  had  a  pro- 
found influence  in  shaping  modern  systems. $  The  atmosphere  in 
which  his  intellectualism  was  formulated  has  always  heen  a 
favorite  one  for  the  idealistic  philosophy.  While  the  Platonic 
intellectualism  is  meant  to  he  primarily  practical,  the  method  of 
reaching  the  practical  was  thru  the  intellect, §  with  the  result  that 
it  could  he  found  only  hy  those  who  had  the  time  and  the  op- 
portunity to  permit  the  Orphic  soul  again  to  visit  that  realm 
whence  it  fell  and  there  to  view  reality  as  it  was  in  itself  and  not 
the  manifestations  in  the  fleeting  order  of  temporality. 

In  the  latter  part  of  the  middle  ages  we  find  Platonic  idea- 
lism confronted  with  a  type  of  mind  more  pronounced  in  demo- 
cratic and  individualistic  tendencies  than  was  the  case  when  the 
system  was  formulated.*  We  have  the  outright  denial  of  the 
existence  of  Platonic  ideas,  a  renewal  of  the  spirit  of  individual- 
ism which  in  later  centuries  resulted  in  the  great  industrial  up- 


*Such  questions  as  the  relation  between  the  particular  and  the  universal,  the 
relation  between  'knowledge'  and  'opinion'. 

"Sir    \\~indelband :      History    of   Philosophy,    (Tufts'   Translation,   p.    140). 

tScv  Russell.  The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  Ch.  IX.  On  the  view  that 
Plato's  doctrine  of  ideas  was  methodological  rather  than  metaphysical, 
see  Mackintosh.  The  Problem  of  Knowledge,  pp.  81-2,  and  references 
there  cited. 

BWindelband,  op.  cit.,  p.   107. 

*The  developnient  of  Nominalism  was  connected  especially  with  Porphyry's 
Introduction  to  the  logical  writings  of  Aristotle  as  concerned  with  the 
"Fi\r  1'rcdicables".  See  Ueberweg,  History  of  Philos.  pp.  365-9. 

28 


hca\al.  tin-  newer  democracy,  and  tin-  freedom  of  intellectual 
pursuits  from  religious  supervision.  In  iliis  strut^le  it  is  to  he 
noticed  tliat  tlu-  church  maintained  the  1'latonk-  position  one 
of  tin-  first  manifestations  of  what  would  IK-  the  position  of  the 
church  and  of  idealism  in  the  future  strn.yyles  U-tweeii  religion 
and  science. 

In  the  ('artesian  philosophy.  cmpKi>ii/n-  as  it  does  the  dual- 
ism of  mind  and  matter,  we  have  the  culture  sperms  of  the  vari- 
ous idealistic  types  of  thinking  of  the  more  modern  \ariety. 
This  dualism,  a  heritage  oj  the  period  of  church  supremacy. 
onl\  to  he  emphasi/ed  on  the  subjective  side  t«  render 
idealism  dominant.  l\calit\  which  is  clear  and  distinct 

the-    test    of    the    realitx    of    the    ohject    is    the      clearness      of      tlu-t 
idea.t      \\'e     Imd.     also,     ni     h  ing       »n       the 

tenet  of  (.od.  and  the  necesviu  of  the  <  i..d  idea  for  the  N\  su-m  as 
a  whole,  the  more  modi  in  n  of  the  Ahsolute.  a  sieoini 

postulate  of  the  more  recent  development  "f  idealism."  In  fact, 
the  Ahsolute  •  d  to  the  phi1os,.ph\  irtes.  "Je 

pense.  done  Je  SUIS"T  ,(]•  me  is  not  knowledge,  and  if  any  ad- 
\anre  is  made  l>e\ond  the  cotitines  of  the  induidual.  somethin- 

:v.       l'.\     the    tlsr    of    the    axi-nn    • 

the    exisumv    of    <  .od    who    in    turn    vi.nrhe-    for    the    truth    of    our 
ideas   ami    who   serves   a>  an   ideal   l>y   which    !••   measure   and   c 
human    thinkin.u.     Thus   the    philosuph;.  furnishes   the' 

chief    stoek    in    trade    .»f    the    idealist,    namely,    tin-    primacy    of    cori- 
sciousiH-sv.    i.n     Ideal,    and     last.       the       religious       BUITOUndingS 
which    alone    idealism   can    flourish.      Hut    with    the    rapid    urmvth    of 
science    which    tended    towards      mechanism.      thu>      alienating      the 
wnrld    from    the    spiritual    realm,    came    the    pressing    need,    in 
the   world    was   to   he    interpreted    in    terms   of    religious    philosophy, 
to    render    the    world      of      science      spiritual.     The      t-mphasi- 
scientific   method   hy    Hacon.+  the   mechanical   philosophy   of    Hohhes. 

•^"'I'lu-  first  rulr  \va>.  IH-VJ.T  t«  'ruth  which  I  did  iv.t 

cU-arly  kimw  tn  !•«.•  suc)i:  that  is.  tn  avoid  haste  and  prcjudico,  and  not  to 
i-Minprfhcnd  anythini:  wore  in  my  juilxnu-nts  than  that  which  should 
prrsi-nt  itsrlf  sc.  cli-arly  and  so  distinctly  to  my  mind  that  I  should  have 
in  to  ciitt-rtain  a  doubt  about  it."  Discourse  mi  Method,  Part 
II,  Torrcy's  Translation,  p.  46. 

*  Meditations.    1. 

t('f.  Augustine's  principle  of  the  immediate  certainty  of  consciousness. 
\Vindelband.  op.  cit  pp.  _T 

J"Tlu-  former,  (empirics),  like  ants,  only  heap  up  and  use  their  store;  the  latter, 
(Scholastics),  like  spiders,  spin  out  their  own  web.  The  bee,  (induction), 
a  mean  between  both,  extracts  matter  from  the  flowers  of  the  garden  and 
and  the  field,  but  works  and  fashions  it  by  its  own  efforts."  Novum 
Organtun,  Sec.  95.  See  also.  Sec  68.  On  induction  from  empirical 
particulars,  see  Advancement  of  Learning,  Vol.  VI.  p.  265. 

29 


and  the  achievements  of  men  engaged  in  the  pursuit  of  the  vari- 
ous sciences,  were  not  condurive  to  a  spiritual  interpretation  of 
the  world.§  But  when  the  idealist,  asserting  the  priority  of  con- 
sciousness, formulates  the  doctrine  latent  in  Cartesian  dual- 
ism, namely,  that  reality  is  idea,  the  problem  of  the  scientist. 
his  solution,  and  his  data,  hecome  matter  for  the  idealistic  post- 
ulate. Since  knowing  was  regarded  as  spiritual,  a  notion  inherit- 
ed from  the  Greeks,  reinforced,  moreover,  by  the  neo-Platonic 
philosophy  as  represented  by  Plotinus,  and  the  Christian  philo- 
sophy as  well,  and  further  since  perception  was  regarded  as  a  case 
of  knowing  or  kno\vK  .!ge ;  the  way  was  opui  for  a  thoroughly 
feligio-idealistic  interpretation  of  nature.* 

With  Berkeley  who  was  first  a  man  of  the  church  and  a 
philosopher  next,  we  have  a  definite  formulation  of  the  stand- 
point of  idealism.  His  doctrine  grew  up  as  a  defense  of  Chris- 
tianity against  the  free-thinkers  and  in  the  effort  to  interpret 
science  from  the  religious  standpoint.  The  concepts  of  space 
and  matter,  the  foundation  of  the  mathematico-physical  science 
of  the  day,  were  first  attacked  by  Berkeley  after  the  Lockian 
manner  of  discovering  the  origin  of  our  ideas.  Newton  who 
had  just  produced  his  work  on  mathematical  physics,  found  it 
necessary  to  postulate  an  absolute  space  and  time,  not  objects  of 
the  senses,  as  a  basis  for  distinguishing  real  from  apparent  mo- 
tion ;  and  in  addition,  matter.f  The  result,  in  short,  of  the 
Newtonian  science  was  a  mechanical  view  of  nature  which 
Berkeley  sought  to  avoid.  He  attacked  the  view  at  the  very  basis, 
namely,  on  its  postulates,  showing  that  distance  and  magnitude 
are  not  apprehended  from  the  beginning,  but  that  the  idea  of 
them  arises  from  a  combination  of  sensations  of  sight  with  sen- 


§Winde1band,    op.    cit.,    pp.    388-9. 

*The  Platonic  soul  occupied  an  intermediate  position  between  the  world  of 
Becoming  and  the  world  of  Being,  Phaedo,  76  ff.  It  is  that  which  moves 
of  itself  and  moves  other  things.  It  is  also  that  which  perceives  and 
knows.  Cf.  Aristotle  Conception  of  the  "active"  reason;  cf.  Cicero's 
view  of  the  spirituality  of  knowledge,  Windelband,  op.  cit.  223.  The 
Stoic  logos  doctrine — that  the  rational  part  of  the  soul  is  an  emanation 
from  the  divine  World  Reason — is  another  expression  of  the  spirituality 
of  knowledge  or  knowing.  See  Ueberweg,  op.  cit.,  p.  194. 

"When  Greek  philosophy  deified  the  speculative  intellect,  it  made  the 
supreme  effort  to  work  clear  of  all  that  was  vague  and  mythical  in  religion, 
only  to  find  that  the  intellect  had  become  a  deity  and  followed  the  older 
Gods  of  emotional  faith  to  the  seventh  heaven."  Cornford,  From  Religion 
to  Philosophy,  p.  261. 

f'Before  there  could  be  real  motion  there  must  be  an  absolute  space  and  an 
absolute  time  which  are  not  determined  by  their  relation  to  anything 
external. ***The  true  space  and  the  true  time  are  mathematical  space  and 
mathematical  time,  but  these  are  not  objects  of  the  senses".  Hoffding, 
History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  Vol.  1,  pp.  410-11. 

30 


sations  "f  strain.*  Tliis  combination  depends  upon  practice,  and 
what  Newton  calls  .v/v/cv  is  <  >nly  a  subjective  association  of  ideas 
furnished  by  the  two  senses.  Thus  Berkeley  has  accomplished 
his  aim.  1>y  abolishing  the  "matter"  side  of  the  (."artesian  dualism, 
rendering  the  Lockian  primary  qualities  dependent  upon  sensa- 
tion, and  reducing  the  foundations  of  science  to  subjectivity:  tin- 
aim,  namely,  to  render  possible  a  religion?.  Of  idealistic  interpre- 
tation of  nature. 

The  idealism  of  Berkeley.  ho\ve\er.  suffered  from  another 
type  of  dualism,  as  Hume  SOOD  saw,  that  of  the  thing  that  thinks 
and  t!ie  ideas.  Hume  reduced  the  thing  that  thinks  to  a 
of  imprt.  ssj,  ,ns,*  with  the  net  result  that  speculation  which  began 
with  Descartes  and  ended  with  Hume  wa>  disastrous  to  spirit 
and  science  alike.  It  i>  at  this  point  in  the  breakdown  of  psycho- 
logical idealism  that  the  Kantian  movement  was  inaugurated; 
and  it  is  to  Kant  rather  than  to  Hcrkeley  that  most  idealists  pre- 
fer to  trace  their  lineage.  Kant  attempts  to  mark  off  the  field 
of  the  conflict  I  his  da\,  the  chief  of  wh'ch  wa>  the 

conflict  hitwecn  materialism  on  the  one  hand  and  spiritualism  on 
the  other.  As  early  as  12(W)  men  had  questioned  the  abiliu  of 
;i  to  deal  with  religion, t  urging  the  latter  to  be  a  matter 
of  faith  rather  than  of  diabetic;  and  from  that  time  to  the 
Kantian  period  the  attitude  towards  religion  wa>  alwa\>  a  prom- 
inent part  of  the  system  of  the  thinker.  The  leading  current.-,  of 
thought  at  the  time  of  Kant  wire:  skepticism,  tin-  thought  of  the 
Knlightenim-nt.  empiricism,  and  mysticism.  These  currents,  creat- 
ing the  problem  of  Kant,  determined  the  nature  and 
bis  system;  each  is  catalogued  and  placed.  He  is  skeptical  as 
far  a.s  knowing  a  world  apart  from  our  ideas  in  this  he  a 
with  Hume.  He  meets  the  ;>r -blem  of  the  Enlightenment  by  assign- 
ing to  reason  its  proper  bounds.  He  is  empirical  in  respect  to 
the  origin  of  our  ideas.  He  answers  mysticism  and  religion  by 
asserting  the  practical  ned-s^tv  of  (iod.  Freedom,  and  Immor- 
tality. It  would  possibly  not  be  admitted  that  Kant's  primary 


*"It    is   certain    l.y   experience,   that    when    we    look   at    a   near   object   with   both 
it    approaches    or    recedes   from   us,    we   alter   the    position    of    our 
It-ssening  or   widening  the   interval  between  the   pupils.      This  dis- 
-:tion   or  turn   of   the   eye   is   attended   with   a   sensation,   which   seems  to 
me   to   lie  that   which   in   this  case   brings  the   idea  of   greater  or  lesser   dis- 
tance  into  the  mind."   Fraser,   Selections  from  Berkeley,   r-    182.     Cf.   also 
\>\<.    184,    191.      See    Lotze,    Microcosmos,    Sec.    4,   pp.    306-10. 

e  nothing  is  ever  present  to  mind  but  perceptions,  and  since  all  ideas 
are  derived  from  something  antecedently  present  to  the  mind;  it  follows 
that  'tis  impossible  for  us  so  much  as  to  conceive  or  form  an  idea  of 
anything  specifically  different  from  ideas  and  impressions."  Hume, 
Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  p.  67.  Also  see  pp.  252-3. 
..ntfe.  History  of  Materialism,  Vol.  1.  pp.  218  ff. 

31 


interest  was  religious,  his  own  statement  to  the  contrary  notwith- 
standing* hut  it  will  he  admitted  that  the  religious  prohlem  was 
one  of  the  matters  of  chief  interest — he  paves  the  way  for  a  re- 
concilation  between  science  and  religion  by  assigning  to  each  its 
field  of  activity. 

From  the  time  of  Kant  to  the  present,  idealism  has  taken 
various  forms  as  the  individual  thinker  has  seen  proper  to 
develop  one  aspect  or  another  of  the  Kantian  philosophy;  but  in 
each  case  the  initial  postulate  is  present — the  priority  of  con- 
sciousness. With  Fichte,  it  is  the  will;  with  Hegel,  the  intellect; 
with  the  followers  of  Hegel,  the  additional  postulate  is  made 
— the  absolute.  All  the  systems,  however.  struggle  with  the 
difficulty  of  Berkeley  which  Hume  criticized  so  forcefully — -dual- 
ism. In  the  Critical  idealism,  it  is  the  thing-in-itself  and  the 
phenomenon  :  in  the  absolutistic  type,  the  dualism  of  the  psycho- 
logical knower  and  the  absolute  knower.  Berkeleyan  subjec- 
tivity is  present  in  all  as  well,  but  with  the  difference  that  the 
subject  is  merely  extended;  instead  of  an  individual  mind  which 
received  impressions  at  the  will  of  God,  we  have  an  absolute  mind 
endowed  with  the  categories  of  logic,  to  whom  the  universe  is 
present  in  one  immediate  experience. 

Assuming  that  it  will  be  granted  that  idealism  works  on 
two  postulates  mentioned  above,  and  that  it  arose  in  response  to 
a  religious  problem  and  that  it  has  been  intimately  the  ally  of 
religion  in  the  conflict  between  the  latter  and  science,  it  remains 
to  consider  the  following  questions :  Have  the  problems  of  relig- 
ion in  support  of  which  idealism  is  formulated  so  shifted  that 
both  the  problem  and  the  solution  are  no  longer  of  interest  ? 
Is  there  any  evidence  for  the  postulates  themselves?  In  regard  to 
the  former  question,  a  different  conception  of  religion  will  carry 
a  different  type  of  thinking;  and  a  difference  in  the  method  of 
solution  will  vary  accordingly.  To  render  the  world  of  science 
subject  to  a  religious  interpretation,  it  was  only  necessary  to  re- 
gard thinking  spiritual  in  its  nature,  a  notion  rich  in  traditions, 
based  upon  a  primitive  soul  concept  which  was  definitely  formu- 
lated in  the  doctrine  of  Plato;*  and  to  regard  the  subject  matter 
of  thinking  as  the  product  of  the  same  spiritual  principle.  Thus 
both  the  process  and  the  material  are  spiritual. 

The  religion  with  which  the  idealistic  philosophy  is  sympa- 
thetic is  primarily  the  "other  world"  religion.  Tt  was  under  the 


*Dessoir,   Outline  of  a  History  of  Psychology,   Introduction. 
Also    Ch.    1,    Sec.    3.    pp.    11-13. 

32 


dominance-  of  such  an  idea  that  this  type  of  thinking  jjot  its 
definite  formulation,  and  in  present  day  types  the  emphasis  on  the 
absolute  is  a  metaphysical  reflection  of  the  same  religious  concep- 
tion. It  is  just  within  recent  years  that  a  different  conception  of 
the  nature  of  religion  has  been  f.  emulated.  L<>om  the  time  of  the 
Romantic  Movement  and  in  fact  earlier,  it  has  been  the  custom 
to  treat  problems  historically,  and  especially  i>  this  true  since 
the  rise  of  the  doctrine  i  \olntion.  Hut  the  religious  field  has 
bei  n  >iulited  until  the  ;  '1'he  hypothesis  "that  re- 
ligion is  the  conseiousm-s.  of  the  h  .  lal  values 

That  these  Inches!  appear  to  embody  more  or  less 

idealized  expr<  the  most  cKmmtal  and  urgent  life  im- 

-."*  will  render  m.  the  type  of  thought  used  for  a 

different  conoptioti  of  rclivr  :  ience.  To  quote  further, 

"In  all  Stages,  the  di  mand  is  for  daily  bread  and  for  companion- 
ship and  achievement  in  family  and  communit\  relationships. "7 
Religion,  that  is  t..  •.  hnnuui  institution.  It  is  to  be  inter- 

preted as  an  att- nipt  to  meet  certain  fundamental  needs  of  the 
peoplr.  wllosr  it  is.  to  IK-  ail  expression  of  the  interests  of  that 
people,  and  t«  \ar>  a>  the  Idealism 

has  lost  in  the  conflict  with  '.  for  the  very 

interest  the  former  attempted  to  vjuard  has  been  preempted  by 
the  latter  and  has  been  -i\rn  an  interpretation  in  its  terms.  Re- 
ligion is  to  be  interpreted  naturalistically  and  in  the  spirit  of 
seience.  "Food  and  sex  are  the  .v-rcat  in-  the  individual 

and  of  society.  Tin  se  may  w««rk  out  in  various  forms,  but  the 
\uround  pattern'  of  every  man's  life  are  determined  by  these  t\\o 
elemental 

It  has  been  shown  that  the  t\  *  upation  determines 

"the  scheme  or  pattern  of  the  structural  organization  of  the 
mental  traits."*  In  the  •  ••.•  Union  of  the  <  iod  idea,  polytheism 
yields  to  monotheism,  not  unlike  the  "categories"  in  their  gradual 
decrease  to  "l"nit\-".'r  <>r  "Inalterable  System  of  Relations"  in  the 
philosophy  of  idealism.  The  inexplicable,  not  only  in  primitive 
life  but  in  modern  as  well  is  explained  or  rather  thrown  on  to 
the  -eiurous  shoulders  of  the  absolute  where  no  explanation  is 


*Ames,    Psychology    of    Religious    Experience,    p.    7. 

tLoc.    cit. 

tOp.    cit.    p.    33. 

It  is  not  essential  to  the  argument — that  religion  is  a  human  institution — 
that  food  and  sex  are  the  only  bases  upon  which  religion  is  founded.  It 
may  he  that  there  are  many  other  factors  which  enter.  See  McDougall, 
Social  Psychology. 

*Dewey,  Psych.   Rev..  May  1902,  p.   217. 

IGrant   Allen,   The    Evolution   of   the   Idea  of   God. 


necessary.  As  the  thunder  holt  of  the  all-compelling  Jove  is 
rendered  intelligible  from  the  standpoint  of  science,  that  attri- 
hute  of  divinity  is  removed  to  another  world,  the  world  of  know- 
ledge ;  when  Ceres  became  explicable  on  the  basis  of  soil  fer- 
tility, one  god  less  inhabited  Olympus.  And  finally  when  science 
explained  religion  on  the  basis  of  human  needs,  human  desires, 
as  a  human  institution,  the  chief  support  of  idealism  was  taken 
from  under  it.  Historically  the  system  refutes  itself,  for  that 
which  gave  it  its  raison  d'etre  has  been  accounted  for  by  its  rival. 
Consciousness  can  be  regarded  as  spiritual,  i.  e.  as  other- 
wordly  in  the  religious  sense,  only  with  a  denial  of  an  evolution- 
ary method  of  approach.  When  consciousness  was  regarded  as  a 
divine  element  which  rendered  man  a  little  lower  than  the  angels, 
and  which  separated  him  from  the  animal  kingdom — which,  in 
short,  is  the  differentia  of  man,  and  when  the  postulate  is  that 
consciousness  is  prior  and  that  things  exist  for  it  alone,  it  ren- 
ders the  task  of  the  idealist  an  easy  one  to  give  to  nature  a 
spiritual  interpretation.  But  when  a  newer  conception  of  con- 
sciousness is  advanced,  when  it  is  shown  that  it  is  not  a  static 
bit  of  divine  spiritual  nature,  but  a  dynamic  factor  in  meeting 
the  needs  of  an  organism  in  the  struggle  to  develop  specific  values, 
when  it  is  viewed  as  a  function  which  has  a  natural  history 
which  can  be  stated  in  terms  of  cause  and  effect,  of  the  give 
and  take  of  experience,  and  when  causes  are  actually  assigned, 
causes  moreover,  which  are  not  ''final"  but  natural ;  then  it  is 
that  we  hold  to  our  idealism  on  other  grounds  than  as  be- 
lievers in  the  results  of  modern  research.  With  the  newer  con- 
ceptions of  animal  mind,*  the  place  and  function  of  the  instincts 
in  the  behavior  of  humans  and  animals,f  the  interpretation  of 
the  emotions  in  terms  of  physiology,^  and  the  view  of  the  cogni- 
tive processes  as  means  of  gaining  control  over  conditions  for 
action, §  of  the  very  categories  which  found  their  lodgment  in 
the  absolute  mind  as  having .  a  history,  as  growing  out  of  and 
up  from  the  conditions  of  adequate  responses  ;§  it  seems  that  the 
conditions  giving  idealism  its  place  in  the  growth  of  systems  have 
so  changed,  its  problems  met  in  a  more  satisfactory  manner  on 
other  hypotheses,  that  the  system  itself  thru  lack  of  contact  with 
present  problems  and  methods,  has  an  historical  interest  only. 

*Washburn.  The  Animal  Mind. 

tMcDougal.   Social   Psychology. 

tjames.   Mind,  O.   S.   ix.,   1884. 

SDewey,  How  We  Think,  Part  II;  Miller.  The  Psychology  of  Thinking; 
Pillshury,  The  Psychology  of  Reasoning;  Dewey,  et  al.  Studies  in 
Logical  Theory;  Creative  Intelligence,  Professor  Bode's  paper. 

34 


With  regard  to  the  postulates  themseK  e>.  it  is  (lifticult  to  find 
a  greater  hit  of  antllropomorphisni  in  all  the  history  of  thinking. 
It  is.  however,  impossible  to  escape  a  certain  type  of  anthropo- 
morphism if  that  term  is  used  to  mean  an  interpretation  of 
facts  in  connection  with  the  problems  ..f  man,  but  to  assign  to  na- 
ture a  purpose  in  itself  apart  from  human  problems,  or  to  con- 
sider it  the  product  of  an  intelligence  wholly  external  to  human 
intelligence.  ..r  to  consider  the  function  of  knowing  as  bringing 

pervading    extra    human    universal    to 

which    all    ditferenc  .    though    it    may    be    in    implicit    form. 

i»r  t..  hold  that  a  perfect  experience  is  one  in  which  the  "that" 
and  the  "what"  are  undiffenntiatcd  in  an  immediacy  of  an  ab- 
solute intelligence  all  of  this  is  merely  a  refined  and  more  poetic 
interpretation  of  the  primitive  manner  of  interpreting  the  facts 
of  experience.  Ti.  Idrui  ..f  tin-  sun  and  the 

moon;  man  ma>  gain  control  over  the  "powers"  by  sacrificing, 
giving  food,  for  this  ur.dcrs  ;;;«/;/  d"Cile  ;  the  winds  are  held  in 
a  great  ca\e  guarded  by  a  deit\  man  who  occasionally 

turns  them  .nit.  The  iarlieM  f..rm  of  theory  is  perhaps  ;mimi.sin,* 
and  tl  tones  imcntcd  by  those  ancient  idealists, 

interpret  the  phenomena  "f  nature  in  term-  of  the  activities  and 
interests  of  man.  Childhood  is  notably  anthropomorphic  and 
mythopoeN  >:uck  in  the  ground  by  (i.nl;  thunder  is 

-peaking    loudly;    lightning    is    <  iod    striking    many    matches    at 
•  me   time.     Thus   it    is   that   primitive   man   and   childhood   are   ideal- 

from    both    the    populates    of    tl:  from    the    priority 

of  mind  in  which  things  are  my  things;  from  the  absolute  in 
that  ;;/y  powers  are  magnified  to  infinity  and  are  used  as  a  lever 
to  move  my  world. 

By  a  survey  of  th<-  uiits  of  science,  by  a  comparative 

study  of  present  with  past  customs,  by  setting  aside  as  conquered 
a  portion  of  the  field  of  experience,  by  a  consideration  of  what 

lied    "progress",    it    has    appeared   to   some     that     there      is   a 
"goal"    towards    which    all    progr  aching,      a      purpose      in 

things,  which  lends  significance  to  the  world  of  chaos  as  it  is 
thrown  down  before  the  individual.  It  is  difficult  at  times  to 
keep  a  steady  eye  on  the  universal  purpose  amid  the  evil  and  ap- 
pearance of  the  world,  but  by  a  careful  inquiry  one  can  cull  the 
wheat  from  the  chaff,  by  an  inquiry,  that  is  to  say,  into  the 
yencral  character  of  Reality;  and  by  a  method,  the  criterion  of 
which  is  that  "what  is.  real  is  not  self  contradictory,  and  what 


Marvin.    History    of    European    Philosophy,    p.    41, 

35 


is  self  contradictory  is  not  real."*  There  is  an  instinctive  de- 
mand on  the  part  of  the  intellect  for  coherence  and  consistency 
and  as  a  gratification  of  this  instinct,  such  an  attempt  into  the 
characteristics  of  Reality  is  to  he  commended.  The  problem 
that  interests  us  here,  however,  is  the  value  of  the  hypothesis  as 
a  means  of  relating  the  facts  it  attempts  to  relate,  for  it  is  as- 
serted that  such  an  inquiry  into  the  general  nature  of  things  is 
science  or  a  science,*  and  since  every  science  works  on  the  as- 
sumption that  its  principles  will  he  or  can  he  verified,  and  that 
knowledge  to  the  effect  that  verification  has  been  made  can  he 
the  possession  of  any  one  who  takes  the  time  and  spends  the 
energy  necessary  to  think  through  the  solution.  With  this  in  view, 
the  chief  objection  to  this  assumption — of  an  absolute,  a  goal,  an 
end — is  the  impossibility  of  verifying  the  hypothesis  for  the  fol- 
lowing reasons:  (a)  there  is  no  method  for  doing  it;  (b)  even 
if  it  could  be  verified  or  if  it  approached  verification,  we 
should  never  be  any  the  wiser  in  this  respect ;  (c)  since  the  in- 
vestigation is  directed  towards  Reality  in  general,  there  is  no 
point  for  beginning,  that  is  to  say,  no  hypothesis  is  possible,  since 
this.  too.  is  part  of  the  Reality  to  be  investigated. 

The  first  of  these  difficulties,  the  lack  of  a  method,  presents 
itself  as  a  serious  one.  Metaphysics  claims  to  be  a  science,  yet  the 
metaphysician  is  the  first  to  deny  the  ability  of  scientific  method 
to  handle  his  data.  "Unlike  religion  and  imaginative  literature, 
Metaphysics  deals  with  the  ultimate  problems  of  existence  in  a 
purely  scientific  spirit;  its  object  is  intellectual  satisfaction,  and 
its  method  is  not  one  of  appeal  to  immediate  intuition  or  unan- 
alyzed  feeling,  but  to  the  critical  and  systematic  analysis  of  our 
conceptions.  Thus  it  clearly  belongs,  in  virtue  of  its  spirit  and 
method,  to  the  realm  of  science.*  But  that  the  method  of  science 
is  not  applicable  is  evident  when  we  note  that  "In  all  (italics 
mine)  our  science  we  are  constantly  compelled  to  use  hypothe- 
tical constructions,  which  often  are,  and  for  all  we  know  always 
may  be,  merely  'symbolic'  in  the  sense  that,  though  useful  in  the 
coordination  of  exerienced  data,  they  could  never  become  ob- 
jects of  direct  experience.''!  If  a  "systematic  analysis  of  our 
conceptions"  is  undertaken,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  we  shall 
ever  get  anything  in  addition  to  or  beyond  the  elements  which 
that  analysis  reveals ;  but  this  method  is  advanced  as  a  means  of 

*Taylor,  Elements   of   Metaphysics,   p.    19. 

*T"aylor,  op,   cit.,   p.    5. 

*Taylor,  op,  cit.,   p.    5. 

fTaylor,  op.  cit..  p.   36. 

36 


reaching  something  in  no  respect  comparable  with  the  original 
data,  namely.  »nr  concepts.  Just  h<>\v  an  analysis  of  our  con- 
cept- reveals  an  absolute— something  not  in  the  original,  is  diffi- 
cult to  see.  I'.ut  that  Metaphysics,  though  a  science,  is  not 
amenable  to  scientitics  method,  is  seen  from  the  latter  quota- 
tion above.  Tbe  hypothetical  constructions  of  the  scientist  may 
be  merely  'symbolic'  useful  but  never  the  objects  of  a  direct  ex- 
perience. Waiving  the  difficulties  invoked  even  in  attempting  to 
-tale  the  hypothesis,  how  is  it  to  be  verified?  In  scientific 
method,  when  prediction,  based  on  the  hypothesis  or  in  terms  of 
it,  are  fulfilled,  it  i>  said  to  be  verified.  When  action  carried 
on  in  the  light  of  the  hypothec  leads  t«.  results  which  were 
calculable  before  action  began,  is  a  statement  of  the  >ame  tiling, 
f'.nt  in  such  an  hypothesis  as  ih,  -[notion,  thci . 

havior    .<•  r    action    which    can 

d    which    will    give    the    hypothesis    a    t 

are    <>nr   tests,    these    ma\    share    the    lot    of    all    scientific    hypotheses 
that    is,    the\    may    be    merely    'symbolic'.      Since    truth    and    error, 
appearance   and    reality,   are    both    admitted    and    present    as    elements 
to    be    considered    in    th<  -sible 

that    the   i  -  d    shall    ':  -inch    at    1 

truth.      It    then    bee  appeal    to    another    principle 

-    in  the  ca.se.  outside  of   the   data  at   hand.   >uch 

;ntie    of    the    original    experience. 

In    the    second    place,    by    \\ '.  >hall    we    reco-ni/.e    that 

whic!  t     partial     verification"-     Admittedly     things 

are    n  il    and    less    real.     "A    completely      ade- 

quatc  apprehension  of  reality  would  In.  one  that  contained  all 
reabty  and  nothing  but  reality,  and  thus  involved  no  element 
whatever  of  deceptive  appearance."*  Such  an  expcrienc 

le   only    for   the   a'  '.lowing  marks  indicate  the 

nee  of  the  absolute  in  the  chaos  ,,f  appearance:  (a)  the 
comprehensiveness  of  the  system;  (b)  internal  systematization. 
Concerning  the  latter,  it  may  be  said  that  it  is  possible  to  build 
•vin  on  any  chosen  si-t  of  axioms  ,,r  principles,  which  pos- 
all  the  'internal  systematization'  the  biased  intellect  might 
crave,  but  this  fact  would  argue,  not  for  the  existence  of  an 
absolute,  but  for  the  accuracy  of  the  deductive  method  on  well 
defined  and  assumed  generals.  Grant  the  axioms  of  the  Euclid- 
ian geometry,  and  the  proofs  that  follow  do  not  argue  for  any 
principle  other  than  the  ability  to  deduce  from  assumptions  which 
are  unquestioned,  conclusions  possibly  less  patent  than  the  "as- 

*Taylor,  op.   cit.   p.   34. 

37 


sumptions.  Comprehensiveness  of  the  system  has  been  urged 
just  as  strongly  to  show  the  opposite  doctrine.  Matter,  Force, 
Energy,  are  postulates  which  have  been  employed  to  account  for 
the  facts  of  experience,  with  the  usual  result  that  the  absolute 
is  either  found  unessential  to  the  system,  or  is  reduced  to  the 
"unknowables."*  The  ancient  atomic  hypothesis  of  Democritus 
and  Leucippus  is  as  comprehensive  as  an  intellect  craving  harmony 
and  consistency  could  desire.  It  accounts  for  everything  from 
alcoholic  intoxication  to  the  construction  of  the  heavens,  yet  one 
would  not  urge  the  fact  of  its  comprehensive  character  as  evi- 
dence in  support  of  an  absolute  intellect.  In  short,  whatever 
postulate  one  might  select  will  result  in  a  system  as  comprehen- 
sive as  one  based  on  another  assumption.  The  same  field  is 
there  to  work  over,  the  same  problems  are  present,  and  the  com- 
prehensiveness of  the  system  is  measured  only  by  the  industry 
and  ability  of  the  author  of  it.  The  criteria  of  the  absolute 
apply  euqally  to  any  system — even  to  those  which  deny  its  exist- 
ence. 

But  since  human  thought  is  always  connected  with  specific 
problems,  even  the  problem  of  the  absolute  being  specific,  how 
are  we  to  place  any  achievement  of  it  in  the  scale  of  absolute 
values?  In  the  present  difficulty,  and  even  in  its  solution,  by 
what  marks  shall  we  behold  the  absolute  as  it  pervades  the  par- 
ticular? Human  experience  is  linear,  so  to  speak,  a  one-dimen- 
sional affair ;  while  systems  are  other-dimensional.  Because  this 
is  so,  we  can  never  experience  totals,  systems,  but  present  pro- 
blems here  and  now.  An  accumulation  of  particulars  may  be- 
come correlated  with  a  nervous  system,  resulting  in  a  habit,  either 
a  habit  of  thought  or  of  thinking,  or  a  habit  of  direct  action ; 
but  it  does  not  argue  for  an  absolute  intelligence. 

The  very  nature  of  the  undertaking  precludes  the  possibility 
of  solution;  not  only  of  reaching  a  conclusion,  but  of  stating 
the  problem,  granting  that  a  problem  exists.  Once  launch  -out  on 
the  problem  of  reality  in  general,  for  "Metaphysics  deals  with 
everything"*  and  there  is  no  place  to  begin  or  to  end,  but  there  is 
a  constant  shifting  of  particulars,  now  here,  now  there,  to  this 
principle,  to  that,  a  justification  of  this  by  that  and  that  by 
this,  until  by  sheer  exhaustion  the  whole  chaos  is  thrown  on  the 
shoulders  of  the  absolute,  as  offering  a  safe  refuge  for  the  dis- 


*Cf.    Buchner,    Force    and    Matter.    Also    Herbert    Spencer,    First    Principles, 

Ch.  III. 
*Taylor,   op.   cit.    p.    7. 

38 


cordant    elements,    for    (here    no    problems    arc    attacked,      but      the 
\Yhole    is    present    in    Immediate-    Experience. 

In   an   attack   upon   a   discordant   situation,   one    in    which  there 

is    a    licnuine    problem    present,    certain    factors    in    the    situation, 

ut   of   it,  are   taken   as    fixed,    for   granted,   and   are   used  as  a 

of    operations.     Certain    meanings    have    been    fixed    by    past 

solutions,    and    these    meanings    furnish    the    lever    for    the    removal 

of    the    present    difficulty       These    very    meanings.      however,      may 

themselves    become    the    object    of    inquiry    at    a    later    period    in   the 

Ition    of   other   difficulties,   but    in    such    a   cas<    ••ilu-r   meanings 

are   taken    as    fixed    and   are   held    SO   until    they    fail    to    function    in 

the    tensioiial    situation.      It    is    in    this    manner    that    hypotheses    are 

verified,    that     mear  clarified,    that    candidates     for 

»:vity    become    elected    to    their    positii«n>. 

In   speaking   of   the   priority  all   have    in 

mind    the    cognitive    aspect    •  '  'ther    aspects    have 

been     eiiiphasixid.    but     e\cn     in     the    <  of     the    activ 

peel,   the   romutur    >ide   is   the   a.umt.     The   problem    of    the    idealist 

rythinu    t-  '       \\'e    should    note 

that  consciousness  viewed  in  its  co-niti\e  aspect  includes  per- 
cept:. •  with  the  result  that  all  conduct 
is  lo^ici/ul  and  Consequently  the  ubiquity  i  if  '  'tie  of  the 
chief  ar.nuiiKiit.x  that  has  been  ur.ued  recently  a-aiiist  the  pri- 
orit\  $  "lie  which  has  een  called  the  argument 
from  trie  predicament".*  This  was  pointed  out  by 
(ireiii  wlun  lie  said  that  "no  object  can  be  conccircd  as  t\vistin</ 
except  in  relation  to  a  thinking  .subject"  should  not  be  confused 
with  the  proposition  "that  it  cannot  <••  t  in  the  relation."* 
The  ideal'  .  that  is  to  >ay.  from  the  proposition  that  every 
tliiiii;  that  is  known  to  exist  (perception  bein.u  a  case  of  know- 
ledge) is  idea,  to  the  c  that  nothing  can  exist  independ- 
ently of  hcini;  known.  \\'hat  the  idealist  really  shows,  it  - 
is  that  what  is  kna-icn  is  an  idea,  but  he  has  not  proved  that 
e\  ei  ythin-  is  idea.  It  seems  that  this  difficulty  is  a  genuine  one 
for  idealism,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  finite  knower  only,  and 
that  his  conclusion  is  based  on  an  enumeration  of  cases  in  in- 
dividual experience,  due  to  a  faulty  view  of  perception.  From 
the  point  of  view  of  the  absolute  knower,  the  idealist  can  escape  the 
argument  from  the  egocentric  predicament,  but  this  is  simly 
dogmatism.  In  this  connection  it  might  be  mentioned  that  the 

'Perry.   Journal    1'hilus.    VII.    1910.   pp.    5-14. 

*Quoted  from  Mackintosh,    Problem  of  Knowledge,  p.  96. 


argument  d<>i-s  not  prove  th  t  there  arc  things  independently  of 
1  icing  known,  when  kinnsiini  is  employed  in  the  same  sense. 
Tin-  realist  who  employs  the  argument,  therefore,  to  show  his 
own  doctrine  can  no  more  conclude  from  the  same  premises  that 
there  are  things  independently  of  being  known  than  the  idealist 
can  conclude  that  there  are  not — the  argument  applies  with  equal 
force  against  both  theories,  and  not  only  against  these,  but 
against  all  theories  which  render  ubiquitous  the  knowledge  rela- 
tion. 

Certain  facts  seem  to  tell  against  the  priority  of  conscious- 
ness. These  facts  are  those  connected  with  the  biological  view 
of  consciousness.  Certain  types  of  behavior,  such  as  automatic 
and  reflex,  not  to  mention  instinctive  behavior,  appear  to  be 
more  elemental  in  the  life  of  the  organism  and  of  the  species. 
In  the  lower  forms  of  animal  life  we  find  the  reflex  and  auto- 
matic behavior  such  as  will  meet  the  peculiar  needs  of  the  organ- 
ism. In  the  higher  forms  of  life  other  types  of  behavior  occur, 
until  in  man  the  ability  is  present  to  form  ''free"  ideas — until 
consciousness  appears.  In  the  child  the  lower  and  more  element- 
al types  appear  first  and  not  until  a  later  period  does  conscious- 
ness develop.  The  laws  of  forgetting,  and  the'  law  of  dissolu- 
tion* indicate  negatively  the  same  fact  of  the  late  arrival  of 
cognition. 

From  the  above  discussion  of  idealism  from  the  stand- 
points (a)  of  its  history  in  which  the  attempt  has  been  made  to 
show  that  the  interests  out  of  which  it  grew  have  ceased  to  exist 
in  their  former  manner,  and  (b)  that  it  cannot  account  for  its 
postulates — that  they  have  been  outgrown;  it  remains  to  consider 
briefly  the  logic  of  the  system.  In  a  general  way  the  remark 
will  pass  that  a  true  logic  of  idealism  is  the  logic  of  the  abso- 
lute— of  a  mind  endowed  with  the  categories  of  logic.  All  cog- 
nitive attempts  of  the  human  variety  separate  the  "that"  from 
the  "what",  even  in  sensation,  but  in  the  true  judgment  or  in- 
ference, no  separation  is  made  but  there  is  an  immediate  experi- 
ence of  differences  within  a  universal.  Processes,  either  deduc- 
tive or  inductive,  are  not  essential  to  a  true  logic ;  but  since  we 
actually  do  something  called  thinking,  it  is  a  task  of  interest  to 
arrange  these  processes  in  a  system  which  approximates  the  pure 
experience  of  the  absolute ;  but  a  true  logic  is  no  logic  at  all. 
It  is  because  we  see  through  a  glass  darkly  and  not  face  to  face 


'Baldwin,    Mental    Development,    Methods   and    Processes,    pp.    387-404. 

40 


that    we    must    place    mir    values    in    a    scale    for    comparison    with 
the   eternal   ones. 

The-  problems  of  idealistic  loi-ic  iiro\\-  mit  of  the  concep- 
tion of  reality  as  a  fixed  system,  a  non-Contradictory  and  self- 
sufficient  totality.  This  totality  is  "there."  "ijven".  in  the  same 
way  that  the  data  of  the  empiricist  are  uiven.  hut  for  the  ideal- 
ist it  is  an  already  organized  and  abiding  totality.  It  is  I 
in  th  if  bein.u  the  product  of  the  logical  absolute  mind. 

The   problem  that   true   l".^ic    is    no    lo-ic    at    all.   to 

Show  a  connection   between   the  temporal   human    intellect    and    the 
lute    mind.    ..r    anain.    to    show    the    method    by    which    a    know- 
«'f    the    true    real:  atic    universe,    is    achievetl     truth 

and    derives    of    reality    heinjn    for    thi-  J1C    identical.* 

Summan!  re      the  Reality. 

•id    Individual    Thinker.     Tli<  •  md    in   a    po>i- 

tioti  with    Reality    »n   one    side,   the    Individual 

with   his    ima^e    in    the    middle,   and    Ideas   on    the   other    side.     The 
problem    !  '  ^.    to    apply    to    Reality    an     Idea.      The    metl: 

the  ji'.iliMiunt  :  the  individual  with  his  ima-«-.     The  human- 

!;t\   which  is  outsidr,  there,  to 

be    kno\vn.    and    he    C"im •>     into  ,  ith     Rc.alit\     in    p< 

lii.n.  world    must    !  i"rom    these    percep- 

I    kni  iwled^f-  -the      point      of    im- 

nu-dia-  rl    with    reality.     \Y.  k    the      following      ques- 

•  -ut    the    com.  |  \\  <  t  n    th<  '      in      the 

-.i-tivity  :      (a)     Is    Realit  -In-    judgment 

side?      (1   )    Are    Ideas    //,    tin.-    R«.alit\    <ir    di.    the\       exist    in    then-- 

•\" tlier    uorld    when    no-  ferred    to    Reality?1 

Ideas    fornud?      (d)    What    is    the    relation    bctuetii 

the    Ima^e   and   the    1«K:.  .t    part    of 

Reality? 

d    such    that    reality    is    inside    the   judgment, 
there  n    for   judgment    because    of    the    coincident 

ility.      If.    however,    a   jud.ununt    is    made,    it    is    made 
in   tlie    l."ckian    -  nu-nt   of    our 

>-an   never  know   whether  or  not   the   ideas 

are   the   same  as   the   reality.     Since   the   idealist   regards   perception 

as   kn.'\vKdt:e.   he   is   compel!-  ,\er    (a)    such   that   reality   is 

.•Hunt  as   Bosanquet   does.     "If   the   object-matt 

•  -I'tuly   outside   the   s\stem    of    ihou^ht,   not   only   our 

ut    thou-ht    itself,    would    he    unable      to    lay      hold      of 

"Bradl-  ..rid    Reality,    ("h.    15. 

41 


reality."*  It  seems  evident  that  thought  does  somehow  "lay 
hold  of  reality". 

Now  "the  real  world  for  every  individual  is  emphatically 
his  world. "f  That  is  to  say,  the  world  for  every  individual  is  an 
extension  of  his  present  perception,  "  which  perception  is  to  him 
not  indeed  reality  as  such,  hut  his  point  of  contact  with  reality 
as  such."  In  perception,  therefore,  the  individual  does  not  get 
reality  as  such,  hut  his  content  or  idea  of  it.  In  this  case,  when 
he  applies  an  idea,  he  is  applying  an  idea  to  another,  and  not  ty 
reality.  If  it  is  enswered  that  reality  is  outside  the  thought  pro- 
cess, we  can  never  get  at  it  by  thought  and  can  consequently 
make  no  judgments  about  it.  Stating  this  again,  we  may  say 
that  if  perception  is  a  case  of  knowing,  we  never  can  know  the 
object,  but  only  the  idea,  and  our  judgments  are  merely  the 
reference  of  one  idea  to  another. 

As  to  (b)  if  it  is  answered  that  ideas  are  /;/  reality,  then 
why  make  any  judgments,  for  what  is  to  be  referred  to  reality 
is  already  there?  If  it  is  not  in  reality,  how  does  it  ever  get  there, 
and  if  it  does  get  there  how  do  we  know  that  it  is  a  correct  refer- 
ence? That  is,  what  determines  just  which  one  of  the  ideas  in 
the  world  of  ideas  shall  be  applied  to  the  "this"  of  immediate 
experience?  If  ideas  arc  without  being  referred  to  reality,  if 
they  are  in  a  world  of  existence,  what  idea  (since  an  idea  is  in 
essence  a  meaning)  can  be  referred  to  them  in  a  judgment  which 
can  in  any  way  characterize  them?  Regarding  the  world  of  ideas, 
Bosanquet  says :  "It  is  not  easy  to  deny  that  there  is  a  world 
of  ideas  or  of  meanings  which  simply  consists  in  that  identical 
reference  of  symbols  by  which  mutual  understanding  between 
rational  beings  is  made  possible.  A  mere  suggestion,  a  mere 
question,  a  mere  negation,  seem  all  of  them  to  imply  that  we 
sometimes  entertain  ideas  without  affirming  them  of  reality." 
"I  only  adduce  these  considerations  in  order  to  explain  that 
transitional  conception  of  an  objective  world,  distinct  from  the 
real  world,  or  world  .of  facts,  with  which  it  is  impossible  wholly 
to  dispense  in  an  account  of  thought  starting  from  the  individual 
subject."* 

But  the  "world  of  objective  reference  and  the  world  of 
reality  are  the  same  world. "f  Bosanquet  has  assumed  a  meta- 
physical reality  as  a  fixed  totality  of  subject-matter  which  is 

*Bosanquet,    Logic,    Vol.    1,    pp.    2  j. 

tOp,    cit.,    p.    3. 

*Logic,   Vol.    1,   pp.   4,   5. 

tLoc.   cit. 

42 


iogiciscd  by  an  absolute  consciousness,  tin  re  to  be  known  by  the 
individual  knower.  On  this  assumption.  meaning  and  reality 
must  coincide,  but  in  this  case  no  judgment  can  he  made.  In 
order  that  judgment  may  be  possible,  and  therefore  knowledge 
(individual),  meanings  must  be  "floating"  to  be  seized  and  re- 
ferred as  occasion  demands.  \Ve  then  have  on  .»ur  hands  a 
reality  which  means  nothing,  in  which  case  we  deny  the  original 
assumption,  and  if  we  affirm  the  original  assumption  we  deny 
the  function  of  judgment.  In  answer  to  (c)  ideas  are  formed 
-election  of  element-  which  are  common  in  a  large  number 
of  particular  cases.  "The  name  stands  for  tlio.se  elements  in  tin- 
idea  which  correspond  in  all  our  separate  worlds,  and  in  our  own 
world  "f  \esterday  and  of  t»d;i\,  ci-nsiderei':  -landing. "J 

Ho\\  i-  this  -election  made-?  Reality  is  presented  in  perception. 
Selection  takes  place.  This  is  continued  until  a  meaning  is 
formed.  I'.ut  the  reply  is  made  that  it  was  reality  (which  just 
is  meaning)  which  i-  presented.  11.. w  form  a  meaning  when  it 
is  the  meaning  which  is  direct!)  proum-d?  If  this  objection 
will  not  be  granted,  the  only  Oth<  of  the  question  is  that 

meaning  wa-  not  presented  (or  reality)  immediately,  it 
tr.u-t  have  hem  presented  mediately,  through  an  idea,  resulting  in 
the  fact  that  our  meanings  are  meanings  of  nKas  and  n..t  of 
reality.  Again,  the  meanin-  1  in  this  manner  are  twice 

removed  from  nality.  e\m  in  the  case  of  perceptual  knowledge 
and  they  can  never  get  back  to  rear  ;  \>\  vine  mystcr- 

ioiiN    act    l-\     which    they    telescope    the    >co>n<l    hand    copy    and    the 
subject    of     the     first     presentation.      P.osanipiet       answers       (c)       by 
:    that    i(Uas    are    not    mere    particular    mental    image-    which 
through    consciousness,    but    they    are    employed    solely    for   tin- 
sake    of    their    gunral    signification.* 

The  image  is  the  fleeting,  the  idea,  that  which  remains  cm 
-tart  in  its  n  ft  mice  throughout  the  differences  ,,f  imagi-ry. 
The  imagery  has  n»  logical  value,  but  is  purely  personal,  purely 
psychological.  The  idea,  however,  frees  from  the  subjectivity 
of  the  individual,  and,  by  its  universal  reference,  gives  objec- 
tivity- objectivity,  that  is  to  say.  from  the  standpoint  of  the  in- 
div'dual  knower.  Xow.  taken  from  the  standpoint  of  the  indi- 
vidual, the  idia  is  a>  much  a  product  of  his  as  is  the  image  per- 
sonal to  him.  a  fact  which  becomes  patent  the  moment  one  con- 
siders the  method  by  which  an  idea  is  formed.  If  it  is  formed 


tOp.  i- it.  p.  46. 
•I.I.JMC.   p.   73. 


43 


liy  the  elimination  of  incongruities  in  particular  instances,  or  is 
the  combination  of  elements  common  to  all  our  worlds,  it  is  as 
particular  as  any  image  which  serves  as  an  element  in  the  whole. 
and  in  fact  is  composed  of  just  the  factors  which  are  asserted 
to  possess  no  logical  value.  By  a  process  of  elimination  and  ad- 
dition, a  meaning  is  formed  from  particulars,  any  one  of  which  is 
infected  with  subjectivity,  but  which,  when  combined,  lose  their 
subjectivity,  and  become  attributes  of  reality,  now  in  the  facts, 
now  referred  to  the  facts  as  a  means  of  interpretation,  securing  in 
the  process  of  combination  universality  and  objectivity  such  as 
was  possessed  by  none  of  the  constituents.  If  the  idea  is  my 
idea,  and  if  the  image  has  no  logical  value,  then  neither  has  the 
idea.  It  is  in  perception  that  immediate  contact  with  reality 
(that  is.  reality  from  the  standpoint  of  the  individual)  takes 
place.  The  idea,  being  the  common  elements  of  many  percep- 
tions, becoming  the  more  general  as  the  process  is  continued, 
would,  it  seems,  be  a  most  unsatisfactory  method  of  interpret- 
ing realit\.  for  the  very  reason  that  the  farther  the  process  is 
carried  the  farther  the  idea  recedes  from  reality.  The  above  re- 
marks, however,  apply  only  to  the  conception  of  reality  as 
"there".  When  it  is  regarded  itself  as  constructed  by  the  indi- 
vidual as  an  extension  of  his  present  perceptions,  the  situation 
begins  to  grow  in  complexity.  If  reality  as  such  is  not  presented 
in  perception  but  only  the  individual's  contact  with  reality  as 
such,  then  the  idea  which  the  individual  forms  is  not  formed  by 
contact  with  reality  as  such  but  only  of  reality  from  the  stand- 
point of  the  individual.  The  puzzle  is  as  to  how  such  an  idea 
could  be  adequate  to  reality  as  such,  having  at  no  time  in  its 
genesis  been  in  connection  with  that  which  it  is  to  qualify  or  to 
which  it  is  to  refer.  It  seems  that  the  difficulties  of  the  situation 
might  best  be  stated  in  an  answer  to  the  question,  What  is 
given  in  perception?  If  reality  is  given,  why  refer  to  it  an  idea 
which  it  is?  If  the  subject  of  the  judgment  is  not  given  in  per- 
ception, that  is,  if  the  subject  is  a  construct  of  the  individual  by 
an  extension  of  his  perceptions,  where  does  he  get  the  predicate 
1  \  which  to  construct  the  subject?  On  the  one  hand  he  is  con- 
structing the  subject  of  the  judgment  by  predicates  of  the  judg- 
ment which  he  has  constructed  by  a  combination  of  elements  which 
he  has  gained  in  his  contact  with  the  subject  of  the  judgment  in  his 
perceptual  experiences.  On  the  other  hand  he  is  constructing  the 
predicates  of  his  judgments  from  the  combination  of  elements 
gained  in  his  perceptual  experiences  of  the  subject  of  the  judg- 
ment, and  is  using  these  predicates  as  valid  in  their  reference 

44 


to  their  source,  ami  is  thereby  building  up  a  larger  world.  All 
this  process  of  construction  takes  place  through  the  image  which 
has  no  logical  standing.  The  image,  while  it  has,  on  this  theory, 
no  logical  standing  as  meaning,  possesses  in  addition  to  meaning, 

nee  as  a  psychological  fact-  that  it  is  a  part  of  reality.  As 
such  it  is  either  a  construct  itself,  or  the  "given"  in  immediate 
experience.  If  it  i>  a  construct,  it  is  constituted  in  the  same  man- 
ner that  any  other  subject  or  predicate  i>  constructed,  and  if  it 
is  a  "given"  it  is  amenable  to  treatment  as  the  subject,  and  thus 
of  the  fiber  of  reality,  to  which  can  be  referred  a  predicate 
gained  by  the  elements  which  correspond  in  all  our  common 
worlds. 

It  would  be  unnecessary  to  carry  over  the  difficulties  involved 
in  the  jit-:  treated  '  |tut  to  his  treatment  of  in- 

ference. The  close  connection  between  the  two  processes,  the 
one  a  direct  and  the  other  an  indirect  or  nicdi.,rc  reference  to 
reality  of  an  ideal  content,  renders  it  impossible  to  eliminate  the 
difficulties  in  inference  which  are  present  in  judgment.  The  re- 
lation between  the  two  processes  is  made  clear  in  the  words,  of 
Mediate  judgment  «.r  inference  is  the  indirect  re- 
ferciii  !;ty  of  d-  within  a  universal  by  means  of 

the  exhibition  of  this  unuersal  in  di:'  directly  referred  to 

reality."*  Immedi.r  -  the  foundation  of  mediate  re- 

ference, and  if  the  foundation  of  mediate  reference  is  faulty,  it 

rtain    that    the   structure   cannot    escape    the    strain. 

Summarizing  the  critic-  DSt  idealism  we  may  say  that 

a  criticism  of  the  system  is  a  criticism  from  the  standpoint  of 
because  of  the  ubiquity  of  the  knowledge  relation.  Hven 
"The  unc.  -ation  by  reproduction  fill- 

tills  some  of  the  functions  of  inference."!  In  early  soul  life 
where  the  reproduction  is  unconscious,  the  reproduction  of  a 
universal,  that  is.  we  have  the  problem  of  logic.  With  this  in 
mind,  the  attempt  has  been  made  to  show  that  idealism,  being  a 
philosophy  of  religion,  fails  because  the  data  of  religion  have 
beui  interpreted  in  terms  of  science — that  the  data  against 
which  idealism  was  formulated  have  been  reinterpreted.  The 
attempt  has  been  '  made  to  show  that  idealism,  struggling  with 
science  in  the  early  days  of  the  scientific  movement,  sought  to 
interpret  nature  in  terms  of  mind,  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
priority  of  mind,  believing  that  by  showing  the  subject  matter  of 
science  to  be  mental,  and  by  working  on  the  principle  of  the 


:.  2.  P.  4 

-i-Op.    ci:  p.    16. 

45 


spirituality  of  mind,  that  the  problems  of  the  scientist  were  a 
part  of  the  problem  of  the  metaphysician  and  religious  philoso- 
pher. This  doctrine  was  shown  to  be  faulty  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  biological  conception  of  mind  and  from  the  inherent 
difficulties  in  the  postulate  itself.  With  the  breakdown  of  the 
subjectivist  view  of  mind,  an  additional  postulate,  the  absolute. 
was  used  to  render  objective  the  world  of  nature — objective, 
that  is,  from  the  point  of  the  individual  knower.  It  was  shown 
that  such  an  hypothesis  is  a  poetic  form  of  anthropomorphism, 
and  that  it  can  never  be  verified.  In  the  last  place,  an  examina- 
tion of  the  purely  logical  treatment  based  on  such  a  metaphysical 
theory,  shows  that  the  logical  processes  of  judgment  and  infer- 
ence cannot  take  place. 


46 


THE  NEW  REALISM 

Tlu-    Xew    Realism    is    the    latest    addition    to    the    philosophical 
household.     A    few    tendencies    in    modern    life    might    he    cited    as 
furnishing   a   social   hackground    for  the   system.     It   is   n. 
however,   to   account    for   a   movement   which    is    recent   as   it   is   for 
one    \\ho-.  md    setting    ate    h"th    marked    hy    great    epochs 

in  history.  Croce*  gays,  in  speaking  «.f  the  origin  .»f  Logistic 
which  he  considers  the  logical  and  mathematical  hack-ground  of 
what  we  call  New  Realism,  that  harrenness  of  the  period  of  any 
thing  worthy  of  the  name  philosophy  is  a  leading  element  in  its 
development.  "\Ve  mu>t  n.  the  circumstances  which  at- 

tended its  hlossoming  time,  or.  to  speak  more  correctly,  the  time 
at  which  it  spread  out  its  thorns  towards  the  sun.  Philosophical 
controversy  had  then  b  •  external  and  empty,  had  des- 

cended to  siieh  pedantic  and  tiresome  quiliMing.  that  soon  after- 
wards an  insurrection  arose  among  the  spirits  it  had  held  cap- 
tive." Al-out  thi>  time  ohjective  idealism  had  suffered  at  the 
Irands  of  P,radh\.  and  a  spirit  of  philosophical  unrest  was  pre- 
sent. The  ancient  moorings  had  heen  se\i-red  idealism  ••re- 
futed", empirici-m  with  its  duality  of  thing  and  mind  in  had  re- 
pute, pragmatism  not  as  yet  with  a  fool  who 
free  from  the  pre^me  oi  life  might  develop  in  their  own 
•seclusion  any  >ystem  which  might 

The  definite  result-  of  the  positive  scientists  have  contrast- 
ed strongly  with  the  ch  nflicting  opinions  in  the  field  of 
philosophy.  Psychology  ,,n  the  one  hand  and  mathematics  on 
the  other  have  shared  in  the  genesis  of  this  type  of  thinking. 
The  "conUnt  of  consciousness",  the  supposed  field  of  the  psy- 
chologic covered  the  -ame  material  as  that  of  the  other  sciences. 
Attempts  to  state  the  relation  hetween  psychology  and  the  other 
sciences  hrinu;  into  relief  some  of  the  characteristic  doctrines  of 
the  new  realism.  The  application  <>f  mathematics  to  physics  and 
astronomy,  and  later  hy  Herhart  and  Fechner  to  the  material  of 
psychology,  had  its  influence  in  hringing  mathematics  to  hear  on 
the  suhject  matter  of  logic. 

There    have    always    heen    those    to    \\hom    the    exactness  .and 
of    ma;'  iled.     At    certain    times    in    the    Ifstory 

'Kncyclopedia  of  the   Philosophical  Sciences,   Vol.    1,   pp.    199-200. 

47 


of  philosophy  this  attitude  has  taken  possession  of  a  people,  hut 
in  all  times  a  few.  shut  out  from  the  affairs  of  active  living,  take 
comfort  in  the  construction  of  worlds  far  superior  to  that  in 
which  it  is  the  lot  .of  the  ordinary  man  to  achieve  values.  Such 
theorixers  say  in  effect,  "If  I  can't  control  the  affairs  of  the  world 
of  action,  I  can  control  a  much  hetter  one — the  world  of  con- 
struction". Not  satisfied  with  the  world  of  action,  shut  out  hy 
circumstances  which  control  them  or  hy  their  own  individual 
choice,  they  build  a  world  in  keeping  with  their  desires  of  per- 
fection and  completeness.  Indeed  it  might  not  he  far  amiss  to 
Mi.ygest  that  one  motif  for  the  polemical  attitude  towards  idea- 
lism is  the  very  fact  that  the  latter  builds  so  perfectly  a  uni- 
verse with  so  few  "loose  ends".  So  eager  a  desire  for  such  a  uni- 
might  lead  one  to  revolt  when  one  found  by  chance  a 
"loose  end",  leading  on  to  the  building  of  "more  stately  man- 
sions." Surely  the  interest  is  not  in  the  problems  of  this  world, 
as  such  statements  as  the  following  indicate  :* 

"The  world  of  being  is  unchangeable,  rigid,  exact, 
delightful  to  the  mathematician,  the  logician,  the  builder 
of  metaphysical  systems,  and  all  who  love  perfection 
more  than  life.  The  world  of  existence  is  fleeting,  vague. 
without  sharp  boundaries,  without  any  clear  plan  or 
arrangement,  hut  it  contains  all  thoughts  and  feelings,  all 
data  of  sense,  and  all  physical  objects,  everything  that 
can  do  either  good  or  harm,  everything  that  makes  any 
difference  to  the  value  of  life  and  the  world.  Accord- 
ing to  our  temperaments,  we  shall  prefer  the  contempla- 
t:on  of  the  one  or  the  other." 

As  in  the  days  of  Plato  wlun  the  ground  became  sinking- 
sand,  he  could  look  for  the  static  in  the  idea  ;  or  as  could  the  mystic 
charmed  with  the  vision  of  eternal  completeness  in  contrast 
with  the  llccting  tilings  of  time;  so  can  the  philosopher-mathe- 
matician escape  the  chaos  of  Conflicting  systems  and  find  a 
haven  of  rest  in  the  "entities  that  merely  are."  The  boldness 
of  the  hold  of  the  romanticists  is  theirs,  for  they  create  if  the 
present  order  of  things  fails  to  satisfy — they  create,  moreover, 
in  the  name  of  discover},  a  world  from  which  tluv  sought  free- 
dom, a  world  of  struggle,  of  successes  and  of  failures. 

But  it  is  proper  that  the  realist  himself  should  tell  us  what 
it  is  he  expects  to  accomplish.  We  can  then  be  assured  that  his 
mission  is  not  undervalued.  "The  old  logic  put  thought  in  fetters, 
while  the  new  logic  gives  it  wings.  It  has.  in  my  opinicn.  in- 
troduced the  same  kind  of  advance  into  philosophy  as  (/aliieo 

*Russell,   The    Problems   of   Philosophy,   p.    156. 

48 


introduced  int<>  physics,  mak'ng  it  possible  at  least  to  sec  \vliat 
kinds  of  problems  may  In.'  capable  of  solution,  and  \vliat  kiiul 
must  lie  abandoned  as  beyond  human  power-.  And  wher-.-  the 
solution  appears  possible,  the  new  logic  provides  a  method  which 
inahK-s  us  to  obtain  results  that  do  IT  >t  merely  embody  personal 
idiosynci  asu -.  but  must  command  the  assent  of  all  who  arc  com- 
petent to  form  an  opinion."*  In  fact  the  realistic  movement 
might  be  characterized  as  a  griuTa!  philosophical  IIOUM-  clean- 

m      -\\  1 i  p^      wide-.     "There      i- 
ground    i". 

an   opportunity   of    reform"     all   the    wa\    from    th  •   "-crupulo;;- 
of    words"    to  1  linate 

allible 
ntit'ic    pr«  .redure  ;    and    in 

!n    the  phy. 

'.  )    \\  ill 

a    pr< 

mplex 

d,     the 

in    sli  '    in    the    ord:i 

all    ti 

in    viiw    of    il> 

'ne    of    th' 

:!u-    finite    knower.      in      boil, 
the        logical        ]>; 
r.    but    h-  MI)    in    the 

11     of     hitt< 

nnity.     The     individual    knower    may      at    times 

thru   the  -thin, 

but    tl  n    just    th-  hether    the    peepin- 

alistic    logician 

:  lough 

-ible.*    but    the    theory    in    its    purity    separates 

from    the    psychological.      \V\v     Realism,    ho\v- 

the    mind    <.f    its    functions    and 


.   Vol.    1.   I-.    5. 

49 


having  placed  tlum  in  the  »vi>rld  at  lurg'-,  t<>  relate  promiscuously 
whatever  tcims  they  perchance  may  staler  on,  lias  no  further 
need  of  it  and  consequently  drops  it  from  its  vocahulary. 

The  second  point  of  agreement  consists  in  the  adoption  by  hoth 
of  what  the  realists  term  the  "fallacy  of  exclusive  particularity." 
This  point  of  contact  is,  indeed,  a  result  of  the  exclusion  of  the 
knower  as  an  individual  from  logical  processes  per  sc.  If  the 
knower  is  on  the  outside,  some  means  must  he  taken  to  account 
for  knowldge  which  is  admitted  present.  The  idealist  as  was 
seenf  attempts  to  make  a  connection  by  means  of  imagery  which 
is  "psychological" ;  while  the  realist  defines  the  individual  as  a 
knower.  That  is  to  say,  the  making  of  the  individual  a  kno-^cr 
is  definitive— that  is  all  that  can  he  said  about  him.  He  cannot 
enter  into  other  relations  with  objects  which  are  objects  of  know- 
ledge only4 

Sensations  and  perceptions  are  cases  of  knowing.  There  is 
numerical  duplicity  which  leads  to  a  discussion  of  the  relation 
of  a  thing  to  its  appearances — a  problem  peculiarly  idealistic, 
but  which  the  realist  must  face  in  view  of  his  conception  of 
knowledge.  "The  problem  of  knowledge"  says  Perry,*  "reduces 
in  the  last  analysis  to  the  problem  of  the  relation  between  a 
mind  and  that  which  is  related  to  a  mind  as  its  object.  The 
constant  feature  of  this  relationship  is  mind."  Mind,  that  is, 
being  a  uniform  relation  may  be  dropped  out.  The  idealist,  how- 
ever, insists  just  as  strongly  that  the  other  aspect  of  the  duplicity 
can  be  dropped ;  showing  that  both  idealism  and  realism  are  ar- 
guing from  a  common  assumption — that  of  "exclusive  particul- 
arity." Professor  Dewey  in  speaking  of  this  common  point  in 
the  two  doctrines  says:  "Otherwise  (i.  e.  unless  knowing  is  con- 
sidered as  a  differentiation  in  a  biological  process)  we  are  rais- 
ing the  quite  foolish  question  as  to  what  is  the  relation  of  a  rela- 
tion to  itself,  or  the  equally  foolish  question  of  whether  being  a 
thing  modifies  the  thing  as  it  is.  And  moreover,  epistemological 
realism  and  idealism  say  the  same  thing:  realism  that  a  thing 
does  not  modify  itself,  idealism  that,  since  the  thing  is  what  it 
is.  it  stands  in  the  relation  that  is  does  stand  in."f 

Another  suggestion  that  may  not  be  unfruitful  in  linking  the 
new  realism  with  the  two  systems  treated  in  former  chapters  is 
the  emphasis  by  the  former  on  discrete  ultimates  as  the  data  of 

tCh.    1. 

tin   this   connection,    see    Dewey,    Essays    in    Experimental    Logic,    pp.    268    ff. 

*Perry,   Present   Philosophical   Tendencies,  p.   272. 

tOp.  cit.  p  276. 

50 


knowledge.  Relations,  terms,  sense  data,  etc.,  function  in  real- 
ism as  do  sensations  in  the  empirical  logic  and  in  the  logic  of  ob- 
jective idealism  from  the  standpoint  of  the  individual  knower. 

In  the  empirical  logic  it  was  found  that  certain  relations 
are  in  the  mind,  hut  others  arc  in  things;  that  is,  there  are 
l>oth  internal  and  external  relations.  In  idealism,  however,  they 
are  all  internal.  In  realism  all  relations  are  external.*  For  as- 
•;ouism  analysis  reveals  certain  elementary  sensations  which 
are  the  real;  for  realism  the  analytic  <K terminations  are  the 
real  and  for  both,  objects  are  complexes  o>mpos<.<d  or  made  up 
of  these  uhimates.  The  problems  are  merely  transferred  to  a 
different  locus  but  they  remain  the  .-amc.  For  the  subjective 
idealist  the  problem  of  how  these  »uisati.in>  ban-  t"getln  r  was 
line-  and  He-Hub  \  answered  that  they  find  unity  in 
the  soul.  Hume  showed  that  the  soul  was  a  po. -r  'unit'ieT*.  and 
_h  !:n  .NHL  following  his  father,  had  ree-'.urse  to  a  "thread  of 
consciousness."  The  Kantian  finds  relations  in  the  mind  and  ali 
uirati/ed  l.y  means  ,,f  the-  Transcendental  1'nity  of  Ap- 
perception. The-  n  ies  along  and  throws  «>ut  the  whole 
to  shift  for  themselves,  "no  where  and  no  when".  There  is 
merely  a  transtYr.  The'  realist  -coops  elements  in  the  nature 
use  impressions  and  relations  from  the  warm  and  hospit- 
able mind  of  the  psychological  knower  and  dumps  them  into  the- 
co,  .1  •  i.\ternali;\  ;  lie  seizes  the  logical  catcgorie-s  of  the 
mind  of  an  all-eompell'ng  Jo\e-.  and  han'shing  the-  possessor  to 
the  regions  of  an  outsider,  sets  up  for  business  in  another 
I  with  a  new  absolute  in  the  ;ier>..n  of  terms,  relations,  and 
propositions-absolutes  that  are-  just  "there",  but  which  are  power- 
ful withal  for  they  generate  a  uni\< 

If    these   points   of    contact    are   granted,   it    follows   that   all   the 

arguments    ir.ade    against     tin-    other    systems     in     respect    to    these 

particular   matters   can    be   urged    with   equal   force  against   the   new 

realism:    the    relation    between    the    content    of    knowledge    and    its 

;   the    placr   of   the    individual    knower.   and    the      problem      of 

;ructing    a    world    in    terms    of    uhimates. 

Coming  neiw  to  a  more  direct  treatment  of  the  new  realism, 
we-  are  confronted  at  the  outset  with  a  diversity  of  opinion  on 
many  of  the  essentials.  What  is  the  nature  of  consciousness? 
Here-  we  find  but  little  unanimity  of  doctrine.  On  the  one  ex- 

*This  statement  indicates  the  logical  position  for  an  epistomological  monism 
of  the  realistic  type,  but  not  all  realists  hold  this  view.  They  may  be 
divided  into  the  "tough  minded"  and  the  "tender  minded" — the  former 
gcing  the  whole  length,  the  latter  refusing  to  externalize  everything. 
These  types  will  be  considered  later. 

51 


trcme   we  see  it  as  a   somewhat  to  which    something    is   presented. 
On  the  other  extreme  it  is  itself  one  of  the  entities  in  a  "neutral 

mosaic".  What  are  "primary"  and  what  are  "secondary"  quali- 
and  are  some  ot"  the  latter  subjective?  Here  the  "tender 
minded"  hesitate  hut  the  "tough  minded"  are  sure  they  are  all 
objective.  How  account  for  error?  Here  again  is  discord;  here 
it  depends  upon  a  subject,  there  it  is  purely  objective. 

The  logic  of  the  new  realism  is  confronted  with  an  initial 
pctitio  priitcipii*  It  strikes  one  as  strange,  too,  that  this  should 
be  the  case.  In  order  to  get  the  discussion  under  way  it  is  es- 
sential that  we  begin  with  a  pctitio.  It  is  significant,  however, 
for  the  initial  error  is  never  removed,  as  we  shall  attempt  to 
show  in  connection  with  the  determination  of  the  data  of  science. 
It  is  also  significant  that  this  admission  is  made  by  a  member  of 
the  school.  It  makes  it  the  more  noteworthy  of  consideration, 
for  if  it  came  from  an  outsider,  such  outsider  would  he  accused 
of  not  having  ability  to  "form  an  intelligent  opinion".  If  it  came 
from  a  scientist,  he  might  be  accused  of  being  ignorant  of  the 
fundamentals  of  philosophy;  if  it  came  from  a  philosopher. 
ignorance  of  mathematics  could  be  imputed  to  him;  and  if  it 
came  from  a  psychologist,  general  ignorance  of  everything  rel- 
evant to  logic  is  his  predicament. 

"We  shall  not  attempt  here  to  give  a  rigorously  lo<jical  ex- 
position of  the  principles  of  Logic.  Such  an  exposition  is  very 
difficult  in  any  science,  but  it  would  possibly  be  impossible  in 
Logic,  for  when  we  are  dealing  with  the  primary  concepts  of 
thought  in  general  it  is  impossible  to  find  others  by  which  these 
can  be  defined.  What  would  be  the  g<>"d,  for  instance,  of  ac- 
cepting the  notion  of  implication  as  indefinable,  and  then  going 
on  to  define  the  proposition  as  'everything  which  implies  itself':3 
Paradoxical  as 'it  may  appear,  it  is  impossible  to  have  a  loi/ical 
exposition  of  the  principles  of  logic:  vve  are  condemned  in  ad- 
vance to  a  pctitio  principii  or  to  a  I'icions  circle."!  The  author, 
however,  is  frank  to  state  that  it  is  useless  to  attempt  to  dis- 
guise the  fact,  but  insists  that  it  is  better  to  admit  it  in  the  be- 
ginning, "without  any  idle  logical  vanity". 

In  the  face  of  these  difficulties  it  seems  best  to  treat  first 
the  type  of  realism  wiheh  we  shall  call  the  "tender  minded." 
The  principle  employed  in  distinguishing  the  two  types  hinges 
on  the  locus  and  function  of  the  psychical  in  the  system.  It  i> 

*I   am   using  the   "analytic"   logic   or  mathematical   logistic   here  as  the  logic  of 

the     iH-vv     realism. 
iCuuturat      Encyclopedia    of   the    Philosophical    Sciences,    Vol.    1,   p.    138. 


to  lie  kept  in  mind  that  the  fundamental  principle  of  new  real- 
ism is  the  independence  or  priority  of  things,  things  being  either 
nts  or  subsistents,  and  both  falling  under  the  general  cate- 
gory of  bsinti.  Idealism  had  made  bciiKj  kno:^n,  or  being  ivilled, 
the  fundamental  category,  and  it  is  from  this  standpoint  that 
realism  takes  its  departure.  Its  aim,  in  short,  is  to  exclude  the 
act  of  knowing  from  loyic.  to  divorce  metaphysics  and  epistem- 
ology;  and  to  do  this,  remembering  the  while  that  there  is  some- 
thing properly  known  as  psychical  involves  the  ta.sk  of  assimiinv; 
t'»  the  logical  and  to  the  psychological  each  its  proper  place  in  the 

I.      It   is.  therefore,   upon   this   matter  that   the  division   1; 
()n   the   one   hand    then-   are   those    who   have    not    broken    with    the 
idealistic    tradition,    and    who    consequently      treat    the      mind 

'!     aiciircr.     There    are    other-     .  :f\    mind,    who 

it    in   an   objecti\e   atmosphere   as   one   of    the    simple   or   com- 
plex   entities    which    go    to    make    up    the    universe    at    lai 

Tilt!)     and 

the    i. IK  •:      treatin  is    depend- 

uit   upon   the   psychical   <>r  a    function  "•"   the   mind;   the  «>ther  treat- 
it    is,    indted,    in    the    interest^    ,,f    this    very 
that    tin  may 

.say.  instead  of  making  the  principle  of  division  hinge  on  the  place 
and  function  of  mind  in  experience,  that  it  hinges  on  the  problem 
of  truth  and  error  that  those  who  recall  the  Alci!>iadean  mind 
to  make  room  for  error  belong  to  the  half  hearted  realists;  whiie 
who  are  with  the  fundamentals  of  the  system  and 

make    error    obj,et:\e.    are    the    thor  .1     whole-heart- 

id     realist-. 

The    two    t\pes    are    ckarly    seui    in    the    treatment      of      Mich 

problems   as   secondary   qualities.     The   realist   believe-   that   if   there 

are    no    ideas,    images    or    mental    constructs    of    any    kind    between 

ii>    and    reality,    the    knowledge    problem    disappears.      because      we 

are    in    immediate    cognitive    relation    with    an    independent    reality 

asistcnt    realism   will    find    it    impossible   to    do   otherwise    than 

!;rm    the    independent    reality    of    all    sense    qualities;    but    here 

who   waver   in   order   to   account    for   error, 

who   boldly   assert   the   objectivity   of    sense   qualities   and 

treat  error  as  objective.     The  reaction  against   idealism   is  complete 

in   many   cases    in    a  to   the   effect   that      in   perception     the 

.>{    is    the    independently    real    physical    thing    perceived,    and 

not   only   percepts,   but    also   images  and  judgments   are   fully   phy- 

3    and    error.-    are      introduced      by      mind      but     the 

53 


errors  so  introduced  arc  always  objective.*  Krror  arises  from 
misdescription,  yet  when  an  object  is  seen  differently,  it  is  diffcr- 
tnt  and  looks  different,  but  its  full  reality  is  the  continuous  total- 
ity of  its  partial  appearances,,  each  of  which  is  also  independent- 
ly rcal.t  The  sensation  of  blue  is  an  awareness  of  blue  and  the 
awareness  of  blue  is  not  itself  blue.  The  idealist  asserts  that  to 
say  blue  exists  is  the  same  in  meaning  as  to  say  blue  plus  con- 
sciousness- exists,  but  this,  says  the  realist,  is  a  self-contradic- 
f'on,  and  results  from  a  confusion  of  the  psychical  act  with  its 
content.*  It  is  asserted  that  both  primary  and  secondary  qualities 
of  bodies  exist  in  them,  regardless  of  an  "awarer",  and  that  the 
difference  is  one  of  ease  on  the  part  of  the  primary  qualities 
in  submitting  to  measurement!  It  is  to  be  remembered,  however, 
that  the  author  holds  the  view  of  the  activity  of  mind.  Such  a 
view  leads  him  to  conclude  that  "Why  error  is  'permitted'  is  a 
problem  no  philosophy  has  ever  solved. "$ 

Before  going  to  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  the  first  type 
of  realism,  we  shall  get  together  different  views  of  conscious- 
ness, although  what  has  been  said  of  secondary  qualities  applies 
here,  for  the  problem  of  consciousness  in  one  aspect  is  the  pro- 
blems of  secondary  qualities.  It  is  worth  remarking  that  the  cog- 
nitive relation  is  ubiquitous — sensation,  perception,  imagination, 
etc.,  are  all  cases  of  knowing.  Sensation,  for  example,  is  "a  case 
of  knowing,  or  being  aware  of,  or  experiencing  something,"§ 
hut  to  be  aware  of  a  sensation  is  not  to  be  aware  of  its  content, 
but  to  be  aware  of  the  awareness  of  a  sense  content. ||  Rut  in 
trying  to  introspect  the  sensation  of  blue,  about  all  we  get  is 
blue,  the  awareness  of  the  awareness  being  somewhat  diaphanous. 
The  criteria  of  the  mental  are  (1)  it  must  be  an  act  of  Con- 
sciousness, (2)  it  must  belong  to  some  mind,  (3)  it  must,  per- 
haps, be  known  to  one  person  only.*  In  fact  it  is  characteristic 
of  the  English  new  realists  to  consider  the  mind  as  the  subject 
of  experience.  The  mental  act  is  all  that  belongs  to  conscious- 
ness, the  Content  being  objects.f 

The  American  realists  generally  are     more     radical     in     their 


"Alexander,  Mind,  N.   S.  XXI.   1912,  p.   2. 

tlbid.   Proc.  Arist.  Soc.   1909-10,  pp.  25,  33,  34. 

*Moore,  Refutation  of  Idealism,   Mind,   N.   S.   XII  pp.   445-9. 

tNunn,   Are   Secondary   Qualities   independent   of   Perception? 

Proc.   Arist.    Soc.    1909-10  pp.    191-217. 
JIbid.   pp.   210-11. 

§Moore,   Proc.   Arist.    Soc.    1902-3,   p.    82. 
Illbid,  Mind,  N.   S.   XII.  p.  449. 
*Moore,    Mind,    N.    S.    XII,    p.    449. 
tRussell,    Problems    of    Philos.    p.    65. 

Alexander.  Proc.  Arist.   Soc.   1909-10,  p.  202,  Mind,  N.   S.   XX,  p.  2. 

54 


conceptions    of    consciousness.     They    Find    fault    with    the    idea    of 
'mental  activity'  common   amon^   the   Kntjlish   realists.     It   is  amoii^ 
the    American    realists    that    we    hnd    the    second    type — the    thor- 
ou.uh-'-ioin-    realist,    those    who    are    consistent    with    their    assump- 
tion-.    The    former,    in    general,    regard    consciousness    as    a    rela- 
i'tit    it    is   a    relation    between   a    subject    of    experience    and    an 
!  :    tlie    latter    make    of    consciousness    an    external      relation 
there   is   no   subject,   but   only   objects   in    relation. 

The   above   remarks   have   beui    made   to   show    the   neiu  ral   doc- 
=  nr'n-    qualities    and    consciousness,    with    a    view    to    urg- 
ing   what    has    been    mentioned    in    the    early    passes,    that    the    epis- 
temolo^ical    problem    is    still    with    the    realist        \-    lon.y    as    he    con- 
siders   mind    a-    a    knower    only,    he    has      precisely       the      problem 

the    idealist    ha>.      As    Ion-    as    he 

knowing    as    psychical.    hi>    I  hybrid    science  :    for    <;, 

not      occur      on      "general    principles"    but      involve      specific    means, 
def'mite    vehichs    for    tli,  ;>li>hnKiit.      If    the    act    is    ps\chi- 

i  the  means  for  its  accomplishment  are  psychi- 
cal, with  the  reMih  that  the  lems  from  which  escape  was 
sought  crop  ,  ,ui  aj 

'•  d    study    of    t\\o  'Ctrine 

of    the    first    t\pe    will    be    made    for    the    purp«-  ninu      into 

touch    with    the     following      probk:  The      realistic 

nd;       (l>)    The    realistic    tlu-ory    of    reality;     (c)    The 

realistic    interpretation    of    the    relation    between    mind    and    reality. 

The     first     to     be     considered     i>     the     theory     of     mind.      There 

are    two    methods,    it    is    a»erud.*    of      studying    mind:      one      the 

method     of     introspection,    the       other  ati«»n.      Intro-;. 

the  content  of  mint',  better  than  does  the  other  me- 
thod, but  it  does  not  define  its  nature.  It  yields  an  inventory 
only.  It  shows  contents  that  coincide  with  other  manifolds; 
that  is.  with  nature,  history,  etc.  It  finds  the  quality  'blue'  but 
it  is  ascribed  to  a  book  or  a  coat.  This  indicates  that  the  ele- 
ments in  the  introspective  manifold  are  neither  peculiarly  mental 
nor  peculiarly  mine.  The  only  peculiarity  present  in  the  content 
is  that  of  grouping  mental  content  when  compared  with  phy- 
sical nature  is  fragmentary.  The  abstract  of  nature  which  I  have 
in  my  mind  does  not  coincide  with  the  abstract  in  my  neigh- 
bor's mind;  but  my  fragments  of  nature  acquire  a  peculiar  pat- 
tern. Attain  natural  objects  do  not  enter  -wholly  into  my  mind. 


*  Perry.     Present    Philosophical    Tendencies.    The    account    given    here    is    based 
on    his    treatment    in    this    volume,    Ch.    XII. 

55' 


hut    1    gather    into    my    mind    a    characteristic   • 

ments    of    nature-.     When    things    arc    in    the    mind,    one    may    mean 

or    represent    another. 

When  we  attempt  to  study  the  action  of  mind  for  "every 
t\pe  of  Consciousness  exhibits  the  duality,  'thinking'  and 
'thought',  'perceiving'  and  'percept',  'remembering1  and  'mem- 
bry'",*  by  the  method  of  introspection,  \\  c  are  disappointed,  for 
the  nature  of  mental  acthity  '-s  11()t  discovered  by  an  introspec- 
tive analysis  of  mental  contents.  We  must,  consequently,  have 
recourse  to  another  method,  namely,  the  method  of  observation 
which  makes  it  possible  to  view  in  another  light  both  mental 
activity  and  mental  content.  "Elements  become  mental  content 
when  the)-  are  reacted  to  in  the  specific  manner  characteristic  of 
the  central  nervous  system."*  The  nervous  system,  that  is.  is 
selective,  and  the  part  of  the  environment  it  selects  is  the  con- 
tent of  perception.  Another  way  of  stating  the  same  thing  is  to 
say  that  "Mental  Content  is  that  part  of  the  surrounding  en- 
vironment 'illuminated'  by  the  action  of  the  organism".  A  com- 
pMc  definition  of  content  is  given  as  "that  portion  of  the  >ur- 
rounding  cmironment  which  is  taken  account  of  bv  the  organ- 
ism in  serving  its  interests".  Whin  action  (which  is  selection) 
is  integrated  with  content  we  have  the  natural  mind  as  an  organ- 
ism possessing  these  aspects:  interest,  nervous  system,  contents. 

It  was  indicated  that  a  movement  from  a  given  whole,  car- 
ried on  !))•  a  process  of  analysis  which  is  the  realistic  "method", 
and  terminating  in  simples  from  which  can  be  deduced  or  from 
which  generate  a  universe,  constitutes  the  new  realistic  dialectic. 
In  the  considerations  now  undertaken — that  of  determining  what 
is  the  world  of  the  realist — we  shall  see  the  method  at  work. 
Rather  than  give  an  abstract  account  of  the  nature  of  analysis 
in  general,  an  actual  example  of  it  as  it  works  in  the  solution 
of  a  problem  will  be  more  enlightening.  Should  the  nv 
prove  disappointing  in  the  question  of  finding  a  world,  and  turn 
out  to  be  a  much  advertised  article  which  we  have  always  used 
in  the  solution  of  corn-rite  problems,  we  may  feel  warranted  in 
geiuralix'ng  our  finding,  pronouncing  it  a  "new  name  for  old 
It  is  admitted  that  the  philosopher  has 

no  superfine  brand  of  knowledge  and  that  all  he  can  do  is  "to 
examine  and  purify  our  common  knowledge  by  an  internal 
scrutiny,*  assuming  the  canons  by  which  it  was  obtained,  and 


"Op.   c-it.   pp.  274,  299,  300. 
"Italii-s   mine. 


56 


applying    them    with    more    care    and    precision/'^ 

Consequently  a  careful  and  precise  internal  scrutiny  re- 
the  fact  that  when  a  is  known,  a  itself  enters  into  a  rela- 
tion which  constitutes  it  an  idea  or  mental  content:  and  also 
that  although  (/  may  SO  enter  into  the  relation,  it  is  not  dependent 
upon  this  status  for  its  hein.n  or  nature.!  \\iien  these  facts  are 
established  it  i>  asserted  that  tlu-  jji..st^  which  have  haunted 
philosophy  from  the  time  »i  Descartes  t»  the  present  immediately 
vanish.  It  eliminate  the  dualistic  prohlem.  for  analysis  re- 
veals  mind  and  l>ody  a-  composed  o!  more  primitive  terms 
which  are  interchangeable.  An  ..l.ject  may  be  body  by  one  relation 
and  content  of  perception  hy  another.  "When  1  percei\e  Mars, 
the  Min's  satellite  (  body  )  i>  im  peio-pt  (mind).*  Likewise  is  the 
dualism  of  knowledge  and  thin.^  escaped  a  lad  made  possible 
hy  the  discovery  h\  at:  ••immanence". 

The    old    view    is    that    kn« -wlrd..;.  other    than    it- 

self, a  notion  which  has  -i\m  rise  t,,  the  doctrine  of  tlu-thinii- 
in-itself  which  is  other  than  the  content  of  knowledge.  Imman- 
ence heals  this,,  defects  l>\  that  the  difference  between 
knov, !  .  tiling  i>  a  functional  and  relational  difference. 

•  s    tin-    prol.K-ni    of       immediate      and 

mediate    knowledge.      In    the     former    <  the      tiling 

that    is    th  I    just    the    th.i  ».      In       mediate      knou- 

.    there    is    "in  mice"    l-etueeti    the    n!>- 

ject  and  the  content,  or  hetween  the  tiling  and  the  tiling  known. 
There  an  deed,  where  there  is  little  or  no  identical  coiitem. 

This    -trai  <•.    that    is    for    a    realist)     i^ 

explained  h\  asserting  that  the  tiling  thought  ahout  and  the 
thought  are  both  experienced. t  Independence,  however,  is  need- 
ed to  make  the  case  for  realism.  This  theory  asserts  that  things 
are  "directly  experienced  without  owin-  their  bein.u  or  their  na- 
ture to  that  circumstance. "t  The  elements,  those  common  to 
mind  and  hody.  n>\-  not  anywhere,  hut  are  what  they  are.  They 
find  a  place  when  in  relationship  and  hriny  with  them  a  character- 
istic which  they  possess.  Reality,  therefore,  or  the  Real  are  ele- 
ments— logical  and  mathematical  entities. 

A    far    more    careful    and    exhaustive    statement    of    the    nature 
of    the    Real,    is    to    he    found    in    Mr.     Russell's    hook,    "Scientific 


tRussell,   Scientific   Method    in    Philosophy,    pp.   66-7. 
tPerry,   Philosophical   Tendencies,    Ch.    XIII. 
*Op.  cit.  p  311. 
tOp.    cit.   p.    312. 
JOp.   cit.   p.   315. 

57 


Method  in  Philosophy."*  The  Chapter.  "Our  Knowledge  .if  the 
Kxtcrnal  World",  not  only  informs  us  as  to  what  the  real  is, 
hut  also  it  is  an  application  of  the  logico-analytic  method.  He 
applies  the  method,  taking  as  data  the  common  sense  knowledge 
of  the  world — furniture,  houses,  nature,  history,  geography,  and 
physical  science.  Hata  are  to  he  scrutinized  in  the  light  of  other 
data,  because  data  have  different  degrees  of  certainty— a  fact 
which  internal  scrutiny  reveals.  The  most  certain  are 
data — and  degrees  of  certainty  are  also  data.  Analysis  reveals 
first,  our  common  knowledge,  second,  degrees  of  certainty  of 
data,  and  third,  primitive  and-  derivative  knowledge.  Primi- 
tive knowledge  ;<  sense  knowledge,  hut  just  what  is  <jircn  in 
sense  is  a  question  because  of  unconscious  inferences/!"  The  next 
step  in  the  logico-analytic  method  is  to  discover  how  the  deriva- 
tive parts  of  our  knowledge  arise.  This  involves  difficulties 
because  of  entangling  alliances  between  logic  and  psychology.  A 
psychological  derivative  may  be  a  logical  primitive  which  is  a  part 
of  our  knowledge  not  arrived  at  by  logical  inference.  It  is  to 
be  kept  in  mind  that  a  separation  of  these  types  is  fundamental, 
(p.  o(M,  for  logical  beliefs,  that  is  logical  primitives,  must  he 
deduced  from  psychological  primitives,  (p.  70). 

Such  an  analysis,  i.  e.  critical  and  internal  scrutiny,  leads  to 
what  are  known  as  "hard"  data  and  "soft"  data,  the  difference 
being  one  of  the  degree  and,  moreover,  a  datum  itself.  The 
former  are  those  which  resist  the  "solvent  influence  of  critical 
reflection".*  Analysis,  then,  is  a  name  for  critical  reflection. 
It  reveals  two  kinds  of  hard  data:  (1)  the  facts  of  sense,  (2) 
the  laws  of  logic.  Most  if  not  all  psychological  derivative 
beliefs,  but  logically  primitive,  belong  to  soft  data,  but  we  must 
use  our  hard  data  to  construct  a  world  for  we  must  be  cer- 
tain about  our  world  at  least.  The  hard  data,  moreover,  are 
our  «•:_']!  sense  data,  for  the  belief  in  other  minds  is  a  deriva- 
tive psychologically  tho  logically  a  primitive.  Scrutiny.  how- 
ever, allows  sonic  addition  to  the  slender  stock  of  our 
sense  data,  namely,  memory,  and  some  facts  of  introspection. 
Facts  of  sense  also  include  space  and  time  relations,  and  facts  of 
arison 'such  as  likeness.  But  these  are  all  subjective  so  if 
there  are  other  minds  their  supply  of  hard  data  might  be  differ- 
ent, for  belief  in  other  minds  is  not  one  of  the  hard  data. 

This    then    appears    to    be    the    terminus    of    the    analytic    pro- 


*Open    Court    Pub.    Co.    1914. 
tOp.    cit.    p.    68. 
*Op.   cit.   p.    70. 


58 


;md  wo  may  now  ask  this  question:  "Can  the  existence 
of  any  other  than  our  own  hard  data  be  inferred  from  the  ex- 
istence "f  those  data"'"?  So  now  we  bei^in  on  the  C(>nstrnctirc 
portion  of  the  process — we  he.yin,  that  is,  to  build  a  world  out  of 
the  ^upply  of  data  which  analysis  has  furnished  us.  Let  us 
start  with  that  stock  in  trade  of  philosophers,  a  table,  and  see 
what  the  result  will  be.  "A  table  viewed  from  one  place  pre- 

a  ditt'eront  appearance  from  that  which  it  presents  from 
another  place.  This  is  the  lan.niuitu-  "f  common  sense,  but  this 
lan.LUia.ye  already  assumes  that  there  is  a  real  table  of  which  we 
see  the  appearances."*  Hut  since  this  admittedly  be->  the  whole- 
issue,  we  must  state  the  facts  in  terms  of  what  we  know  only 
namely,  >cii>e  data.  Therefore  we  must  say  that  while  we  have 
muscular  sensations  which  make  us  >ay  we  are  walking,  our 
visual  sei  'lan.uc  in  a  continuous  way.  "What  is  really 

known  is  a  correlation  of  muscular  and  other  bodily  >ensatioii> 
with  changes  in  visual  sensations. "t  We  must  remember  also 
that  a  sensation  is  the  QWQ1  an  object  and  not  the  ob- 

ject.:): The  cxpiTience  called  seein-  a  color,  that  is.  is  found  by 
analysis  to  be  a  complex  of  at  least  two  elements  -the  color  ,,r 
the  sensible  object  and  the  awa:  .lion.  Thus  in 

the  above  quotation,  all  we  know  in  the  case  are  the  sensations. 
This  distinction  between  the  object  and  the  awa' 

important  one  and  a  Confusion,  it  is  claimed,  leads  to  serious 
results  for  philosophy^  The  problem  is  oiu-  of  reconstruction, 
and  the  first  thin--  :nt  for  are  illusions  that  there  are  none. 

It    appears   that    with    at  use   data,    w<_-   are   not   able   to 

build    a    ver\     stately    universe,    .so      an      hypoth  projected 

(mirabile  dictu)  and  instead  of  inquiring  what  is  the  minimum 
assumption  by  which  we  can  explain  the  world  of  sense,  we  pro- 
ject a  model  as  an  aid  to  the  imagination  -a  construction  as  a 
possible  explanation  of  the  facts.  My  the  aid  of  our  model  hypo- 


tOp.  cit.  p. 

*Op.   cit.    p.    77. 

tOp.  cit.   p. 

tOp.  cit.  i>.   76. 

Sin  an  rarlu-r  work,  The  Problem  of  Philosophy,  Home  University  Library 
Strks.  Mr.  Russell  came  to  an  agnostic  conclusion  with  reference  to  the 
thing-in-itself.  All  we  know  are  our  sense  data — and  they  are  subjective 
and  "caused"  by  something  outside  which  possibly  resembles  them.  It  is 
my  belief  that  he  has  not  escaped  the  agnostic  predicament,  even  with  his 
conception  of  the  thing-in-itself  as  a  logical  construct.  Sensation  is  a. 
case  of  knowing  in  a  situation  in  which  an  object  known  is  differentiated 
from  an  act  of  knowing.  The  legitimacy  of  the  whole  procedure  is 
questionable,  but  it  is  not  germane  to  our  point  here.  Granted  that  the 
object  and  the  thing  sensed  are  indentical,  our  problem  is  to  find  what 
kind  of  an  object  it  is  as  a  factor  in  a  logical  process. 

59 


thesis  we  proceed  as  follows:  Suppose  that  each  mind  looks  out 
on  a  world  from  a  point  of  view  peculiar  to  itself.  (Of  course, 
we  do  not  know  anything  ahout  other  minds,  whether  in  fact 
there  are  such).  Then  suppose  that  each  of  these  perceived 
worlds  exists  precisely  as  it  is  perceived.  (This  assumption  aims 
;  away  from  the  thing-in-itself  ).  Suppose  an  infinite  num- 
ber of  worlds  unperceived.  Then  .  the  system  of  worlds,  per- 
reived  and  unperceived,  we  call  the  systems  of  "perspectives". 
By  a  correlation  of  similars  between  things  in  one  perspective 
and  those  of  another,  we  reach  a  system  of  points  in  space,  not 
"private"  but  "public"  space — which  (public  space)  can  not  be 
perceived,  but  if  it  is  known  it  is  only  our  inference.  Space  can 
thus  be  rendered  continuous  as  a  relation  between  perspectives — 
space,  that  is  not  in  the  private  worlds  but  outside  them,  is  a 
continuity  by  virtue  of  the  relations  between  points  of  view. 
The  momentary  common  sense  thing  can  be  defined.  "Given 
any  object  in  one  perspective,  from  the  System  of  all  the  objects 
correlated  with  it  in  all  the  perspectives ;  that  system  .  may  be 
identified  with  the  momentary  common  sense  thing.  Thus  the  as- 
pect of  a  "thing"  is  a  member  of  a  system  of  aspects  which  is  the 
"thing"  at  the  moment.  All  the  aspects  of  a  thing  are  real,  where- 
as the  thing  is  a  mere  logical  construction.,,* 

In  this  manner  Russell  has  established  the  world  of  "matter". 
There  are  yet  two  other  points  to  be  made  clear  before  the 
world  of  physics  is  rendered  complete,  namely,  time  and  space; 
but  for  our  purpose  we  may  omit  the  method  of  reaching  them, 
for  it  is  along  the  same  line  as  that  employed  in  finding  a 
world.  We  find  when  the  two  are  accounted  for,  the  three 
"elements"  of  physics,  namely:  space,  time,  point;  taking  the  place 
of  the  former  constants,  centimeter,  gram,  second. 

We  have  discovered  Reality  as  this  type  of  realist  views  it 
and  it  is  next  in  place  to  discover  where  knowledge  comes  in 
and  what  it  does  when  it  does  enter.  We  want  to  discover  the 
place  and  function  of  judgment  and  other  logical  processes  in  a 
world  such  as  analysis  has  delivered  to  us.  But  before  the 
task  is  attempted  a  few  words  should  be  said  about  the  method 
of  reaching  this  technical  view  of  the  things  of  common  sense 
or  of  the  reality  of  which  the  things  of  common  sense  are  as- 
pects in  a  system  of  points  of  view. 

Following  the  order  of  development  we  have  adopted,  the 
first  question  is  that  of  mind.  For  this  type  of  realism  the  mind 

*Ibid,  p.  89. 

60 


actually  plays  a  part  in  the  universe  for  it  is  the  source  of  error. 
The  idealist  makes  it  the  source  of  both  truth  and  error,  believ- 
ing if  it  is  good  (or  bad)  enough  for  one  it  is  good  (or  had) 
enough  for  both.  The  half  hearted  realist  must  account  for  error, 
s<>  he  accepts  half  of  the  idealistic  doctrine,  giving  error  over 
tn  tin'  mind,  or  making  the  mind  the  source  of  error,  while 
truth  is  a  function  <>f  objectivity  or  is  objectivity. 

It  seems  that  the  only  difference  between  mind  and  what  is 
not  mind  is  a  matter  of  grouping.  A  Comparison  of  one  with 
the  otlu-r  sh.>ws  that  the  mental  content  is  f ramnentary.  and 
moreo'ver  tin-  abstract  in  my  neighbor's  mind  dors  not  coincide 
with  the  abstract  in  my  own  mind.  There  is  considerable  mys- 
tery  in  all  this,  for  we  are  told  that  mind  just  is  things  in  a  cer- 
tain relation,  ami  it  pu/./les  one  to  determine  a  method  of  com- 
paring an  abstract  (which  is  just  mind  «>r  nature  whichever 
om  choos«  with  nature.  That  is.  the  performance  eoii- 

:n    comparing    nature    with    itself     for    the    contents    of    mind 
<le    with    nature,    b  tC,      It     is    not    to    be    disputed    that 

the  comparison  of  A  with  A  would  be  a  highly  interesting  piece 
of  labor  but  one  wonders  what  <ionf  about  it 

after  the  job  is  over.  Tlun  my  pattern  or  abstract  does  not  coin- 
cide with  my  neighbor's.  Just  how  my  abstract  could  be  com- 
pared with  my  neighbor's  I  cannot  see.  especially  when  both  my 
abstract  and  his  ,//-,•  nature,  for  nature  is  our  common  abstract. 
In  fact  the  very  i<;<  tract  OT  peculiar  </r,>n^iii>/  is  another 

.statement    of    the    idealistic    predicament    of    the    correspondent 
the    world   of    the    individual    mind    with    that    of    tin-   absolute    con- 
sciousness.     Yd    the    realist    is    compelled    to    resort    to    "abst: 
to  account   for  error.     \Ve  an'  told  that  an  individual' mind  gathers 
into    itself    a    characteristic    assemblage-    of     fragments    of     nature, 
yet    these    characteristic-  ire    <>r   coincide    with    it;    and    just 

what  .;/v  the  characteristics  or  the  differentia  of  nature  or  of 
abstiv.  re  left  to  imagine.  Of  course,  it  is  asserted  that 

tin  0'iium  is  determined  by  a  reaction  "characteristic  of  «he 
central  nervous  s\stem".  but  this  throws  no  l;ght  on  the  matt, 
but  states  a  problem.  \Vhcn  things  are  in  the  mind,  one  may 
mean  or  represent  another,  leaving  it  to  one  to  infer  that  when 
-  are  not  in  the  mind  this  could  not  occur;  but  we  are  told 
that  it  may  enter  consciousness  without  dependency  upon  the  fact 
for  its  heiin/  or  nature.  Elements  are  mental  when  ihey  are  re- 
acted to  in  the  specific  manner  characteristic  of  the  central 
nervous  system.  How  does  such  a  statement  of  the  case  differ 
from  the  old  conception  of  soul  or  consciousness  or  mind?  The 

61 


fact  is  the  same  problems  arc  present  with  the  diflVrence  tliat 
instead  of  a  faculty  of  attention  which  is  selective,  we  have  sub- 
stituted the  more  modern  conception,  a  nervous  system.  The 
close  connection  of  the  realistic  conception  of  mind  with  the 
faculty  psychology  of  the  past  has  heen  pointed  out  bef«rr. 
"The  realist  works  on  the  platform  of  a  faculty  psycholo- . 
taining  intelligence  knit  into  certain  indefinahles  such  as  impli- 
cation, relation,  class,  and  term,  and  has  transported  the  faculty 
from  the  human  soul  to  a  mysterious  realm  of  subsistence."* 
The  "illuminated"  part  of  the  environment  is  the  content  of  con- 
sciousness, yet  the  "illuminator"  is  on  the  outside  and  is  in  the 
same  position  as  the  early  "mind"  or  "soul". 

We  are  able  readily  to  see  why  the  theory  of  immancnca 
does  away  with  the  dualism  of  mind  and  matter  and  of  knowing 
and  the  thing  known.  If  knowing  and  the  thing  known  are 
identical  of  course  there  is  no  dualism;  but  what  about  the 
abstract?  Dualism  is  escaped  only  at  the  point  of  surrendering 
an  explanation  of  error,  and  is  taken  up  gladly  when  the  need 
arises  for  it. 

Let  us  examine  how  mediate  knowledge  is  possible  on  this 
view  of  the  nature  of  mind.  In  immediate  knowledge  we  have 
the  thing — that  is  the  idea  is  just  the  thing  known  or  a  thing 
in  relation  to  a  mind ;  but  in  mediate  knowledge  there  is  a  dif- 
ference. In  cases  of  memory  and  imagination  the  outcome  is 
sorry  enough  and  in  perception,  I  think  no  objection  would  be 
offered  if  (and  the  if  is  important)  perception  were  treated  as  a 
natural  event  such  as  walking,  and  not  made  a  case  of  presenta- 
tion to  a  nervous  system  (knower).  But  in  mediate  knowledge 
the  case  seems  hopeless.  Keeping  in  view  what  mind  is,  portions 
of  the  surrounding  environment  illuminated,  or  things  in  rela- 
tion to  a  nervous  system  are  mind,  we  fail  to  see  a  place  for  in- 
ference. The  explanation  is  that  the  thing  thought  about  and  the 
thought  are  both  experienced.  Let  us  see  what  this  means. 
The  thing  thought  about  is  the  illuminated  environment ;  the 
thought  is  the  illuminated  environment  (for  the  thought  and  the 
thing  are  identical).  Now  both  of  these  illuminated  environments 
are  experienced,  that  is,  both  illuminated  environments  become  an- 
other illuminated  environment  by  virtue  of  being  present  to  a 
nervous  system.  Certainly  we  are  in  possession  of  sufficient  illu- 
mination for  almost  any  process  to  take  place,  but  just  how  one 
casts  any  light  on  the  other  or  how  they  all  make  for  a  process 

*Creative   Intelligence,   p.    119.   The   quotation   holds   only  of  the  thorough-going 
realist. 

62 


<>f   inference.   I  am  unable  to  see.     Possibly  another  way  of   stating 

the    case    will    clear    up    the    difficulty.     The    thing    thought    about, 

;    (for   the   thing    thought   about   and   the   object  are 

Identical),   and   the   thought    or   the   content   or   the     thing     thought 

conunt   is  just   the  thing   in   relation   to   a   mind),   are   both   in 

relation  to  a  mind.  i.  e.(  are  both  the  thing  thought  about  and  the 

'it,   both    are    mind    and    object    Of    content. 

The    above    is    the    dialectic    when    strict    adherence    is    given    to 

the    definition    of    mind,    when    the    implications    of    that    definition 

made    explicit.      Hut    we    must    remember   that    there    is   another 

of    meanings.     When    things    are    in    tlu-    mind    one 

may    represent     or    mean    another.      Hut    as    has    been    pointed    out. 

this    conception    involves    all    the    difficulties    of      idealism      on      the 

ground    of    the    u!'!i|uit\      of    the      knowledge      relation.     It      seems 

that    the    n.ali>t    is    committed    either    to    idealism    from    which    he 

de>ir.  <  .ipe    ..r    to    the    embarrassing    situation    of      usir 

many    words    which    mean    nothing    or    aii    of    which    mean 
.'.me    thing,    and    consequent!;  information. 

It    has    poxvil.lv    become    apparent    that    realism    is    invoked    in 
a    circle.      In    tl  'he    i  elation    between    kimwer    and 

in    this    chapter    that    they    were 

guilty    of    the     -.mie    fallac\     attributed    by    them    to      the      idealists, 
namely.   "<  particularity."     The   examination   of   the   method 

of    timlin-.,  il    fortify    the    contention    that    new    realism 

might    be  characterized   as  philosophic*   circulorum. 

l!y    \\hat    right    can    the    realist    assert    that    we    undertake    an 
operation    called    "logical    ai  \\'hat    are    r.v    that    we    are 

able  to  make  Mich  an  analysis?     JIY  are  those  who  have  been  shut 
out    from    the    logical    proee-s    altogether.     Our  ;iv'ty, 

our  modi  operandorum  have  been  transferred  to  objectivity. 
There  is  nothing  /<>./;><;/  left  in  the  dispossessed  mind,  .and  it 
must  take  satisfaction  in  turning  its  "eye"  in  the  general  direc- 
tion of  the  logical  behold  it  as  it  throws  forth  or  ejects 
a  unherse  by  virtue  of  the  activity  of  its  "elements".  It  can 
not  analyze  for  it  has  nothing  to  analyze  with.  It  can.  only 
•r  behold.  The  analysis  has  already  taken  place — it  is  al- 
ready finished,  and  the  job  of  the  mind  is  that  of  a  mere  beholder 
of  the  ejected  univer-e.  To  be  able  to  speak  of  our  having  a 
part  to  play  in  logical  analysis,  we  must  endow  ourselves  with 
the  equipment  necessary  to  make  this  possible — but  this  is  to  deny 
the  fundamentals  of  the  system.  It  is  miraculous  that  the  dis- 
m-nd  could  even  sec  the  logical  process — i.  e.  under- 
stand it.  It  has  nothing  to  understand  with.  It  is  a  sensitive 

63 


which  rereiu.s  iiu-  a-ti\  ity  of  propositions,  hut  which  con- 
tributes nothing  for  it  lias  nothing  to  contribute.  The  plate 
Understands  nothing  of  \\liat  it  has  received,  nor  does  the  light 
understand  what  it  lias  illuminated.  Xeith'.-r  can  the  mind 
understand  what  it  has  done,  for  like  the  plate  or  the  light,  the 
means  for  understand  mi'  are  transferred  to  other  realm- 
uheti  the  real  that  we  analyze  a  whole  into  elements. 

•rt!ng    what    he    dinies    in    other    connections- -that    intclli- 
sluires    in    the   affairs    of    reality.      Let      us    analyze,   hut      we 

iiDth'n.^  to  analy/.e  with;  let  us  behold,  hut  we  have  no- 
thing to  hi  hold  with.  Have  we  not  eyes  and  ears?  Yes,  hut 
and  ears  are  lila  the  sensitive  plate,  they  receive,  hut  they  do  not  om- 
trihute.  Tiny  ha\e  no  part  to  play  in  the  logical  drama.  In  short 
it  is  urged  that  the  very  fact  that  the  mind  can  hehold  the  logical 
drama  is  evidence  that  the  'mind'  and  'things'  have  grown  to- 
gether, one  to  'tit'  the 'other  out  of  chaotic  processes,  on  a  com- 
mon level,  co-partners  in  a  hiological  process.  Just  as  the  in- 
vention Tits'  the  conditions  out  of  which  it  arose,  so  does  the 
'mind1  tit  the  conditions  out  of  which  it  arose. 

Analyst,  the  Shibboleth  of  the  realist,  is  impossible  on  his 
theory  of  mind.  Kut  granted  thai  he  can  do  it,  we  want  to  know 
how  it  is  done.  \\'e  shall  take  our  common  knowledge  -that  of 
furniture,  nature,  history,  physical  science,  as  data,  and  we  shall 
find  by  analysis  what  is  in  it.  We  assume  the  canons  by  which 
this  common  knowledge  was  obtained,  and  apply  them  with  more 
care  and  precision.  \\'e  must  remember  now  that  these  com- 
mon data  an-  called  in  question-  (m  the  wholesale.  They  are  not 
reality.  Then  again  we  are  assuming  the  canons  by  which  this 
common  knowledge  was  obtained,  and  this  common  knowledge  is 
not  knowledge  of  'true'  reality  or  'real'  reality  or  no  question 
would  ha\e  arisen  about  it.  That  is.  we  are  calling  in  qu 
our  common  knowledge  but  we  are  assuming  the  canons  by  which 
it  was  established.  ///  order  to  eall  it  in  question  and  eritieise  it. 
()f  cour.se  we  must  begin  .somewhere.  Xo  one  questions  that  but 
the  question  here  is  the  legitimacy  of  calling  the  whole  body  of 
our  common  knowledge  in  question,  leaving  nothing  to  work 
from,  but  assuming  as  a  valid  principle  of  criticism  the  very  can- 
ons by  which  this  erroneous  knowledge  was  established.  It  is 
a  wholesale  problem  and  the  method  of  meeting  it  is  that  by 
means  of  which  the  faulty  knowledge  wa>  originally  established. 
The  procedure  is  this:  after  we  have  a  good  deal  of  knowledge. 
in  show  that  the  whole  thing  is  questionable.  After  we  have 
learned  a  unat  deal  about  the  external  world,  about  scienc 


ralirg,  weacan   tnen  .inoa    max  tats   Knowledge   is  nor 

--T 

of   the  actiikj    of  propositions   iinani.lnl   wkh   *sofr"   data. 

.  ~ :  ~ .  -         ~      1     ~       .     T      .<T"      ••»  -i'  1^  r      . !~      ^  ~~  :  ~  ±          :  -  "         "  ~  i. 

Our  data   are  onestionable  and   we   acimjuiec  this    with   a  naad 

of  ontological^  entities.  Scrutiny  reveals  the  facts  of  sense  and 
the  laws  of  logic  as  the  *nanT  data,  /for  the  mind  beholds  the 
laws  of  logic  k  is  iiimmimlr  to  say,  or  rather  how  k  fmds  them. 
It  involves  the  same  type  of  question  as  to  dUcimine  how  the 
nose  would  arroaaf  for  the  Pnrkin j e  phenomenon;  or  the  eye 
rrpbm  the  mysteries  of  the  odor  of  sauerkraut.  The 

~~         -     •"• "~,      -"        "  -..•-  -         r~        '      '  ;_ 


How  is  experience  possible?  The  realist  aasacis  that  k  is  pos- 
sible because  the  laws  of  logic  are  in  •atnrc.  as  Kant  c  ipjuni'd 
k  by  naking  natnre  conform  to  the  p<iuu|4cs  of  the  nmad.  A 
more  hopet nl  answer  is  f onnd  ni  the  fact  llm.  *mnKi  is  "nature 
performing  the  act  of  itaectkm.  No  one  has  e ver  been  serions- 
ly  agitalfil  orer  the  ttnesbon  as  to  whether  the  lavs  ot  diges~ 
tion  belong  to  the  objective  world  of  nature  or  to  the  subjective 
otdei  of  the  digestion  U^Lt  pfr  s*.  it  is  generally  recognized 
that  the  only  fruitful  discussion  in  that  field  is  centered  abont 
~  ~  "  "  " " "  *~  -  "  .  ""  -.  *.  -  ~  ~  ~  7  - ..  '  j  ---?.:.  ~~  . "  ; 

the  process.  Neither  is  the  qnestion  as  to  how  food  "fits*  the 
tract  nor  the  tract  the  food,  one  which  an  j  one  woold  consider 
-r"  _'  -jr.f.  :.~  _ "-  -  -L  ----- 

Suutin>  reveals  as  hard  data,  die  facts  of  sense  alone. 
On  ill  I  ing  the  difficulties  involved  in  determining  what  are  facts 
of  sense,  and  when  we  know  we  have  them,  let  us  see  how  we 
get  them  and  what  we  do  with  them  when  we  do  get  them 
get  them  from  the  world  of  common  sense  which  is  not  the  real 
world.  We  have  fled  from  this  world.  L  e^  the  worlc 
mon  sense,  to  the  real  world  where  we  find  facts 
Bat  the  piobkm  now  is  to  construct  a  world  oat  of  these 
We  have  left  the  world  of  common  sense,  have  found  c 
now  we  are  to  make  amotkfr  world,  not  that  : 
for  we  had  that  to  begin  with,  bat  jmst  what  kind,  it  is  hnpos-i 
sible  to  say. 

place?     It   is  already  c^mstm^fd  so  why  destroy  it     and     bafld 
another  &mt  of  tkf  note  that  tkr    lor*    t&am    tvorM    AM**    : 
Is  k  not  probable  that  die  camsfrvrtrtf*  world  win  be  precisely  the 
HOI  hi  of  common  sense  wktlk  which  we  started .     It    this  is  the 
or  labor  has  been  in  vain:  and  if  not.    the     data    oat    of 


>:mr.* 

r  tfce 

rat  xv 

. 


;*  ferae  taem  liifMnaui  m»  JST  ~s- 
ioB  4te-  ivst  c-is;  we  axe  c?mnjcfe«d 


.     -• 

rt   :c  i  wodst    We  lone  %«t  «? 

-e  ?^ofcn  sevteC    \\ 


---_ 


**scmak£ 

-  >^     -^     *^1«* 


vat  «a* 
t  dear  tint  we  OB  MX  99 


»  •  rid 


nfrm  a*  seat 


Hf*     '^•f 


iMt,   Vpr 


or  of  t»s  as  a  c*m*ruA.  for  darre  if  •&  aprat 


if  «v 


as  a 


for  «f 

- 


v  .   :•:•   give 


aord  i~~    !•  afl  <rf  hit 
I 


- 


Jed.  - 

:- 

--. 
- 


.- 


data  and  the  laws  of  logic,  he  is  unable  to  construct  on  the  basis 
of  his  hard  data,  a  world  that  differs  in  any  characteristic  way 
from  the  world  of  Berkeley.  He  must  have  recourse,  that  is,  to 
matters  not  ultimate  (to  soft  data)  to  get  the  world  of  physics. 
If  this  is  the  method  and  result  of  analysis,  it  appears  that  it 
states  more  difficulties  than  it  resolves ;  and  would  lead  to  an  in- 
terpretation of  analysis  in  terms  which  avoid  an  initial  petitio. 
Before  undertaking  a  second  katabasis  into  the  shadowy 
world  of  simple  entities  and  a  complementary  anabasis  into  the 
world  of  common  sense,  it  is  essential  that  the  rod  and  staff 
which  guides  the  realist  thru  these  realms  and  which  frees  him 
from  the  fear  of  evil,  be  more  carefully  examined.  That  rod  and 
staff  is  analysis.  Should  it  appear  to  be  a  feeble  support,  should 
it  turn  out  to  be  watered  stock  in  an  apparently  great  enterprise, 
it  is  probable  that  the  enterprise  itself  is  misconstrued  and  will 
go  bankrupt.  If  analysis  is  found  to  be  a  false  god,  an  idol 
worshipped  because  it  functions  in  certain  enterprises,  the  struc- 
ture erected  on  its  foundations  will  be  correspondingly  false. 
That  it  does  function  in  many  enterprises  no  one  doubts,  but  to 
take  it  from  its  locus  of  successful  functioning  and  make  it  a 
lever  to  lift  the  universe  is  to  commit  that  error  so  repeatedly 
charged  against  others,  namely,  the  error  of  "pseudo-simplicity". 
It  is  my  contention  that  there  is  no  occasion,  no  point,  to  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  logical  implications  of  a  system  which  refutes 
itself — of  a  system  built  upon  an  initial  fallacy.  To  discuss  the 
logical  implications  of  such  a  system  is  to  admit  that  the  system 
has  established  a  world  in  which  logical  operations  are  possible. 
It  is  true  that  we  may  'suppose'  that  the  case  has  been  made, 
that  there  is,  for  example,  such  a  'thing'  as  the  'neutral  mosaic*, 
that  analysis  has  actually  revealed  certain  logical  laws  and  mathe- 
matical principles  in  objective  nature;  and  on  that  supposition, 
work  out  the  place  in  the  supposed  system  of  logical  processes, 
such  as  judgment,  inference,  error,  et  cetera.  But  the  point  here 
is  the  original  question — that  the  process  called  analysis,  as  that 
process  behaves  in  the  hands  of  those  who  employ  it,  is  an  illegi- 
timate process,  in  that  it  (1)  questions  what  it  assumes,  namely, 
the  real  reality  of  its  data,  and  (2)  that  it  cannot  occur  because 
there  are  no  means  at  the  disposal  of  the  individual  for  carrying 
it  on.  The  conclusion  of  the  former  process  has  been  indicated  in 
the  statement  that  if  the  world  of  common  sense  is  not  the 
real  world,  then  the  data  derived  from  an  examination  of  that 
world  are  not  the  real  data,  so  that  a  world  constructed  on  the 
data  found  in  the  questioned  world  will  be  a  doubtful  world  in  so 

68 


far  as  the  data  themselves  arc  doubtful :  or,  that  if  the  data  are 
the  renl  data,  then  the  world  from  which  the  data  are  obtained 
is  the  real  world,  and  the  reconstructed  world  will  be  precisely 
the  world  we  had  to  begin  with.  The  first  process  has  possibly 
been  made  clear  in  the-  example  of  the  circular  efforts  of  Mr. 
I\u»ell.  "The  second  difficulty — the  lack  of  means  for  carrying 
on  the  process  of  analysis — will  niijage  us  from  the  point  of  view 
of  Holt's  idea  of  conscious 

A    legitimate    pn>ress    of    analysis    lakes    place      under      condi- 
tions,   sucli    us    the     follow'ng  :     The    continuity    in    the    exi>erience 
of     the    individual     is    interrupted.      His    non-retlectional    proc 
liis    desiriii-j.    his    hoping,    his    p-.  rcei\  in-,    experience    is    interrupted 
by    the    intrusi  ••uthinu    which    challenges    the    type    of    ex- 

perience Mich  as  has  been  indicated.  In  other  words,  a  difficulty, 
a  problem  ha-  \  hieh.  if  continuity  is  to  be  re-established, 

must  be  nut.  Just  why  problems  arise  is  not  in  question,  but 
the  admitted  fact  that  t;  rise  is  all  we  care  for  in  this  ron- 

n.      In    such    a    situation,    there    is    soinethinu    which    is    g 

a   datum.      I'm    it    is   just    because   all    the    data   are    nnt    given,   that 

the  d.flicult)    is   presi  nt  :   and   it   is   just   here  that   the   fallacy  of  the 

old    empirical    '.  r.nd     in   the   assumption   that    the    facts   are 

all    there   to   b,  ized    on.      Let    it    be    noticed    that    the    whole 

tied,    but    that    the    difficulty    is    a    particular 

'Cow  tin-  question  comes  to  lie  that   of  discovery  of  the  data, 

and    this    will    depend    entirely    upon    the'    occasion    which    gave    ori- 

the   question.      \\  \-   are   not   looking    for   data   /'/;   f/cncral,   but 

the   difficulties    into   which    experience    has 

fallen.  If  the  question  is  whether  or  not  this  tree  will  burn — fire 
being  lu-  of  tlie  problem  -an  analysis  of  the  tree  will 

'.     'the     tree     is     poplar',     et 

which    means      something,      suggests      something. 

\Vlui!  f    such    neutral    entities   as   'Contour", 

.    and    'above    or   t<>   the    riuht    of.    is     not      pertinent 

to   tne   question    at    issue-- -will    it   burn?     The   discovery   of   data   in 

1    influences    particular    probU-ms    in    the    same    way   as    such 

that   "every   effe-ct   has  a   cause"   influences  problems   in 

:iairel\.   rot   at   all.    for  the   .Luneral   law   tells  us   nothing 

in    hand.     Analysis    functions    in    a    situation    which 

is    refiectional.    as    a    method    of    finding   what    is    i>iven,    'there',    for 

on    the    foundation   of   the   given,   such   a 

ill    make    possible    an    entrance    upon    direct    experi- 

lt   imfli;  ---.ething  to  be  analyzed,  tho  not   the  wh-^le 

universe.    (2)    means   of   doing   it.    which   in   turn   implies   judgment 

69 


and    inference. 

With  this  statement  <>f  the  nature  of  analysis  as  it  actually 
is  employed  in  experience — ordinary  experience  as  well  as  in 
science — we  shall  examine  especially  the  possihility  of  analysis 
from  the  second  standpoint — means  for  its  accomplishment  --from 
Holt's  conception  of  the  nature  of  consciousness.  It  is  custom- 
ary to  treat  a  phenomenon  from  the  standpoint  of  its  genesis. 
We  shall,  accordingly,  attempt  to  determine  how  consciousness 
arises  in  the  hope  that  its  genesis  will  throw  some  light  on  its 
nature.  "Our  starting  point  is  a  world  of  pure  being."*  "Tak- 
ing consciousness  as  a  theme  of  discourse  it  will  he  possible  to 
frame  a  deductive  system  consisting  of  terms  and  propositions 
as  premises,  and  themselves  not  'conscious',  nor  made  of  'ideal' 
stuff,  such  that  all  the  essential  features  of  consciousness  will 
follow  as  logical  consequences. "f  Again,  he  says  the  object  is: 
"the  interpretation  of  the  universe  as  a  purely  neutral  universe, 
or  in  other  words,  the  deductive  showing  of  how  a  neutral 
universe  can  contain  both  'physical'  and  'mental'  objects. ***This 
point  of  departure  involves  no  theory  of  reality,  nor  knowledge, 
no  sensationalism  or  other  veiled  form  of  dualism.***We  shall 
derive  the  'knowledge'  relation  without  assuming  it  in  our  pre- 
mises."* It  seems  clear  that  the  purpose  is  to  derive  conscious- 
ness or  mind  from  something  that  is  not  mind,  from  a  neutral 
somewhat.  But  it  is  clear  that  we  must  account  for  what  is 
familiarly  known  as  mind.  As  Holt  says:  "This  means  (a  de- 
ductive account  of  consciousness)  the  framing  of  a  set  of  terms 
and  propositions  from  which  a  system  is  deducible  that  contains 
such  an  entity,  or  class  of  entities,  as  i<.v  familiarly  knoic  under 
the  name  of  consciousness  or  uiind."^ 

At  the  outset  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  we  start  with  what  is 
'familiarly'  known  as  mind.  We  do  not  want  to  press  this  as- 
pect of  the  difficulty  further,  but  it  is  an  excellent  example  of 
the  circular  dialectic  of  the  whole  of  new  realism.  The  question 
is  :  to  form  a  set  of  terms  from  which  mind  is  deducible.  The 
oddity  of  the  situation  hinges  about  the  fact  that  we  have  before 
we  begin,  all  the  information  about  mind  that  we  can  ever  get 
even  after  the  deduction  is  complete.  We  don't  begin,  that  is, 
with  the  simples,  but  with  mind  and  objects  themselves  which  are 
already  known.  The  inductive  or  empirical  aspect  is  either  for- 

*Holt,    the    Concept    of    Consciousness,    p.    86. 
tlb.   p.   87. 

*Holt,    the    Concept    of    Consciousness,    p.    136. 
lib.    p.    166. 

Italics  mine. 


gotten   or  omitted,   and   instead   of    starting   with   a   world  of   pure 
being,  we  begin   with  the  affairs  of  the  common  sense  world. 

Coming- directly  t<>  the  genesis  of  consciousness  we  find  that 
systems  of  ! icing  arise  from  certain  '(iivens'  consisting  of  terms 
and  pr< -posit  it  ins.  which  "generate  of  their  o-;cn  motion  all  fur- 
ther terms  and  propositions  that  are  in  the  system."*  These 
fundamental  terms  are  undefined,  and  the  activity  involved  in  gen- 
eration doe>  not  invoke  time  or  space.  That  is  "Logical  activ- 
ity is  neither  spatial  nor  temporal.''?  The  idealist  expresses 

:une  thought  when  he  says  nothing  real  can  move.  Thus 
we  have  a  timeless  and  spaceless  generation  of  a  universe  that 
is  in  time  ami  -  all  the  subsequent  portion  of  the  exposi- 

tion shows.  If  it  is  objected  that  logic  furnishes  no  principle 
of  unity  since  the  terms  and  propositions  are  discrete,  it  is  re- 
plied that  an  explicit  variety  of  terms  is  implicit  in  one  proposi- 
tion. The  question  of  the  applicability  of  the  logical  system  to 
i  peculiar  question  indeed  for  a  realist — is 

answered   '  mis  can  correspond 

by    a    "in  iatioii.      The    difference    between     the    two 

logic    and    that    of    actual    things-    is    like    that    be- 

•     two    piciures    which    are    identical    save    that    one    is    colored 

while  the  other  is  in   white  and  black.     The  main  point   in  the  doc- 

trliu-  -pondence    is    that    there    is    no    difference,    or    rather 

that    there    are    no    two    things    as    knowledge    and      tile      object    of 

knou  ledge.    ».r    of    thought    and    the  thing  thought  of  ;  the  point  being 

that    nothing    can    r«  present    a    thing    but    the      thing      itself.     This 

maintained    on    the   basis   of    a   difficulty   involved    in   in- 

ction  of  distinguishing  between  consciousness,  and  the  oh- 
of  consciousness,  or.  it  could  be  said,  the  foundation  of  this 
type  of  realism  the  who],-  hearted  type — is  that  of  the  objectiv- 
ity of  secondary  qualities.  On  the  basis  of  the  identity  of  con- 
sciousness and  the  object  of  consciousness,  one  wonders  why  the 
problem  of  correspondence  should  ever  become  a  problem,  but 
this  will  be  considered  later. 

MU    now     discovered     (or    in    fact    assumed)     that    logical 
and    mathematical    concepts    are    objective,    i.    e.    not    in    conscious- 

,md  that  primary  and  secondary  qualities  are  also  in  the 
same  status  (which  is  termed  "neutral"),  the  way  is  made  clear 
for  the  deduction  of  consciousness,  for  finding  among  the  neu- 
tral entities  the  knowledge  relation.  The  most  simple  of  the  en- 

Mtalics  mine. 

Hi'lt.  The  t'niicrpt   of  Consciousness,  p.    16. 
tH>.   p. 


titles  of  the  'mosaic'  arc  certain  ones  which  we  seem  to  have 
vaguely  made  out  such  as  identity,  differences,  numbers,  and  the 
ive.  Tin  nee  follow  in  perfect  Cotntian  order,  the  algebras. 
secondary  qualities.  Kuclidian  geometry,  mass.  physics,  chemistry, 
objects  forming  the  subject  matter  of  geography,  geology,  astro- 
nomy, etc.,  and  here  the  chasm  between  the  organic  and  inor- 
ganic is  bridged  on  the  assumption  that  "Life  is  some  sort  of 
chemical  process,  and  nothing  further",  whereupon  we  enter 
botany,  biology,  etc.  Here  then  appears,  in  the  simple  to  complex 
series,  a  complex  entity  called  consciousness  or  mind. 

\Yithout  stopping  to  examine  the  many  difficulties  involved 
in  such  a  phantastical  "genesis",  such,  for  example,  as  the  chasm 
1  iet ween  the  inorganic  and  the  organic,  or  the  introduction  of 
qualities:  or  the  fact  of  a  backward  reading  of  the  world  of  com- 
mon sense  as  a  basis  for  the  genesis;  we  shall  keep  our  eye  on 
the  position  of  consciousness  or  mind.  And  here  it  is  fundamental 
to  note  that  //  is  one  of  the  complex  entities  in  the  "neutral 
mosaic",  occupying  a  position  about  midway  in  the  series  of  sim- 
ple to  complex  entities.  Thus,  in  answer  to  the  question  as  to 
what  light  genesis  throws  on  the  nature  of  mind,  we  find  that 
it  shows  it  to  be  one  of  the  complex  entities.  Whether  it  has 
come  to  be  as  a  result  of  the  activity  of  propositions  which  mean 
nothing,  is  not  essential  to  our  present  purpose.  Whether 
formal  implication  is  not  a  false  god,  is  not  so  much  our  aim 
to  determine.  But  to  undertake  a  "genesis"  of  concrete  reality 
on  the  fundamental  of  formal  propositions  from  which  every 
vestige  of  meaning  has  been  squeezed,  creates  in  the  mind  of  a 
reader  the  suspicion  that  the  idea  in  the  mind  of  the  author  is 
to  reduce  the  whole  position  to  absurdity.  One  of  the  favorite 
ways  of  killing  a  thing  is  to  let  it  kill  itself.  And  in  this  case 
it  seems  that  the  following  out  of  the  logical  implications  .  of 
the  system  leads  to  such  difficulties  that  no  serious  thinker  could 
be  deluded.  Implication  is  in  order  only  in  the  presence  of 
meanings.  One  thing  may  mean,  imply,  indicate,  point  to,  an- 
other thing;  but  seriously  to  assert  that  the  universe  is  implied 
in  "A-right-of-B",  "A-A",  "A  not  A",  when  A  and  the  rest 
mean  nothing,  is  a  bit  of  sheer  nonsense. 

\Ye  have  found  consciousness  in  the  "neutral  mosaic".  Rut 
uist  further  consider  its  nature,  with  the  idea  in  mind  of 
(b .  Krnvining  the  possibility  of  analysis,  analysis  being  the  key 
which  unlocks  the  mysteries  of  the  universe.  For  a  further  de- 
termination of  the  characteristics  of  mind,  we  ma}-  consider  the 
a  "navigator  exploring  his  course  at  night  with  the  help 

72 


of    a    searchlight."     "It    illuminates      a      considerable      expanse     of 

ami    cloud,   and    objects   that    lie      above      the      horizon.     The 

sum   total    of    all    surfaces    thus    illuminated    in    the     course     of   a 

night    is    a   cross-section    »f    the    region     thru     which     the     vessel 

The    manifold    .so    defined    is    neither    ship    nor    searchlight, 

nor   any    part   of    them    hut    is   a   portion   of    the    region   thru   which 

the    ship    is    parsing."*     This    cross-section     resembles    those      that 

are    found    in    any    manifold    in    which    there    is    organic    life.     The 

use    is    the    nervous    system      or    me- 
chanisms to    IK  r\  ous    systems    in    the      lower      forms      of 
organic    life.      \"W    a    cross-section    defined    by    the    response    of    a 
:     is    consciousness.      To    determine       what       entities 

.11  \       to      determine 
fic      reaction.     "This 

•;•.(!    by    the    .specific    reaction    of    rellcx- 
S    the    manifold    of    our    sensations, 
"I      In    this    manner   has 
the    k;  -    bein    rt  ached    deductively. 

Such  >nt   ..r~  the  nature  ist   account 

v-.il    proper!  ..     The    wonder    is    that    it    should 

n    the   basis   of   empirical 

nature    that    tlu     'deduction'  made    possible,      i'ut    at    this 

the    ir.ui\-t    is    in    the    problem    of    analysis    from    the    stancl- 

:;!nil.      1  think  it  can  he  shown  that  analysis 

;    take    i  the    i'titie    nicemn    of      realism      being 

nil.    the    structure    built    on    that    foundation    falls,      or      rather      no 
stiuctur*  ble. 

In    the    first    place    we    musl    note    that    the    means    of    analysis 

Veil   t ran.s i\  i  red    t  >   objectivity.     Th.e    mind     has     nothing   to 

/ith.      hs  tools    of    judging    and 

\    unities    in    tlie    neutral    mosaic.     The    job    of 

the  unrolling  of   the  universal  scroll  as  this 

lf-acti\ity   «»f    propositions   whose     content 

by    which   the   thinking     mind     explores     those 

m    that    ensue    from   the    Given    is   called   deduc- 

t'i  n".*     Judgment    and    inference,   two   prime     necessities     of      any 

re   not    functions   «,f   the   process   hut   are   onto- 

The   mind.,  like  the  searchlight,  casts  the  pale  light 

of    r.  -\      faculties     on     the     universe     and    defines   itselj. 

Tb.e-  K-nt  and  inference  are  there;  the     business     of 


*Op.  cit.  p.  i: 

Til, id.   p.    182. 

*n>.  P.  16. 


73 


mind  is  to  behold  them  as  the  concrete  universe  shapes  itself 
about  them  as  iron  filings  arrange  about  the  magnet.  It  can  not 
judge,  nor  infer,  nor  hypothecate.  Meanings,  too,  are  there,  and 
they  whip  themselves  into  unity  about  the  rallying-point  of  an 
empty,  timeless  and  spaceless,  tho  active  proposition,  as  the 
charmed  worshipper  falls  at  the  feet  of  the  medicine-man. 
Where  is  memory?  It  is  'there'.  Where  is  imagination?  It  is 
'there'.  When  the  roll  is  called  out  yonder,  all  are  there — all, 
that  is,  but  the  searchlight.  How  it  shines  is  a  mystery.  Its 
means  of  shining  are  taken  away  and  they  render  possible  the 
definition  of  an  object. 

One  should  note  this  difference  between  the  searchlight  and 
the  responding  nervous  system.  The  former  does  not  select,  but 
shines  on  what  is  in  the  way ;  the  latter  is  selective,  and  is  cap- 
able of  regulating  itself  in  view  of  what  it  defines.  This  is  an 
empirical  fact,  but  the  means  of  regulation  are  also  in  the  cross- 
section.  The  knower  is  deprived  of  all  his  possessions  yet  he  is 
commanded  to  analyze.  Why  analyze?  What  results  from  it? 
Even  if  it  were  possible  to  do  it,  why  should  it  be  done?  Surely 
not  the  better  to  act,  for  action  is  reserved  for  the  proposition. 
Is  it  to  know?  If  so,  it  is  like  asking  the  butterfly  to  demon- 
strate the  binomial  theorem,  or  commanding  the  earthworm  to 
show  an  aesthetic  appreciation  of  Parsifal.  As  well  command  the 
ape  to  gaze  into  the  heavens  and  .plot  the  orbit  of  Jupiter  or  to 
behold  the  satellites  of  Saturn,  as  to  cry  "analysis,  analysis."  when 
the  only  means,  and  the  only  purpose,  for  the  accomplishment  of 
it  are  moved  to  that  to  which  the  method  is  applicable. 

But  there  is  another  strange  side  to  this  story  of  conscious- 
ness. We  have  just  been  talking  as  if  it  were  outside  of  the  pro- 
cession. It  is  outside  when  it  must  be  to  account  for  certain 
facts,  empirical  facts,  but  we  find  it  in  the  "mosaic".  Conscioir.s- 
n'ess  is  now  the  objects— the  illuminated  part  of  the  environment. 
There  is  no  difference  between  thought  and  the  object;  "no  con- 
tent of  knowledge  that  is  other  than  its  object".*  Behold  now 
an  object  analyzing  itself.  Consciousness  is  trees  and  rivers,  pro- 
positions and  axioms,  love  and  astronomy.  We  must  analyze, 
or  analysis  must  take  place,  but  consciousness  is  the  object,  and 
the  tree  must  perform  that  delicate  feat  upon  its  own  person- 
ality, reducing  itself  to  elements  in  violent  motion,  which  it  fur- 
ther reduces  to  "private  perspectives"  from  which  it  deduces 
"public  space".  When  astronomy  analyzes  itself  it  finds  itself 

Mb.    p.    150. 


able  to  overcome  the  paradoxes  of  Zeno  by  certain  mathemat- 
ical theories  of  infinity  based  on  an  elimination  of  spatiality 
from  the  Euclidean  point.  Thus  the  story  goes  throughout  the 
whole  of  objectivity — each  object  must  be  capable  thru  analysis 
of  discovering  neutral  entities,  simple  logical  and  mathematical 
laws  which  are  its  real  reality. 

It   appears   that   analysis   is   impossible  on   the   realistic   interpre- 
tation   of    consciousness.     When   consciousness    is   outside   the   pro- 
n.   it    has   no   means   of    doing   anything;   when   it   is   inside  or 
rather    when    it    is   the   object    the    foolish    question      of      an     object 
an-.dys'n^    itsrl;  I'ut    lest    it    would   seem   that   consciousness 

has    not    been    handled    as    the    realist    intends    it,   a    few    more    state- 
ments   of    its    nature   and    function    might    be    offered.      What    is   the 
the  one-to-one  correspondence   SO   tr.uch   spoken  of?* 
•Knee    between    :cln;t.    pray?     There    are      at      least      two 
txpes.   and    PIT  haps   an    infinite   number   depending    upon    the   nature 
of    the    pi  fundamental.      P>ut    these    are    two 

that  car.  (1)    The  correspondence 

in    the    lo-ical-matluir.  positions    and    concrete    real 

things;     (2)    tlu-    corres]  the    content    of    the    conscious 

•Action    witli    'reality'.      In    the    first    type    the    two    realms    are 
<:<ntical.    except    that    the      concrete      lias      additional 
matter    laid    on    its     fundamental    structure.     We    begin    ostensibly 
with    a    number   of    simple    logical    and    mathematical    entities    which 
rid;    then    after   the    world    is    generated,    the   thought 
occurs   that    tliis   is   a    formal    world.    \oid    of    bone   and    blood;   and 
;    content,   denied   in   the   original,   we   must    resort   to   a   make- 
shift  of    a    tlieoiy    of    correspondence    which      is      .supposed     to      be 
'acknowledged'    by    a    mind    which    turns    out      to      be      the      things 
which    correspond.     The    ;  reposition    \\hich    generates    the    partic- 
ulars   which    are    those    <•/    a    universal    which    is      the      proposition 
itself  -the    old    problems    of    the    idealistic   logic    of      the     concrete 
universal-    turns    out    to    be    not    reality    but    that    to    which    reality 
must   correspond.     If   the  activity  of   propositions   generates  a   real 
m,    the    question    of    correspondence    is    senseless;    if    it    does 
not   generate   a   real   system   it     is     useless     or     meaningless.     The 
" Repetition   of    Identicals"   will   not   solve  the  problem   if   the   iden- 
ticals  are   not    reality,   and   if   they   are   reality   there   is   no   corres- 
pondence  because   there   is   identity. 

The    representative    theory    ,.f    knowledge    is    laughed      out      ot 
coiir.  us    to    believe    that    they    (secondary    qual- 

*Ihi.!    pp.    31    If.    Also    Ch.    3.    and    many    other   places. 

75 


ities  )  are  'knm\n'  l>y  means  of  entities  \vh!;:h  have  neither  t  x- 
Unsion,  shape,  size,  motion,  color,  sound,  odor,  taste  or  touch."* 
\Ye  are  not  defending  the  representative  theory  of  knowledge, 
but  we  assert  that  the  realist  is  making  the  same  statements. 
The  realist,  however,  is  a  little  more  subtle.  He  asks  us  to  be- 
lieve that  real  reality  is  a  group  of  propositions  without  content, 
non  spatial,  non  temporal.  His  colors  are  not  qualitative  //  he 
is  consistent  •leiih  Jiis  premise,  but  they  define,  /;;  their  ultimate 
reality,  a  series  of  points.  Sounds,  odors,  tastes — all  are  reduc- 
ible to  points  in  space.  But  behold  the  idea  of  a  mile  a  mile 
long,  of  a  thousand  years  just  that  long  in  time..  Ideas  of  space 
are  spatial,  the  real  reality  is  non  spatial;  ideas  of  time  are  tem- 
poral, tho  real  reality  is  timeless — and  so  on  with  all  the  rest. 
The  difficulty  has  been  all  along  that  of  squeezing  the  content  from 
the  proposition,  making  it  meaningless,  and  then  later  having  to 
beg  what  was  thrown  away,  to  account  for  qualities  by  means  of 
a  subtle  doctrine  of  correspondence. 

Let  us  behold  the  genesis  of  this  second  type  of  correspond- 
ence— that  between  the  content  of  consciousness  and  reality. 
"Now  since  the  process  of  cognition  assuredly  involves  both  a 
knower  and  a  known,  a  subject  and  an  object,  it  is  implied  that 
an  individual  mind,  witnessing  acts  of  cognition  in  order  to 
describe  the  process,  can  include  both  subject  and  object,  and  can 
watch  the  changes  in  both."*  Yet  we  are  told  repeatedly  that 
consciousness  and  objects  are  identical.  The  known  are  objects 
which  are  consciousness.  Knower  and  known,  on  the  premises 
of  whole  hearted  realism  are  identical  and  to  introduce  the  two 
to  make  a  place  for  correspondence  is  to  commit  the  idealist's 
fallacy. 

"Nothing  can  represent  a  thing  but  the  thing  itself ".f  This 
is  true  realistic  doctrine,  but  we  are  haunted  by  the  whys  of  the 
painful  discussion  of  representation  or  correspondence.  Then 
we  hear  of  symbolic  ideas  in  such  cases  as  that  of  a  blind  man's 
idea  of  color.  Let  us  recall  what  consciousness  is — the  illuminat- 
ed environment  i.  e.  the  objects.  Then  compare  such  statements 
as  this:  "Our  ideas  are  never  completely  identical  with  the  ob- 
jects,"* So  we  are  faced  with  this  difficulty  of  explaining  how 
objects  which  are  consciousness  .agree  with  themselves.  We  have- 
on  hands  the  old  idealistic  problem  of  degrees  of  reality  and 


*Ib.  p.  141. 

*Ib.  P.    87. 

tlb.  p.  142. 

*Ib.  p.    149. 


knowledge.  To  define  consciousness  as  an  object  or  as  objects 
and  then  to  ask  how  it  happens  that  objects  disagree  with  them- 
selves, and  to  assert  that  knowledge  is  never  complete  when 
knowledge  is  the  object,  is,  I  submit,  a  bit  of  polite  quibbling. 
How  a  tree  disagrees  with  itself,  or  how  it  is  incomplete,  I  am 
unable  to  say.  Then  again,  thought  follows  after  the  activity  of 
neutral  entities.  Of  course  it  is  already  in  the  neutral  mosaic — 
one  of  the  entities,  and  is  a  group  of  objects.  It  would  be  a 
spectacle  long  to  lie  remembered  to  behold  the  process  of  a 
neutral  entity  which  is  itself  active,  being  chased  in  non-temporal 
time  and  non-spatial  space,  by  another  neutral  entity  under  similar 
disabilities;  when  both  neutral  entities  are  the  same  thing. 
The  snake  -wallowing  itself  would  be  in  comparison  a  mere  side 
-how.  To  see  an  object  eternally  after  itself  in  such  a  timeless 
and  spacelc--  universe  i-  a  vision  that  rarely  comes  to  a  mortal 
man. 

It  would  be  useless  t"  enumerate  further  paradoxes  of  re- 
presentation. The  above  are  difficulties  in  perception  only.  If 
perception  pre-ents  such  anomalies  what  are  the  revelations  of 
memory  and  reflective  processes0  These  difficulties  were  touched 
upon  in  another  connection — with  the  half-hearted  realistic  con- 
ception of  mediate  knowledge — and  the  same  difficulties  are  here 
phi-  many  other-;  but  all  hinge  on  the  fatal  doctrine  of  repre- 
sentation on  the  principle  of  consciousness  as  set  forth  in  this 
type  of  realism. 

A  word  may  be  said  about  reflection  since  this  is  a  strictly 
logical  category.  Reflection  is  distinct  from  sensation  and  per- 
ception. It  is  asserted  that  the  fallacy  of  confusing  immediate 
with  reflective  consciousness  has  borne  serious  fruits  for  phil- 
osophy— a  statement  to  which  we  gladly  assent,  for  it  has  been 
the  contention  here  that  this  fallacy  committed  alike  by  realist 
and  idealist  leads  to  the  pseudo-problems  of  epistemology.  But 
;  ak  of  introspection  and  reflection — to  introduce  such  cate- 
gories on  the  theory  of  consciousness  earlier  described  is  certainly 
not  to  make  for  clearness.  What  introspects,  and  what  reflects? 
Do  objects  reflect  themselves,  do  they  perform  introspective  opera- 
tions on  themselves  to  determine  their  content  (which  is  them- 
selves) at  an  earlier  time  of  their  activity?  We  are  told  that  the 
"original  content  of  consciousness  and  later  introspective  judg- 
ments about  that  content  are  to  be  distinguished".*  I  believe  it 
has  been  shown  in  the  criticism  of  analysis  that  processes  of  judg- 


*Ih.  p.  216. 

77 


nu-nt  arc  impossible.  For  an  original  content  to  be  at  any  future 
time  different  from  itself  is  senseless.  If  it  could  be  possible- 
just  how  the  difference  could  be  stated  can  never  be  made  out, 
for  there  is  nothing  to  which  they  are  differences,  since  that  to 
which  they  are  differences  are  the  things  themselves.  Reflection 
turns  out  to  be  an  affair  of  representing  the  thing  as  a  map  re- 
presents a  country.  How  different  from  the  cross-section!  How 
different  from  the  doctrine  that  consciousness  and  objects  are 
identical!  The  old  doctrine  of  representative  knowledge,  de- 
rided and  scoffed  at  comes  to  the  rescue  in  accounting  for  the 
"empirical  properties  of  consciousness." 

The  questions  of  judgment  and  inference  need  not  be  consid- 
ered for  there  appears  to  be  no  place  in  the  system  for  them. 
Likewise  truth  and  error — considered  by  the  authors  of  the  sys- 
tem, of  course — can  be  discussed  only  on  the  assumption  that  the 
system  makes  a  place  for  them.  The  half-hearted  realist  whose 
purpose  is  the  same  as  that  of  his  more  sturdy  comrade,  namely, 
to  banish  the  act  of  knowing  from  logic,  recalls  the  empty  mind 
to  make  room  for  error.*  The  other,  with  characteristic  bold- 
ness, follows  his  premises  to  their  logical  conclusion,  and  makes 
error  objective.! 

The  findings  with  reference  to  consciousness  lead  to  thoughts 
of  its  relation  to  the  fundamentum  of  new  realism,  namely,  the 
priority  of  things.  Idealism  against  which  realism  arose  is,  as 
we  have  attempted  to  show,  founded  on  the  principle  of  the  pri- 
ority of  mind,  and  it  is  to  the  other  extreme  that  realism  swings. 
But  we  are  to  notice  that  animals 'react  to  definite  cross-sections 
and  thereby  define  a  conscious  area;  plants,  too,  have  organs  of  re- 
action analogous  to  nervous  systems  and  react  thus,  forming  a 
conscious  cross  section.  They  react  to  light,  to  intensity,  to  grav- 
ity, and  thus  these  factors  are  the  environment,  the  cross-section 
of  the  plant.  The  chasm  between  the  inorganic  and  the  organic 
has  been  bridged — so  it  is  asserted — and  inorganic  matter  reacts 
to  definite  stimuli,  as  mercury  to  heat,  hydrogen  to  oxygen  and 
stones  to  gravity.  In  short  everything  reacts  in  some  definite 
way  to  every  thing  else,  resulting  in  the  ubiquity  of  consciousness. 
We  began,  Launfal-like  (or  was  it  Quixote-like?)  in  search  for 
the  grail  of  consciousness  and  we  have  found  it  at  our  door- 
ex  cry-where.  Can  we  marvel  at  such  statements  of  critics  of 
realism  when  they  ask  "what  remains  of  the  supposed  gulf  be- 

*See   Perry,   The   Truth    Problem,    Tn'l.    Philos.   etc.      XIII,    19-20,   and   Russell, 

The    Problems    of    Philosophy,    Chs.    XII-XIII. 
tSee   Holt,    Concept   of   Consciousness,    Ch.    XIII. 

78 


t  ween  absolute  idealism  and  analytic  realism?"*  or,  "Thus  when 
the  realist  conceives  the  perceptual  occurrence  as  an  intrinsic  cast 
of  knowledge  or  of  presentation  to  a  mind  or  knower,  he  lets  the 
of  the  idealist's  camel  into  the  tent.  He  has  then  no  great 
cause  for  surprise  when  the  camel  comes  in  and  devours  the 
tent."t 

It  seems  that  there  is  no  -;ulf  between  the  two,  and  that  the 
position  maintained  in  the  early  part  of  the  chapter  to  the  effect 
that  idealism  and  realism  are  talking  ahout  the  same  tiling,  on  the 
principle  of  the  fallacy  attributed  hy  the  realist  to  the  idealist, 
that  of  "exclusive  particularity,"  has  been  justified.  That  which 
the  realist  attempts  to  discard  as  the  source  of  our  metaphysical 
is  the  whole  universe-  a  knower.  a  reaet(>r,  to  which  things 
aie  presented  and  which  are  consciousness.  If  tlu-  1,,-ic  of  (ireen 
or  I'.osanqiut  can  offer  a  more  complete  universal  consciousness 
that  .ueiierates  differences  which  are  differences  of  this  universal, 
1  am  unable  to  see  it.  for  they  speak  the  same  lanvjua.ue  as  the 
ha\e  shown  that  true  logical  processes  are  impos- 
sil)!e  on  idealistic  premises,  and  if  we  have  shown  that  idealism 
and  realism  are  complementary  undertakings,  does  it  not  follow 
that  Laical  pr  re  impossible  on  the  i>remises  of  realism  ? 

And  does  it  n..t  seem  evident  that  if  knmvin.u  "makes  no  differ- 
to  the  objects",  that  it  is  senseless  to  limit  consciousness  to 
a  "ei-ov— section"— that  it  is  universal  just  as  idealism  teaches, 
and  that  this  i>  a  realistic  statement  of  the  idealistic  problem  of 
the  relation  between  a  finite  mind  and  the  universal  conscious- 
Does  it  not  appear  evident  that  both  these  types  of  theory 
are  he.^inninv  with  the  results  of  knowing,  with  formed  material, 
and  are  attempting  to  deduce  the  nature  of  the  material  from  its 
form?  They  ha\e  both  accepted  the  results  of  approval  science- 
knowled-t  and  ha\e  ai.au /e<l  this  product,  and  thereupon  have 
attempted  to  show  that  the  processes  hy  which  the  original  res  of 
experience  is  fashioned  into  instruments  for  adequate  responses, 
are  the  ont..l..-ical  predicates  which  define  and  exhaust  a  world 
of  pure  bein-  or  of  an  absolute  experience. 

Summari/in-  briefly,  we  may  say  that  the  attempt  in  this 
chapter  has  been  made  to  show  that  idealism  and  realism  are 
speaking  the  same  language ;  and  that  if  this  is  true,  the  logical 
difficulties  of  the  one  are  those  of  the  other.  In  connection  with 


*Crcative   Intelligence,   p.    1U7,   Professor   Moore's  paper. 
tDewey.    Essays  in    Experimental   Logic,   p.   255. 

79 


difficulties  of  tin-  system  itself,  it  has  been  maintained  that  the 
method  of  the  system  can  not  i>e  employed  without  a  petitio. 
Further,  that  on  the  account  given  of  mind  or  consci<m>m  ss,  tin- 
latter  can  not  function  in  such  a  process,  even  in  a  genuine  pro- 
cess of  analysis,  an  example  of  which  was  offered ;  because 
there  are  neither  means  nor  data.  We  have  suggested  that  in 
order  to  account  for  the  empirical  properties  of  consciousness, 
that  the  very  fundamentals  of  the  system  have  been  denied.  All 
of  which  has  led  to  the  conclusion  that  in  a  neo  realistic  world  of 
neutral  entities,  among  which  either  consciousness  is,  or,  all  of 
which  are  consciousness;  that  there  is  no  place  for  logical  pro- 
cesses. 


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